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9    Cities are becoming more crowded, of-fering ever more opportunities for mo-bility, culture and education, which in turn 
require a vast range of increasingly complex and 
costly facilities. Traffic flows overlap. A relentless 
commercial show-off excites the public’s desires. 
Round-the-clock human surveillance is no longer 
possible due to the high costs, but the development 
of electronics in the capitalisation of information and 
their crossover, with the provision of tools that can 
be either preventive or dissuasive, is leading to  a 
general increase of the number of cameras watching 
over spaces dedicated to transport, public gather-
ings, and shopping centres. The prevention of tech-
nical incidents is the predominant reason for the in-
stallation of cameras, the images from which are 
both looked at directly and also, increasingly often, 
analysed using software. Preserving the integrity of 
these facilities is the second priority of these instal-
lations; misuse and intentional damage require rapid 
interventions for certain equipment, the functioning 
of which might affect thousands of people. The third 
motivation behind these installations is compen-
sating for the reduction in the human workforce re-
sponsible for operating the equipment. It is for all of 
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these reasons that our cities have become consumers 
of video surveillance images. The users of these im-
ages belong to both the private and public spheres.
But a fourth motive has become apparent, and it 
brings a political twist to the debate. Thanks to CCTV 
cameras we can stop criminals from operating in the 
streets, in public spaces. This motive is borne out of 
a negative acknowledgement concerning the effi-
ciency of the police services. Thus, increasing the 
number of cases solved would deter would-be crimi-
nals to commit a crime. This maxim for a liberal-
leaning criminology asserts the principle that if 
criminals feel certain they will be caught, then they 
will abstain from commiting a crime. Hence, the 
twofold argument used in official texts: video cam-
eras contribute to prevention and help to arrest crim-
inals. Perhaps, perhaps... But is it worth it? Studies 
do not show a clear reduction in crime: they show 
arrests in some criminal cases, justifying in-depth 
studies, but the desired mass effect has not materia-
lised. And this is a worry. To achieve at least the 
second objective, and perhaps even the first, cameras 
need to be placed throughout the entire city because 
crimes are evenly spread out in urban areas. If we 
cross this threshold by saturating public space with 
cameras, we are on a slippery road towards a society 
of mistrust, of restrictions of liberties. These  ques-
tions are being debated throughout Europe.What 
price do we want to pay for a society that holds secu-
rity as a fundamental value? A French parliamentary 
report has recently been published following a series 
of natural disasters. Its main conclusion is that per-
haps we should think about re-introducing a “cul-
ture of risk” among citizens. The triumphalism of 
technology has eliminated the notion of risk from 
the consciences of citizens. What about letting them 
know that despite the wonders of technology, they 
must continue to live in a situation of risk? Is this not 
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the same question that could be asked with regard to 
crime? There is no such thing as a safe, crimeless so-
ciety, and any methods that purport to eliminate all 
risk should be rejected by responsible citizens. The 
increasing number of cameras watching over public 
spaces infringes on our individual right to anonymity. 
Public authorities have a duty to justify this infringe-
ment. The European Convention on Human Rights 
invites us to demand such a justification. It is essen-
tial in our opinion that the methods of use of cam-
eras and images should be clarified. Such is the aim 
of the work carried out by practitioners and experts 
with the support of the Forum.
Michel Marcus
Executive Director 
European Forum for Urban Security
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Introduction
 Video surveillance on the rise
    The first decade of the 21
st century began 
under the sign of an event that will have 
marked minds and practices. The attacks 
of 11 September 2001 imposed security as a pri-
ority on the world agenda. Since then, a plethora of 
means deemed useful in the fight against terrorism, 
including video surveillance, has been deployed at 
all levels. The questions of their effectiveness, of the 
appropriateness of the instruments used and their 
impact on freedoms in relation to objectives, espe-
cially over the long term, were secondary. 
Terrorist attacks had been committed well before 
2001 but had never attained this global dimension 
brought out by the media. It is no coincidence that 
the European nation that has experienced this in the 
most regular and prolonged way—the United King-
dom—is the one that has sought most to develop all 
possible responses, in terms of prevention as much 
as resilience. 
The choice of technology for facing up to the growing 
demand for security on behalf of citizens has found 
its justification in the events of 11 September 2001, 
like those of 11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 
2005 in London. Since then, recourse to technology 
has continued to grow in all the other European 
countries.
Yet, like the impressive images presented merely a 
few hours after the London attacks showing how the 
presumed terrorists arrived on the scene of the crime, 
the 2008 declaration by the person in charge of Lon-
don’s video surveillance, describing it as a fiasco, 
went round the world. Once the emotion of the 
events had passed, it was advisable to question one-
➤
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self as to the pertinence of the use of technology in 
preventive actions, its effectiveness and also the ad-
vantages and disadvantages ensuing from its use. 
These questions are as topical in the countries that 
envisage resorting to more video surveillance, such 
as France decided in 2008, as in those that are al-
ready quite advanced in the use of this technology, 
such as the United Kingdom. For the past 25 years, 
the United Kingdom has experienced an exponential 
increase in these technologies and is now the world 
leader in the use of video surveillance. However, over 
the past few years, numerous voices have been raised 
to challenge the validity of ‘complete video surveil-
lance’ and to learn the lessons from the experience. 
The British are now carrying out thinking on their 
systems and in particular the way of using them1. 
Thus, the new Deputy-Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, 
recently announced that the government was going 
to prepare a new law for the protection of funda-
mental rights. In a press conference on 19 May 2010, 
he declared: “This government will end the culture of 
spying on its citizens. It is outrageous that decent, law-
abiding people are regularly treated as if they have got 
something to hide.…Video surveillance is going to be the 
object of custom-made laws…’’2
This questioning becomes all the more topical for 
European cities as technology is invited into the 
elaboration of local and regional security policies. 
Town councillors must both respond to their elec-
tors’ demands for security and justify the choice of 
instruments they set up, out of concern for transpar-
ency and a democratic exercise of the decision-
making process. By admitting that technology is the 
response considered most appropriate by states for 
1 National Strategy for Video Surveillance - 2008
2 Deputy Prime Minister – Speech and Q&A – 19/05/2010, London
fighting against threats such as terrorism, what 
about the local level for crime prevention? Most Eu-
ropean cities and regions are confronted with ev-
eryday crime, the effects of which are not as spectac-
ular as those of a  terrorist attack but which 
nonetheless challenge the overall well-being on a 
territory and can harm its sustainable development. 
They are therefore led to consider any instrument 
that might help them to guarantee the security of 
their citizens and cannot ignore the potential assets 
of technology.  
Although it is true that citizens give a mandate to 
elected officials to ensure their security, they also in-
vest them with their trust so that security choices not 
be made to the detriment of the respect for rights and 
liberties guaranteed by the law. This trust also pre-
supposes that the authorities assume responsibility 
for the choice and the transparent use of the instru-
ments employed for security ends.  
The right to security, the right to protection of one’s 
private life? Is there an order of priority? Does one 
prevail over the other? In theory, citizens should be 
able to enjoy both without having to choose between 
them. The two go hand in hand in a democratic so-
ciety and are guaranteed equally as much by the na-
tional legislative frameworks as by international 
texts such as the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Human Rights (1950) or the European Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000). Yet, in prac-
tice, the reconciliation of security and freedoms is far 
from being evident. Liberty is a weak right, which is 
easily relativised in face of problems of insecurity. 
Video surveillance is a technology that raises many 
questions in this sense. What can be filmed? Is there 
a right to private life in public areas? And if so, how 
to protect that right? How to avoid discriminating 
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against certain groups and how to put the advan-
tages of this surveillance tool at the disposal of the 
whole population? How to ensure that video surveil-
lance works and when to resort to other instruments? 
When is it effective in a cost-benefits ratio? How to 
protect personal data and how not to produce it 
needlessly? How to use video surveillance with citi-
zens as a crime prevention tool and guarantee of 
public peace?
Thought and exchange of experiences on video 
surveillance practices in the respect and 
protection of individual freedoms 
It was to respond to all these questions and identify 
good practices that this European project ‘Citizens, 
Cities and Video Surveillance’ came into being. This 
reflection was able to be developed thanks to the in-
volvement of ten partners, namely the cities of Le 
Havre and Saint-Herblain (France), Rotterdam 
(Netherlands), Liège (Belgium), Ibiza (Spain), Genoa, 
the Veneto and Emilia-Romagna regions (Italy), the 
police of London and Sussex (United Kingdom), as 
well as European experts. The project received finan-
cial support from the European Commission (‘Fun-
damental Rights and Citizenship’ programme). 
The project aimed at providing cities with the neces-
sary knowledge and tools for setting up an integrated 
security policy in which social realities and freedoms 
are taken into account in the same way as public 
peace.
To meet the challenges posed by video surveillance 
in terms of rights and freedoms, the partners set as a 
specific goal going more deeply into the fundamental 
question of the responsibility of the elected official 
who must find a balance between the demand for se-
curity and the strategic choices enabling him to re-
spond in a democratic manner. 
As the title of the project indicates, the citizens are at 
the heart of local policies. Therefore, it was neces-
sary to pay particular attention to taking them into 
account in the setting-up or evaluation of video sur-
veillance arrangements. In fact, insofar as these ar-
rangements are intended above all to serve the citi-
zens, the latter must be not only consulted as to their 
expectations and needs in terms of security but must 
also be fully informed as to the functioning, costs 
and benefits of these new tools. The partners there-
fore examined how to take these issues into account 
at all stages of the implementation of a video surveil-
lance project, from installation to evaluation, by way 
of functioning, and they discussed and proposed al-
ternate or complementary solutions. 
Furthermore, the ambition of this partnership of 
cities, regions, municipal and regional police was to 
formulate a Charter for the Democratic Use of Video 
Surveillance, i.e., in accordance with fundamental 
rights. The eventual objective is to implement this 
Charter and define a label that identifies the cities re-
specting its principles and recommendations.  
The underlying idea of this joint approach is also to 
establish a common language on video surveillance 
in Europe, accessible to, and comprehensible by, all. 
This is a necessary approach to ensure  transparency 
of political decision-making. 
Cities helping cities…  
The methodology of the project is based on the fun-
damental mission of the European Forum for Urban 
Security: ‘Cities helping cities’. The cities, regions and 
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police authorities hope to improve their system by 
sharing their experiences and drawing information 
from them. This exchange has been enriched and 
supplemented by contributions from experts such as 
the French Forum for Urban Security, a number of 
professors from major universities and high-ranking 
civil servants who allowed for enriching the discus-
sion and making the link between research and prac-
tices. The experiences of each partner were analysed 
according to an analytical grid. These exchanges of 
practices and know-how were given concrete expres-
sion in the form of the Charter for the Democratic Use 
of Video Surveillance. 
…to create a Charter for the Democratic Use of 
Video Surveillance in the framework of a Euro-
pean cooperation
Beginning with the project’s kick-off meeting, held 
in Paris in April 2009, the wealth of experiences and 
diversity of situations presented by the partners 
came out. Technical diversity first of all, with notable 
differences concerning the number of cameras (from 
four to 60,000!), as well as the types of camera and 
their functionality or geographical coverage. Diver-
sity, too, of political contexts: which authorities can 
decide to install cameras on the public land; which 
operators can be the managers; which persons are 
authorised to pass on information and those who 
can be the consignees; what legal framework, what 
debates on video surveillance at the national and 
local levels (see Part III of this publication). Diversity, 
too, in terms of legibility and perception of video sur-
veillance by the citizens of the project’s partner cities: 
favourable with some, distrust and reservations with 
others, which induces different levels of public de-
bate on the use of cameras and the protection of fun-
damental rights. Diversity of situations and legisla-
tions finally, which brought out the difficulty of 
reaching an agreement on the project’s field of ap-
plication: video surveillance solely on the public 
land? How to  treat semi-public lands or private 
spaces for public use? The chosen approach was to 
concentrate on the public spaces for which all the 
partners are competent without, for all that, losing 
sight of video surveillance systems on semi-public 
land, which represent a very large portion of existing 
systems and for which the project’s conclusions 
could also be a source of inspiration. 
The project’s first objective was to have an overall 
view of video surveillance practices and the mea-
sures taken for protecting the private life of citizens. 
The analytical grids of the practices of the project’s 
partners allowed for seeing how data protection was 
integrated into the different phases of the life of a 
video surveillance system, namely the analysis of 
needs, installation, management and evaluation. 
To complete this overview and to have a common 
understanding of the problem, the project partners 
benefited, as of the first work seminar, which took 
place in Le Havre 3 and 4 June 2009, from the con-
tribution of experts coming from different sectors—
legal, political/sociological, technical, philosophi-
cal—and representatives of human rights protection 
NGOs and police associations.
Experts and professionals were in agreement on the 
principal challenges of video surveillance on public 
spaces, which would be: 
➤  on the one hand, finding a way to preserve the 
social codes of intimacy on the public land in a video 
surveillance framework. This theme is developed in 
this book by Benjamin Goold. It is also present in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
20 21
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Rights in Strasbourg focussing on complaints against 
‘paparazzi’;
➤  on the other hand, finding a good balance in terms 
of the cost-benefits ratio between the price that 
people are willing to pay by giving up, to a certain 
point, their intimacy and the benefits that they ob-
tain thanks to increased security. Which means that 
decisions would be made in full awareness of 
consequences. 
➤  Breaches of respect of one’s intimacy are not per-
ceived by the citizen as being terribly important. 
However, when all is said and done, the sum of every 
little intrusion in a citizen’s private life can take on 
considerable proportions, and this trend is increased 
tenfold with every technological development. The 
protection of private life on the  public land stems 
from the political authority, and the players con-
cerned should be given a share in this approach. So it 
was necessary to take into account the protection of 
data and individual freedoms at every level of video 
surveillance use.
Secondly, the project allowed for seeing video sur-
veillance practices in detail during in-situ visits or-
ganised by three partners of the project: the city of 
Genoa (Italy), the Metropolitan Police of London and 
the police of Sussex (United Kingdom) and Lyon 
(France), an associate city in the project.
First of all, these visits allowed for obtaining detailed 
knowledge on the use of video surveillance, seeing in 
the field the way a system is run and having ex-
changes with diverse stakeholders about the prob-
lems and assets of this technology.
The study visit to London and Brighton allowed, in 
particular, for obtaining information on the English 
experience with video surveillance, integrated as an 
investigation instrument in criminology, and be-
coming aware of the debates that are current in the 
United Kingdom as to its impact on private life, 
thanks to meetings with experts employed by the 
government in the anti-terrorist fight and militants 
of NGOs like Liberty.
The visit to Genoa illustrated the reality of an Italian 
city where several video surveillance systems are in 
operation, run by different institutions. Here, the 
challenge is the sharing of information: just how far 
and under what conditions?
The visit to Lyon allowed especially for under-
standing the approach of a city that had already ac-
companied its video surveillance system with a 
charter of ethics and which had also set up a college 
of ethics in charge of overseeing the system. 
These study visits also showed how cities and re-
gions use video surveillance in different ways, in re-
lation to the objectives they are pursuing, and in 
what ways the management protocols, communica-
tion, the public cameras-private cameras ratio and 
the attitude of citizens, ranging from support to op-
position, vary. It clearly came out that the impact of 
video surveillance varies according to the nature and 
size of the areas under surveillance, the type of of-
fence and the possible combination of this tech-
nology with other prevention measures.
These visits also allowed for identifying a certain 
number of arrangements and measures put in place 
to guarantee the protection of the citizens’ private 
life, including the special parametrising of cameras, 
the training of operators on the legal framework gov-
erning data protection, the ‘proper use’ charters 
where cities agree to respect fundamental rights, and 
independent supervision systems. 
The perspective contributed by the experts, the on-
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site visits, the meetings with local professionals, and 
the analytical grids describing partners’ practices 
subsequently served as a basis for discussions for 
the two working seminars that were held in Buda-
pest, 2 and 3 December 2009, and in Bologna, 11 
and 12 March 2010. 
The Budapest seminar was first of all the occasion 
for including Central European practices in the 
project, with contributions and visits of the city of 
Budapest, the ombudsman for the protection of data 
and Hungarian NGOs, and contributions of the city 
of Brno (Czech Republic) and the Czech Ministry of 
the Interior. The seminar also illustrated the diffi-
culty of finding a common language reflecting the 
various problems across Europe, going beyond po-
litical divisions to arrive at a  common denominator 
that is not simply an a minima agreement of the part-
ners’ positions. For example, the notion of an ‘eth-
ical’ charter, well accepted in France, was not unani-
mously approved on the European level. The 
accepted solution of a charter for the ‘democratic 
use’ of video surveillance best translated the spirit of 
the project, which puts citizens at the centre of local 
policies in a concern for the democratic exercise of 
elected officials’ power of representativeness. The 
choice between the notions of ‘video protection’ or 
‘video surveillance’ was also discussed at length. 
The debates also focussed on the creation of a label 
for the implementation of the charter; this label 
would be intended for cities respecting its principles. 
Here, too, opinions were mixed: whereas some im-
mediately saw this as the logical continuation of 
work for the implementation of the charter, others 
were more doubtful as to the idea of being auditioned 
to receive this label. That said, the idea was not to 
create a label in the framework of this project but 
simply to study its feasibility. 
The Bologna seminar served to identify the charter’s 
key principles, stated at every phase of the system’s 
life. The challenge was to find independent but com-
plementary principles, which, together, would char-
acterise a democratic use of video surveillance.  
This was also the occasion for proposing an initiative 
going towards the creation of a common video sur-
veillance language across Europe: the creation of a 
common, standardised means of signalling, which 
might get a clear, complete message across to any 
citizen across Europe. Several discussions focussed 
on the indispensable information that such a means 
of signalling should include in light of what already 
exists in the cities and countries represented in the 
project. 
The definition of the seven federating principles that 
are at heart of the Charter for the Democratic Use of 
Video Surveillance, as well as explanatory comments 
accompanying them, were written by the partners 
during joint work at the final seminar, which took 
place in Paris on 9 April 2010.
The project’s final conference, hosted by the city of 
Rotterdam 27 and 28 May 2010, marked both the 
final outcome of the partners’ 18 months of work 
and the recognition of the town councillors’ respon-
sibility in the use of video surveillance. By becoming 
the Charter’s first signatories, the mayors of Rot-
terdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, and Saint-Herblain, 
Charles Gautier, also senator and president of the 
French Forum for Urban Security, thereby reaffirmed 
that town councillors are responsible before the citi-
zens for the tools they choose for implementing their 
policy, and that they also have an obligation of trans-
parency. Moreover, they both invited the other Euro-
pean cities to sign the charter. 
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This publication therefore reflects this long work, 
which enabled the project’s ten European partners to 
share the points of view of experts from various 
countries in Europe, exchange practices tested by 
the cities, discuss stakes and challenges of video 
surveillance as regards the respect of private life and, 
finally, formulate together proposals of responses. 
Part I
The challenge:  
Reconciling the use  
of CCTV and  
individual liberties
➤
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    Over the past twenty years, the use of CCTV cameras has become increasingly common throughout Europe. Although countries 
like France, Germany, Holland and Italy were initially 
slow to follow the United Kingdom’s lead, CCTV sys-
tems are now being installed in towns and cities 
across the continent, with the result that public area 
surveillance is an inescapable fact of life for a growing 
number of Europeans. Although it appears that there 
is considerable public support for the use of CCTV, 
the spread of this technology has serious implications 
for civil liberties and the relationship between citi-
zens and the state. In particular, CCTV cameras rep-
resent a substantial threat to individual privacy and 
to the exercise of rights such as freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of association. As a consequence, it 
is vital that those responsible for the management 
and operation of these systems are aware of the dan-
gers of public area surveillance, and that they work to 
ensure that CCTV does not threaten fundamental 
human rights. 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the human 
rights implications of CCTV surveillance, and aims to 
help CCTV managers and operators develop public 
area surveillance policies and practices that are con-
sistent with a commitment to the protection of indi-
vidual rights and a respect for civil liberties. 
➤
CCTV and Human Rights
Benjamin J. Goold
University of British Columbia
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Part I – The challenge: Reconciling the use of CCTV and 
individual liberties
CCTV and Human Rights
CCTV and Privacy
All of us need a degree of privacy. Without it, it would 
be impossible to maintain a sense of dignity, develop 
meaningful relationships with others, or simply find 
time to be alone with our thoughts. Privacy is crucial 
to the development of the self because it frees us from 
having to worry about being constantly watched and 
judged by those around us, and it enables us to con-
trol how and when we share information about our-
selves with others.1 It is for these reasons that most 
countries recognize at least some basic right to pri-
vacy, and limit the ability of individuals, private orga-
nizations, and the state to collect information about 
people’s personal lives, or to monitor them without 
their knowledge or consent.2
It is important to recognize that the right to privacy 
does not disappear as soon as we step outside our 
homes. Although no sensible person would expect to 
enjoy the same level of privacy in the street as they 
would in their own living room, most of us do expect 
to enjoy a certain degree of privacy and anonymity as 
we go about our business in public. Indeed, one of 
the great joys of living in cities is the ability to lose 
oneself in the crowd, and to be free of the demands of 
1 For an overview of the different theories of privacy, see: Solove, D.J. 
(2002), “Conceptualizing Privacy”, California Law Review 90: 
1087-1155; Solove, D.J. (2009) Understanding Privacy (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass.); and Nissenbaum, H. (2010), 
Privacy in Context (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California)..
2 One of the clearest assertions of the right can be found in Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.”
3  See: Goold, B.J. (2002), “Privacy Rights and Public Spaces: CCTV 
and the Problem of the ‘Unobservable Observer’”, Criminal Justice Ethics 
21(1) Winter/Spring; and Goold, B.J. (2008) “The Difference between 
Lonely Old Ladies and CCTV Cameras: A Response to Jesper Ryberg”, 
Res Publica (March).
our families, friends, and colleagues. In part, it is this 
promise of anonymity and the freedom that goes with 
it that attracts many people to town and city streets. 
Equally, although few would expect to meet a friend 
at a restaurant or a coffee shop and be entirely free 
from scrutiny, there are strong social conventions 
that help us to enjoy a reasonable level of privacy in 
such circumstances. While nowhere near as exten-
sive as in such obviously private spaces as the home 
or car, it is clear that we do have a right to some pri-
vacy in public.3
By its very nature, public area CCTV undermines this 
right. By exposing us to scrutiny every time we walk 
down the street, cameras strip us of the possibility of 
anonymity and make us visible to the watchful eye of 
the state. While we obviously surrender a great deal of 
privacy every time we go out in public, it is still no de-
fense for users of CCTV to point out that other mem-
bers of the public are also watching us. Being watched 
– and possibly recorded – by a camera is different from 
being looked at by a stranger. The former type of ob-
servation is typically longer, more intense, and inti-
mately connected with the power of the state. Because 
we cannot see or question the person behind the 
camera, it is hard for us to know how to respond to 
being watched, or to decide what we should do about 
it. Because we cannot know whether the images cap-
tured by the cameras will be kept or who might have 
access to them, we cannot be sure that they will not be 
misinterpreted or used in objectionable ways. As phi-
losopher and criminologist Andrew von Hirsch has 
observed, being watched by CCTV “is like conducting 
one’s activities in a space with a one-way mirror; while 
one may know that someone is watching behind the 
mirror, one does not necessarily know who they are or 
what they are looking for.”4
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Aside from the obvious intrusion, it is this uncer-
tainty that poses one of the greatest threats to our 
experience of privacy in public. Faced with the pros-
pect of constant video surveillance, it is reasonable to 
expect that some members of the public will feel the 
loss of privacy keenly and change how they behave; 
not because they believe they are doing anything 
wrong, but because they don’t want to be the subject 
of police attention or risk having their actions misin-
terpreted. This is likely to be especially true for young 
people and certain minorities, who may already feel 
unfairly targeted by the police and local governments. 
As Giovanni Buttarelli, the Assistant European Data 
Protection Supervisor has argued: 
“Being watched changes the way we behave. Indeed, 
when watched, many of us might censor our speech and 
our behaviour. This is certainly the case with widespread 
or continuous surveillance. Knowing that every move 
and gesture is monitored by a camera may have a psy-
chological impact and change behaviours. This consti-
tutes an interference with our privacy.”5
How should operators and managers of CCTV sys-
tems seek to ensure that the use of public area sur-
veillance does not fundamentally undermine the right 
to privacy or negatively change the way in which 
people enjoy public spaces? First and foremost, it is 
essential for such systems to be operated in accor-
4 von Hirsch, A. (2000), “The Ethics of Public Television Surveil-
lance” in von Hirsch, A., Garland, D. and Wakefield, A. (eds.) Ethical 
and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (Hart Publishing: 
Oxford)
5 “Legal Restrictions – Surveillance and Fundamental Rights”, Speech 
delivered by the Assistant European Data Protection Supervisor 
Giovanni Buttarelli at the Palace of Justice, Vienna, June 19th 2009 
(availableat: www edps.europa.eu/.../site/.../09-06-19_Vienna_ 
surveillance_EN.pdf)
dance with local and national laws, and every effort 
must be made to prevent abuse of the cameras and 
breaches in system security. Secondly, the cameras 
should only be used for those purposes originally 
identified when the decision to install them was 
taken: gradual “function creep” must be avoided. Fi-
nally, systems must be open and transparent, and 
those responsible for running them directly account-
able to the public. Although the installation of sur-
veillance cameras in public places will inevitably have 
a negative effect on individual privacy, by ensuring 
that the above steps are taken CCTV operators and 
managers can help to minimize the loss of privacy 
and ensure surveillance is both lawful and 
appropriate. 
CCTV, Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of 
Association
Although it is clear that CCTV cameras have serious 
implications for privacy, the use of public area sur-
veillance technologies by the police and local govern-
ments can also undermine other fundamental human 
rights. In particular, CCTV surveillance has the po-
tential to discourage people from exercising their 
rights to freedom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation in public places. Both of these rights are es-
sential to the idea of democratic self-government, 
and must be protected in order to ensure that indi-
viduals are free to organize themselves politically, 
criticize the decisions of their elected representatives, 
and hold their government to account. If citizens 
know that they may be captured on video every time 
they attend a public rally or take part in a protest 
march, then there is a very real danger that the pres-
ence of CCTV cameras could have a substantial 
chilling effect on these rights, eventually leading to a 
reduction in political freedom and democratic partici-
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pation.6 This is a point that was recently acknowl-
edged by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
in a privacy impact assessment of a CCTV system op-
erated by U.S. Immigration and Customs: 
“Cameras may give the government records of what in-
dividuals say, do, and read in the public arena, for ex-
ample documenting the individuals at a particular rally 
or the associations between individuals. This may chill 
constitutionally protected expression and association.”7
Given the potential threat to freedom of expression 
and association, it is important that CCTV is only 
used to prevent crime and promote public safety, and 
never for the purpose of gathering information about 
the political views or activities of citizens. Where, for 
example, the police plan to use CCTV to monitor a 
protest march in their efforts to maintain order or 
prevent violence, they must be careful not to retain 
any images of individuals unless they are to be used 
as evidence in a criminal investigation. Similarly, 
where images of a person are recorded with a view to 
prosecuting him or her for a criminal offence, these 
images should not be subsequently passed on to se-
6 As Keith Boone has argued, privacy is “vital to a democratic society 
[because] it underwrites the freedom to vote, to hold political 
discussions, and to associate freely away from the glare of the public 
eye and without fear of reprisal.” As a consequence, where surveillance 
threatens privacy it also threatens political freedom. See Boone, C. K.
 
7  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for 
the Livewave CCTV System (September 17, 2009). This point has also 
been made by Buttarelli, who notes that: “CCTV may discourage 
legitimate behaviour such as political protests supporting unpopular 
causes. Participants traditionally had the right to anonymously 
participate in a peaceful assembly, free of risk of identification and 
repercussions. This is fundamentally changing.” See: “Legal 
Restrictions – Surveillance and Fundamental Rights”, Speech delivered 
by the Assistant European Data Protection Supervisor Giovanni 
Buttarelli at the Palace of Justice, Vienna, June 19th 2009, p. 8.
curity services or other law enforcement agencies un-
less there is a compelling reason to do so.
In addition to these restrictions, the police and other 
users of public area CCTV must ensure that the public 
are fully informed about the purposes, operation, and 
regulation of the systems. If the chilling effects of 
surveillance are to be avoided, it is not enough to re-
strict the use of CCTV and adopt robust privacy pro-
tections. The public must also be able to trust that 
the systems will not be abused, and that over time 
they will not be used for political purposes. This is 
especially important in countries that have only re-
cently made the transition to democracy, and where 
memories of political repression are likely to be rela-
tively fresh. Trust in the police and government is 
hard won and easily lost, and it is not difficult to see 
how the misuse of CCTV for political or some other 
illegitimate purpose could seriously undermine that 
trust.
Reconciling Safety, Security, and Rights
“There are indeed circumstances when it is legitimate 
and necessary to sacrifice privacy and other fundamental 
rights to a certain degree, in the interest of security. Our 
society must be able to defend itself in the best way 
against threats. However, the burden of proof must al-
ways be on those who claim that such sacrifices are nec-
essary and the proposed measures are all effective in-
struments to protect society.” 
Giovanni Buttarelli, Assistant European Data 
Protection Supervisor, Vienna, June 2009 8
One of the most difficult questions society faces is 
how best to reconcile the public’s demand for safety 
and security with the need to respect and protect in-
dividual rights. Although CCTV cameras in public 
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places like streets and city centers can play a major 
role in reducing crime and disorder, they can also 
constitute a serious threat to individual and political 
rights. As a consequence, it is vital that the police and 
other users of CCTV keep the following in mind when 
engaging in any form of public area surveillance:
➤ CCTV surveillance inevitably infringes an individu-
al’s right to privacy
As a consequence, it is for the police and local gov-
ernments to ensure that they can provide a convincing 
and lawful justification for the use of cameras in 
public spaces, and that they develop systems of con-
trol and accountability that seek to minimize the 
negative effects of surveillance on individual privacy
➤  CCTV surveillance poses a significant threat to the 
exercise of political freedom
Because state-sponsored surveillance of public 
spaces and events has the potential to seriously un-
dermine the ability and willingness of individuals to 
exercise their rights to freedom of expression and as-
sociation, CCTV must never be used for the purpose 
of collecting information about the political activities 
or affiliations of citizens. Users of CCTV must be able 
to guarantee that cameras will not be used for polit-
ical purposes, or to discourage public assemblies or 
protests.
➤  The public must be able to trust the users of CCTV to 
respect their rights
Perhaps most important of all, the public must be 
able to trust users of CCTV to respect their rights, and 
8  “Legal Restrictions – Surveillance and Fundamental Rights”, Speech 
delivered by the Assistant European Data Protection Supervisor 
Giovanni Buttarelli at the Palace of Justice, Vienna, June 19th 2009, 
p.4 (available at: www.edps.europa.eu/.../site/.../09-06-19_Vienna_ 
surveillance_EN.pdf). 
for that trust to be justified. Even if CCTV is not being 
misused, if the public believe that their rights are 
being infringed then the presence of cameras may 
still undermine trust and confidence in the police and 
government. It is not enough for the users of CCTV to 
respect the individual rights; the public must believe 
that they are committed to protecting privacy and re-
specting rights to freedom of expression and 
association. 
Operating public area CCTV systems necessarily re-
quires the police and other public bodies to confront 
one of the most fundamental tensions in modern 
democratic societies: the competition between the 
demand for security and our shared commitment to 
the protection of individual rights. If they are to suc-
cessfully reconcile these two objectives, then the po-
lice and others must first begin by acknowledging 
that it is the state to justify why it should be allowed 
to watch its citizens, and not for citizens to have to 
explain why they shouldn’t be watched. As soon as 
this fundamental truth is forgotten, it is only a matter 
of time before surveillance begins to place rights in 
jeopardy.  
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    The deployment of close circuit television (CCTV) surveillance in the UK provides an invaluable learning opportunity for other 
societies. Even this claim might be a too controver-
sial starting point for some. As Professor Marianne 
L. Gras has argued in her 2004 paper, The Legal Reg-
ulation of CCTV in Europe, while the UK may have led 
Europe in terms of the scale of its CCTV investment, 
other commentators are not so convinced that the 
UK’s mechanisms of legal and political oversight 
have kept pace or that the UK model is one to be fol-
lowed anyway. 
For the past twenty years, the British government 
has been a world leader in CCTV investment. In the 
bold words of the UK Home Office, “In many ways, 
we have led the world from its early introduction in 
the 1970s to the massive growth in CCTV installa-
tion and use in the 1990s.” Between 1999 and 2003 
alone, a total of £170 million (roughly €200 million 
as of 2010) CCTV funding was made available to 
local authorities following a competitive bidding 
process. This led to over 680 CCTV schemes being 
installed in town centres and other public spaces 
throughout Great Britain.
Perhaps understandably, with the rapid rolling out of 
a relatively untried technology, many mistakes were 
made; lessons were often learned only slowly, and 
sometimes the hard way, about what CCTV could 
and could not achieve. Associate Professor at the 
Faculty of Law of the University of British Columbia, 
and formerly a lecturer at Oxford, Benjamin Goold 
went so far as to note in 2004 that, although the 
➤
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Government was prepared to fund the development 
of new CCTV systems in many British cities, “it ap-
parently has no great interest in seeing whether they 
actually work”. Accordingly, CCTV grew very fast in 
the UK context, rather faster than was justified by 
any evidence of its impact or effectiveness for CCTV 
appeared to have only a negligible effect on crime 
rates in the areas where it had been deployed. Yet, a 
wholly unrealistic expectation prevailed, sustained 
in part by an unholy alliance of enthusiastic police 
entrepreneurs, security industry marketing agents 
and fearful citizens, that CCTV could solve many of 
our public area crime and disorder problems. 
As a Home Office evaluation from 2005 concluded: 
“[CCTV] was oversold – by successive governments – as 
the answer to crime problems. Few seeking a share of 
the available funding saw it as necessary to demonstrate 
CCTV’s effectiveness… Yet it was rarely obvious why 
CCTV was the best response to crime in particular 
circumstances”. 
As other countries increase their levels of CCTV in-
vestment, the UK experience can provide useful les-
sons, significantly improving the process of policy 
transfer, avoiding mistakes, developing better prac-
tice, clarifying issues, and even saving money. It can 
also make a reality of the promise of “evidence-led” 
policy development. In an area of policy-making that 
goes to the heart of questions of state power and se-
curity versus citizen privacy and individual rights, 
the issues surrounding the management, governance 
and oversight of CCTV systems in the UK can pro-
vide a useful basis upon which other societies can 
plan their own. As the European Forum for Urban 
Security moves towards the development of a Eu-
rope-wide code of practice and ethics for CCTV, the 
British experience can provide a salutary lesson. In a 
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wider sense, it also bears out an uncomfortable truth 
of the politics of law and order:. As David Garland 
pointed out in his 2001 book The culture of control, 
“Crime control strategies … are not adopted because 
they are known to solve problems.”
Policies and strategies are often adopted because 
they are politically expedient, popular, cheap, con-
sistent with existing priorities or favoured by domi-
nant interests. As Stephen Savage (Professor of 
Criminology and Director of the Institute of Criminal 
Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth) has noted, 
much of the law and order politics of the 1990s were 
fundamentally driven by politics and ideology rather 
than research. It is as plausible to argue that the var-
ious “CCTV challenge” funding competitions or-
ganised by the Home Office since the 1990s – and 
the form that these took, matched funding-bids 
based upon public/private partnerships - were as 
much about kick-starting local crime prevention 
partnerships as they were about funding CCTV itself. 
It is arguable that the CCTV industry in the UK was a 
spectacular beneficiary of a unique combination of 
circumstances and its own slick publicity. We might 
proceed rather differently a second time around.
At a time when the perceived threats posed by crime, 
violence, disorder and terrorism are generating new 
demands for security and when the security indus-
tries themselves are sensing lucrative new markets, 
the research community should do two things: 
- to ensure that the measures of crime prevention 
adopted actually deliver the crime reduction benefits 
promised, 
- to ensure that these measures avoid becoming ex-
pensive ways of intensifying an already tense and 
often dysfunctional law and order politics, for in-
stance by augmenting the powers of the police vis à 
vis the rights of citizens; reinforcing problematic so-
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cial boundaries between supposed “innocent citi-
zens” and “others”; demonizing youth and other 
“visible” public groups; subsidising the security of 
the affluent and redistributing (displacing) crime 
risks onto the already vulnerable, and facilitating the 
emergence of more risk averse and ultimately less 
accountable public order.
French author and social commentator Loic Wac-
quant has catalogued such developments in the USA 
over the past decade and cautions against Europeans 
following suit, trying to tackle crime and disorder 
problems by criminal justice and security measures 
alone. He notes, “Any policy claiming to treat even vi-
olent crime solely with the criminal justice apparatus 
is condemning itself to programmed inefficiency… 
aggravating the disease it is supposed to cure.” 
Accordingly, the adoption of CCTV in the UK, while 
resembling a search for the “magic bullet” cure-all, 
accompanied by a populist, but ill-informed, wave of 
public support, does not represent a path one would 
recommend that any other countries should neces-
sarily or blindly follow.  This is not because the tech-
nology has simply not delivered the promised bene-
fits (many of these were exaggerated, unrealistic and 
unreasonable anyway), but rather because the adop-
tion of CCTV begs many other questions about law 
enforcement and the practice of policing, all of which 
require serious consideration if this technology is to 
be effectively integrated into the criminal justice and 
security infrastructures. 
Outside of the UK, citizens and political authorities 
may answer such questions in quite different ways 
and they may want CCTV cameras to help solve other 
problems. This, in a sense, is the very first point. We 
should ask not: what can CCTV cameras do for us? 
But rather, what problems do we want to tackle and 
how might CCTV surveillance help?  
Policing perspectives
By 2007, while acknowledging that there was still a 
“debate” over “how effective CCTV is in reducing 
and preventing crime”, the UK Home Office and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were suf-
ficiently forthright to acknowledge that while CCTV 
has made a contribution to “protecting the public 
and assisting the police”, this had occurred “despite 
CCTV systems being developed in a piecemeal 
fashion with little strategic direction, control or reg-
ulation [and] this approach has failed to maximise 
the potential of our CCTV infrastructure.” This “lack 
of a coordinated approach to CCTV development,” 
the report continued, “poses significant risks in 
terms of compatibility of systems, cost of accessing 
the images and the potential loss of operational 
effectiveness.” 
Yet, as we have noted, beyond these essentially op-
erational issues of utility, impact  and effectiveness 
lie many further questions pertaining to democracy, 
rights, citizenship, oversight, accountability and re-
dress, all of which have a bearing upon public trust 
and confidence in policing. Societies developing 
their own CCTV surveillance systems need to con-
sider these matters too, not just the technical 
questions.  
Whereas the police were now willing to acknowl-
edge criticisms that the academic, research and 
evaluation community had been making for nearly 
a decade or more, the response has not entailed any 
unpacking of the complex CCTV systems currently 
in place. Rather, a “national strategy” has been ad-
vanced to address the failings of the hitherto “hap-
hazard and incremental” CCTV expansion of recent 
years. Of course this would not be the first time that 
criminal justice policy-makers have called for “more 
and better” of something to tackle the perceived 
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failings of an earlier, seemingly insufficient, dose of 
the same solution. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the British Security Industry 
Association was having none of it, their spokes-
person noting that, while CCTV growth may have 
been piecemeal, the real faults lay with police forces 
which had not maximised the potential of their own 
systems. It seems that, as in other areas of criminal 
justice, a troubling circularity of thought prevails. 
Whatever problems are associated with CCTV, more 
CCTV is the solution, both our police and our secu-
rity industry seem to agree on this simple fact. The 
real issue, however, and this is the lesson for other 
societies, is to try to think outside this particular box 
– or even beyond the camera.  
More recently, enthusiastic support has been voiced 
for CCTV from another policing source. In his con-
troversial memoir, The Terrorist Hunters, former As-
sistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
Andy Hayman, wrote of the significant contribution 
that he believed surveillance technologies were 
making to contemporary policing: “Despite the con-
cerns of civil liberties groups, the surveillance society 
of CCTV cameras, listening devices and databases 
recording our e-mail and phone activity, our criminal 
and car records, and anything else we care to think 
of, is paying off big time when it comes to catching 
criminals and terrorists.”
That brief comment, the points it makes explicit and 
those it doesn’t, connects with so many of the issues 
which run to the heart of many questions about the 
role of CCTV in effective public safety management. 
In the first place Hayman presents the contribution 
of surveillance technologies “despite the concerns of 
civil liberties groups” as if there is always an inherent 
contradiction between policing and freedom. It is not 
necessarily so, although this debate takes us back to 
the first establishment of uniformed policing in 
London. As Robert Peel, founder of the Metropolitan 
Police in 1829, remarked, “Liberty does not consist 
in having your house robbed by organised gangs of 
thieves, and in leaving the principal streets of London 
in the nightly possession of drunken women and 
vagabonds. Properly established, appropriately man-
aged and effectively monitored, surveillance can en-
hance safety, security and freedom.”
Yet Hayman also refers to surveillance technologies 
other than CCTV, making the point that this whole 
area of policing and security management has 
changed rapidly during recent years such that the so-
cial implications, the law and principles of gover-
nance have not always kept pace with the techno-
logical potential. Yet, a kind of “mission drift” can 
occur where technologies are used in ways that were 
never intended, resulting in costly and inappropriate 
investment and supposed solutions (“technological 
fixes”) that are ineffective, leading to scepticism and 
disillusion when the system does not deliver the an-
ticipated results. 
Some of these problems have certainly been true of 
CCTV use in the UK, for example they also arose in 
the investigation of the 2005 London suicide bomb-
ings “in relation to the lack of [system] integration, 
the quality of images and the difficulties associated 
in retrieving digitally recorded footage,” as ACPO has 
acknowledged. Furthermore, at least one study has 
concluded that improved street-lighting could have a 
more significant preventive impact on crimes re-
corded than CCTV (Farrington and Welsh, 2002) – 
and street-lighting was much cheaper.
In a related fashion, Hayman talks of the use of sur-
veillance technologies for “catching criminals and 
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terrorists” and yet the widespread adoption of public 
area CCTV surveillance systems in the UK was based 
upon the cameras’ crime prevention potential. 
CCTV, operating within the paradigm of situational 
crime prevention would, it was assumed, deter of-
fenders by making them visible and identifiable and 
by bringing the principle of “guardianship” from 
routine activity theory to otherwise relatively un-
guarded areas.  
  
Both approaches suggested some connection be-
tween surveillance and rational choice, that the fact 
of being observed and caught on film would influ-
ence behaviour and deter offenders from offending. 
In practice, however, CCTV proved to have relatively 
little impact on some types of offences, for example 
inter-personal violence (perhaps due to the influence 
of alcohol). In fact, of virtually all of the evaluation 
schemes established to monitor the effectiveness of 
surveillance cameras on town centre crime, few 
looked any further than to assess the impact of CCTV 
on recorded crime trends. Very few studies followed 
through to explore CCTV in relation to incident man-
agement, evidence development, case preparation 
and prosecution, even as police officers themselves 
were realising that it was here that some of the major 
benefits of CCTV might be found.  
A final issue relating to Hayman’s observation con-
cerns what we might call the “police point of view”. 
CCTV’s most enthusiastic supporters are often the 
police themselves, and when presented with a new 
crime control technology, they may be keen to try it 
out. However, the police are not necessarily the best 
equipped to undertake the problem analysis, and for 
a long time, CCTV has been likened in the UK to “a 
cure looking for an illness”. Commentators may have 
had a strong intuitive sense that CCTV would – in-
deed should - influence crime levels, but there was 
little available evidence of its effectiveness. 
Some commentators have been sceptical arguing that 
police managers might adopt CCTV to allow them to 
save resources by reducing police patrol levels in cer-
tain areas. At other times the lobbying and marketing 
of CCTV by security industry representatives has been 
called into question. Thus, marketing by vested inter-
ests may have generated unrealistic expectations 
about what security cameras could achieve. 
Facing two such sets of potentially vested interests, 
the case for an independent evaluation of CCTV 
schemes might seem incontrovertible. However, the 
limits of the early CCTV evaluations were often re-
stricted to simple questions of crime reduction im-
pact. The potentially much wider role that CCTV 
technologies might play across a wide range of po-
licing activities was rather overlooked: a case of re-
stricted vision, perhaps.  When future CCTV systems 
are considered or when systems are to be modernised 
and developed these issues need appropriate consid-
eration – systems may need to be fit for a variety of 
purposes as the Home Office and ACPO have 
acknowledged. 
There are further complaints, emanating from the 
ACPO CCTV survey team itself, that “the quality of 
images recorded by CCTV systems varies consider-
ably”, whilst anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
“over 80% of the CCTV footage supplied to the po-
lice is far from ideal, especially if it is being used for 
primary identification” purposes.
Finally, the case for civilian oversight, public ac-
countability, and independent monitoring is as im-
portant in relation to CCTV as in other areas of con-
temporary policing. Not only is this important in 
terms of the public understanding of the purpose of 
CCTV but it also helps establish its acceptability, and 
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while enhancing public trust and confidence, can 
improve the effectiveness of policing systems. This is 
an area often overlooked, even in the recent UK 
Home Office CCTV strategy document. While the 
document considers the necessity for inter-agency 
collaboration, the importance of local stakeholders 
and partners, and the need for effective governance 
and oversight of CCTV planning, it is rather silent 
about the systems of local accountability to which 
such surveillance systems might be subject.   
Reference is made to national processes of inspec-
tion and oversight such as the UK Information Com-
missioner and the Surveillance Commissioner but 
local arrangements are overlooked, even though 
there are many good examples or templates to draw 
upon. Conversely, this may be an area in which dif-
ferent political cultures or contrasting policing tradi-
tions suggest alternative solutions. After all, the 
point here is not to impose “one size fits all” solu-
tions across diverse European cultures, but rather to 
raise issues that experience has shown are important 
when CCTV surveillance is considered. 
As Gras has argued, a number of other cultures, 
amongst them Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, might lay claim to rather more stringent 
regulatory regimes than the UK. For her part, 
speaking at the Efus Zaragoza conference Riches, 
has pointed out that in the UK, CCTV was developed 
in a largely pragmatic fashion with little thought 
given to the monitoring and accountability issues 
until systems were already up and running.
Drawing conclusions
Problem analysis and Implementation
Taking these issues together we can draw some im-
portant lessons from the best available UK experi-
ences of CCTV installation and use. First of all it is 
worth noting the somewhat surprising conclusion 
drawn by Martin Gill and Angela Spriggs in their 
2005 evaluation for the UK Home Office:
 “It would be easy to conclude …  that CCTV is not 
effective: the majority of the schemes evaluated did 
not reduce crime and even where there was a reduc-
tion this was mostly not due to CCTV; nor did CCTV 
schemes make people feel safer, much less change 
their behaviour.”
With such a conclusion, the main surprise might be 
why CCTV systems ever took off in the UK to the ex-
tent that they did. Apart from the political issues, we 
also must consider other questions related to the 
implementation of CCTV, and which security man-
agers and police, in particular, have often been slow 
to acknowledge and act upon. As Gill and Spriggs 
noted, suggesting that CCTV is a failure is just as 
misleading as the security industry’s over ambitious 
claims for CCTV’s success.  
To take a more nuanced and evidence-led view, we 
need to bear in mind a number of issues, and con-
sider a number of factors.  
Crime rates or criminal incidents alone are not nec-
essarily a good indicator of crime and disorder prob-
lems, or of public fears and concerns in an area, or of 
the quality and experience people have of their com-
munity safety. Policing and crime prevention initia-
tives have to take this complexity into account.  
The complex and varied roles and purposes of a 
CCTV system: intelligence development, evidence 
gathering, incident management, and order mainte-
nance all need to be acknowledged. Situational crime 
reduction, via prevention or deterrence, is not the 
only outcome. Clarity about a variety of purposes is 
essential.  As the Home Office noted in its 2003 eval-
uation of CCTV projects implementation:  “When 
considering which type of crime prevention mecha-
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nism to use, it is important to be clear about the 
problems in the area and specific about the capabili-
ties of a CCTV system to address them. If the two do 
not correspond, CCTV is not the right solution.”   
Finally, CCTV systems have to be integrated with ex-
isting policing and crime management initiatives. 
This might mean that other policing processes might 
have to change. It was quite unrealistic to imagine 
that CCTV systems could have a sustained impact on 
their own. In a similar fashion, policing priorities 
had to be determined by reference to the problems 
requiring solution not driven by any a priori assump-
tions about the need for surveillance cameras. 
By 1999, the Home Office guidance for CCTV devel-
opment partnerships was insisting that any applica-
tion for funding had to set out “the criteria for identi-
fying a relevant crime prevention mechanism”. This 
is to say that CCTV proposals had to be supported by 
evidence of “theoretically sound crime reduction 
principles which suggest plausible causal mecha-
nisms by which [the CCTV system] could work 
against the current crime or disorder problem in the 
current context.” 
However, Gill and Spriggs went on to note in their 
final report that even where CCTV projects had dis-
cernible objectives which “had to be stated in tender 
documents”, these “often did not drive the scheme… 
and were rarely embedded in day-to-day practice”. 
So even when funding applications did contain evi-
dence and problem analysis, these were often over-
looked as soon as the funding was achieved.
Crime reduction and community safety 
impacts
When it claimed that “there is an ongoing debate 
over how effective CCTV is in reducing and pre-
venting crime”, the 2007 Home Office National CCTV 
Strategy document sought, perhaps understandably, 
to keep that very debate alive. In fact, the accumu-
lated evidence from research and evaluation, a com-
bination of rather mixed, unimpressive and other-
wise disappointing or unreliable results, provides 
the more compelling story.
Many local CCTV evaluations were carried out in the 
UK on the back of the various waves of CCTV instal-
lation although these were not always very method-
ologically rigorous and often confined to impact as-
sessments. Many were also rather too short term to 
provide any reliable evidence of sustained influence 
on crime trends and patterns. That said, a number of 
larger and/or comparative projects began to emerge 
later, as did a growing picture of evaluation 
experience. 
In 2002, Brandon Welsh and David Farrington  un-
dertook for the Home Office Research Study a survey 
of 46 CCTV evaluation projects worldwide. 
The results were rather mixed, half of the eligible 
studies “found a desirable effect on crime” although 
five found an “undesirable” impact, and five more 
found no significant impact. The CCTV schemes in 
the UK generally showed a greater range of impacts 
than those in North America. Furthermore, CCTV 
“had no effect on violent crimes but … a significant 
desirable effect on vehicle crimes”, and on crimes in 
car parks. Finally, “In the city centre and public 
housing setting, there was evidence that CCTV led to 
a negligible reduction in crime of about two per cent 
in experimental areas compared with control areas.” 
Noting that “surveillance studies” was still a rela-
tively new area, the authors went on to suggest that 
there needed to be further research on both the op-
timal conditions for securing CCTV effectiveness and 
the mechanisms by which positive results are ob-
Evaluating CCTV: Lessons from a Surveillance CulturePart I – The challenge: Reconciling the use of CCTV and 
individual liberties
50 51
tained. It seemed fairly clear that an appropriate 
package of interventions was necessary for the best 
results. They concluded rather optimistically that 
“CCTV reduces crime to a small degree”. They ad-
vised that “future CCTV schemes should be carefully 
implemented in different settings, and should em-
ploy high quality evaluation designs with long fol-
low-up periods. In the end, an evidence-based ap-
proach to crime prevention which uses the highest 
level of science available offers the strongest formula 
for building a safer society.” 
Such conclusions about CCTV surveillance impacts 
have been confirmed in many other similar studies 
especially the large national study by Gill and 
Spriggs, in 2005. These authors also concluded that 
CCTV appeared to have limited crime reduction ef-
fects in town centres and residential areas but ap-
peared to work best in relatively contained and con-
trolled access locations (hospitals, car parks, 
shopping malls). CCTV had poor results on impul-
sive violence and alcohol-related offending, but 
better results on more premeditated crimes. 
As in other studies, they also noted “halo effects”, in 
other words crime reduction in adjacent areas, and 
crime displacement. The technical attributes of par-
ticular systems appeared to have either marginally 
positive or negative influences on the effectiveness of 
particular systems but these were of relatively little 
overall significance. 
Finally, surveys of members of the public in all the 
CCTV scheme areas found very little evidence of sig-
nificant changes in either behaviour or levels of fear 
or concern about crime.
Gill and Spriggs concluded: “Assessed on the evi-
dence presented in this report, CCTV cannot be 
deemed a success. It has cost a lot of money and it 
has not produced the anticipated benefits.” However, 
they noted, lessons are being learned and the tech-
nology is improving rapidly with new “event-led”, 
proactive, “intelligent” behaviour recognition and 
biometric systems presenting new safety manage-
ment opportunities - whilst also bringing new threats 
and challenges. 
Above all, their “evidence based” conclusion repre-
sents a warning against an all too tempting search 
for technical solutions. CCTV is but a tool, and where 
it was perceived to have failed this was often because 
the expectations were too ambitious or because it 
was being used in unsuitable places for the inappro-
priate problems. In those cases, CCTV may have 
been poorly planned or badly implemented, or per-
haps not effectively integrated into other community 
safety strategies and policing systems. 
As Kevin Haggarty, a Canadian criminologist writing 
on surveillance, has noted, perhaps one beguiling 
myth we need to question is the unproblematic as-
sumption that there are “surveillance solutions” for 
social problems. What the Home Office referred to in 
2007 as “the search … for the panacea of CCTV” may 
be a futile one. Such “solutions” will undoubtedly 
generate still further problems and dilemmas.  
Issues here might include the question of who bene-
fits most from the umbrella of protective surveillance: 
in the UK town centres, high value retail areas were 
the first major beneficiaries, as opposed to residential 
areas, children’s playgrounds or schools. These were 
not necessarily the most obvious community safety 
priorities or the most needy areas, but the nature of 
the funding arrangements in the early schemes meant 
that occupiers of these areas could most readily afford 
the matched funding investment costs. 
Another issue of inequality arises: at whom are the 
cameras mostly directed, who is most frequently 
under surveillance? There are profound social and 
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ethical questions associated with surveillance 
processes.
These ethical questions stretch to the definition of 
the crime and security problems that we are seeking 
to solve and into the design, monitoring and integra-
tion of the systems developed. They also involve the 
processes for oversight, monitoring, evaluation, ac-
countability and redress that need to be part of effec-
tive community safety strategies. If these issues are 
not considered at every stage, problems will likely 
emerge that will diminish the effectiveness of the 
system itself. However technically sophisticated a 
system is, it will only be as effective as those who op-
erate it, and it will only enhance community safety if 
it meets the needs and reassures the citizens it is in-
tended to serve.
As Gill and Spriggs have said:
“Too much must not be expected of CCTV. It is more 
than just a technical solution; it requires human inter-
vention to work to maximum efficiency and the prob-
lems it helps deal with are complex. [It can] help reduce 
crime and boost the public’s feeling of safety, and it can 
generate other benefits. For these to be achieved though, 
there needs to be greater recognition that reducing and 
preventing crime is not easy, and that ill-conceived so-
lutions are unlikely to work no matter what the 
investment.”
NOTE: this is an edited version of Professor Squires’ paper. 
The complete version is available online from the following re-
search page: 
h t tp ://www.br ighton.ac .uk/sass/contac t/deta i l s .
php?uid=pas1       
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    I defend the idea of Privacy by Design for CCTV applications in policing and in the security domain as a way to overcome 
deep ideological, political and philosophical contro-
versies concerning the nature and importance of pri-
vacy. Privacy by design is rapidly becoming more 
prominent in data protection policy and software en-
gineering. The EU is promoting the idea as a new 
standard in The EDPS Video surveillance guidelines 
(Brussels, March 17 2010: p. 10):
“Data protection and privacy safeguards should be built 
into the design specifications of the technology that the 
institutions use as well as into their organisational 
practices”. 
I believe this is the preferred approach, but in order 
to make this idea succeed, two conditions need to be 
fulfilled:
1 - we need to realise that Privacy by Design or Pri-
vacy Enhancing applications are part of a more global 
approach to technological innovation, which is 
sometimes referred to as Value Sensitive Design or 
Design for Values. This approach requires a specific 
methodology in order to avoid improvisations in 
software engineering that might increase the risk of 
lack of transparency and accountability; 
2 - Privacy by Design can only succeed if we are clear 
about the moral values underlying data-protection 
and have access to a fairly detailed and fine-grained 
account of the moral justifications of data protection, 
since all design decisions, however small and seem-
ingly unimportant, will have to be argued for on the 
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basis of clear and convincing moral considerations. 
The privacy issue lies at the heart of an ongoing de-
bate in nearly all Western democracies between lib-
eralists and communitarians over the question of 
how to balance individual rights with collective 
goods, individual rights and community interests. In 
the case of the issue of privacy, this debates opposes 
those who argue that it is necessary to protect the 
privacy of individuals by limiting the access to per-
sonal information, and those who believe that it is 
necessary to open this access because it will benefit 
the community. Some have argued that this is a con-
trived opposition, but it remains a real tension which 
emerges in all sorts of cases involving the infringe-
ment of privacy, such as, for instance, undercover ac-
tions led by the police on the internet, the disclosure 
of medical files for health insurance purposes or epi-
demiological research, the linking and matching of 
databases to detect fraud in social security, soliciting 
information about on-line behaviour of internet 
users from access providers in criminal justice cases 
and the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in 
public places for crime prevention.
The political philosopher Michael Walzer correctly 
observes that, “Liberalism is plagued by free-rider 
problems, by people who continue to enjoy the ben-
efits of membership and identity while no longer 
participating in the activities that produce these ben-
efits. Communitarianism, by contrast, is the dream 
of a perfect free-riderlessness.” Communitarians are 
looking at information technology to help them in 
the pursuit  of  the dream of  perfect  free-
riderlessness. 
Privacy has also been the subject of much philo-
sophical discussion (Nissenbaum, 2004; Roessler 
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2005; Decew, 1997, Van den Hoven 2009) and many 
different authors have presented varying views on 
what is privacy. Different conceptual and philosoph-
ical accounts give different answers to the question 
of what privacy is and why it is important. Unfortu-
nately, there is hardly any consensus and it does not 
seem likely that we will easily reach one. 
Added to the controversy is now the idea that privacy 
is completely obsolete – “you have zero privacy, get 
over it” -, that modern technology has turned it into 
something of the past, and that we should accept 
this as a fact of life. 
Many different concepts underly the idea of privacy, 
and no one is very clear about what it really means 
nor understand clearly how technology, software en-
gineering and systems development affect it. For 
practical purposes, such as the formulation and de-
sign of laws, policy and technology, the conceptual 
muddles and confusion concerning the nature and 
importance of privacy lead to practical indecision, 
delays, inefficiency, high costs and failures in ICT 
projects. 
It is necessary today to “reconstruct” the notion of 
privacy, in order to move on and tackle the urgent is-
sues that we are facing on a daily basis without get-
ting bogged down by endless debates.
The central role given to the concept of privacy when 
we debat about the moral issues surrounding the 
protection of personal data obfuscates the search for 
practical solutions. It leaves us stuck in  a deep and 
irresolvable controversy about the nature of the Self 
and the Community, opposing liberals and commu-
nitarians. Since it is not easy to take sides, I suggest 
we address the issue from another point of view and 
simply ask ourselves: why should we protect per-
sonal data; what moral reasons do we have to do so? 
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Can we consider that we should protect them just as 
we protect, say, nuclear reactors, medieval manu-
scripts, babies or bird sanctuaries? In each of these 
cases we have good reasons to restrict access, limit 
visiting hours, stipulate what behaviour is accept-
able, who is allowed to get near or interact, and how. 
In each of these examples protection takes on a dif-
ferent form and has a different rationale. What would 
count as a good moral reason to protect personal 
data and what type of reason would justify limiting 
the right to others to access these data? 
The moral reasons why we should be concerned with 
our personal data are the same ones that justify im-
posing limitations on what others can do with it 
(generate, process, store, disseminate, access). They 
are the following:
First, the protection of the individuals whose per-
sonal information is available to others. In an infor-
mation society, people are at risk of being harmed 
precisely when and because others have access to 
their personal information. This is what we would 
like to prevent: the use of personal information 
against the people. 
The second reason is related to fairness in the market 
of personal data. We protect personal data, and have 
laws to that effect, because so many people would 
like to have a cheap and easy access to them. A lot of 
people and organisations have good reasons to hide 
from the public the market value of personal data 
and the secondary use that can be made of it. Con-
tracts offered to clients in order to get access to their 
personal data, such as loyalty cards, are often not 
fair. Data protection regimes should guarantee a fair 
bottom line and protect citizens against abuse and 
breach of contracts. 
The third reason has to do with a fair management of 
information. Information about individuals has a 
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“natural habitat”, so to speak. It is gathered and ex-
changed in the framework of a series of well delim-
ited situations, and managed by specific groups of 
people, such as doctors, police officers, human re-
sources managers, lawyers etc. It is inappropriate to 
divulge this information across those social bound-
aries, for instance if information is leaked out of the 
medical sphere into the commercial sphere, or out of 
the family sphere into the political sphere. Each of 
these spheres should be kept separate.
Finally, the fourth reason is that each individual has 
the right to his/her moral autonomy and control over 
how he/she presents him/herself. People want to be 
identified as the people they themselves identify 
with. They want to be seen as the person they see 
themselves as. This requires discretion and choice 
about the personal information that they disclose. 
This also requires data protection and the respect of 
the sovereignty of each invidual over his/her per-
sonal information.
Value Sensitive Design and Privacy by Design
The integration of security and privacy in design, ar-
chitecture and engineering are not new. As far back 
as in the 18th century, the philosopher Jeremy Ben-
tham conceived what he believed would be the ideal 
architectural design of prisons. He said: “Morals re-
formed— health preserved — industry invigorated 
— instruction diffused — public burthens lightened 
— Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock — the 
gordian knot of the poor-law not cut, but untied — all 
by a simple idea in Architecture!” His idea was that 
security and control over prisoners would be greatly 
enhanced by the design of  a dome-shaped prison, 
which he named the “Panopticon” because the ober-
vation deck of the guards would be situated in the 
center, allowing them to see everything around. This 
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is a very early example of incorporating concepts into 
design. Today, incorporating ethical values into the 
design of technology is referred as Value-Sensitive 
Design (VSD). Privacy by Design is one of the applica-
tions of Value Sensitive Design. 
Value Sensitive Design incorporates moral values 
into the design of technical artifacts and systems by 
considering design from an ethical perspective, and 
by researching how moral values (e.g. freedom, 
equality, trust, autonomy, privacy, or justice) may be 
fostered or curbed by the design itself (Friedman 
1997; Friedman 2005). Value Sensitive Design fo-
cuses primarily and specifically on moral values, 
whereas traditional design focuses rather on func-
tional requirements such as speed, efficiency, storage 
capacity and usability. Although building a user-
friendly technology might have the side-effect of in-
creasing a user’s trust or sense of autonomy, in Value 
Sensitive Design the incorporation of moral values 
into the design is a primary goal, rather than a by-
product. Value Sensitive Design is also, as I have ar-
gued  (Van den Hoven 2005: 4), “a way of doing ethics 
that aims at making moral values part of technolog-
ical design, research and development”. 
VSD can only be used in the data protection area if we 
manage to clearly define which moral values need to 
be incorporated in the design of a system, and how 
they can be translated into “non-functional require-
ments”. The following step is to detail these require-
ments in a very precise and clear set of functions that 
need to be assigned to the system. But this method-
ology doesn’t exist yet, and the danger is that with 
the evolution of technology, systems may become 
even more obscure than they are now. 
VSD aims at reconciling different and opposing 
values in engineering design or innovations (Van den 
Hoven 2008b). This is directly applicable to the op-
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posing values at stake in the debate about CCTV: 
security and privacy. 
As a society we value privacy, but at the same time we 
value security and the availability of information 
about citizens. This tension is exemplified in the de-
bates about CCTV cameras in public places. We ei-
ther accept to trade our privacy for security by in-
stalling cameras everywhere, or we refuse to do so in 
the name of the respect of privacy, and thus settle for 
less security. Smart CCTV systems allow us to have 
our cake and eat it, because their smart architecture 
integrates the surveillance function with systems that 
limit the flow and availability of recorded 
information. 
The first generation of CCTV cameras offers relatively 
little in terms of security. The images are blurry and 
they infringe on the privacy of passers-by by recording 
their whereabouts. The second generation offers 
much better quality and thus provides more security. 
But precisely because the quality of the images is so 
good, they are more invasive. Now, the third genera-
tion of “smart camera systems” records only suspi-
cious events and are equipped with an integrated 
function that blocks the recording of images inside 
private houses. It is a perfect technology-based solu-
tion to our moral dilemma. For example, the Rot-
terdam police already uses such “smart” systems, 
equipped with software tools that prevent camera op-
erators to film inside private houses. 
The technological parameters of these smart systems 
can be configured in such a fine-grained manner that 
they offer all the advantages and functionality of cut-
ting-edge CCTV without any infringement of  data 
protection norms. When previous systems were 
based on “all or nothing”, we now have a technology 
that allows to choose who gets access to which re-
cordings, on which conditions, how long the images 
are stored, and how the recordings can be used and 
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merged with other databases. 
A common trait of many “smart”, innovative tech-
nologies is that they allow the combination of previ-
ously irreconcilable values or preferences. For in-
stance smart environmental technologies reconcile 
the quest for economic growth and sustainability, 
and so-called smart bombs promise to hit the en-
nemy without causing civilian casualties. 
Privacy by Design: a moral innovation 
It seems legitimate to affirm that since society has 
the moral obligation to both guarantee the privacy of 
its citizens and maintain the safety and security of all 
public places, then it also has the moral obligation to 
do what it takes in order to satisfy these two obliga-
tions. It is morally imperative that we keep re-
searching and innovating along the lines of Privacy 
By Design, a technology that allows to combine se-
curity with privacy. 
Such an endeavour that requires a fine-tuning of the 
technology and a fine-grained reflexion on the moral 
justification of data protection. Moreover, it requires 
a systemic methodology in order to connect both 
realms, the technology and our moral values. 
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    Urban video surveillance became a Euro-pean issue for the first time in 1997, when it was picked as one of the key themes of 
the European conference on “Crime Prevention: To-
wards a European Level”, organised by the Dutch 
Presidency of the European Union in Noordwijk 
(Netherlands). The closing declaration of this confer-
ence stated, in particular, that:  
  “Cameras as crime prevention tools are, in general, a new and cost-effective way to reassure citizens preoc-
cupied by their security. They deter criminality and can 
support public prosecution. [However], closed circuit 
television (CCTV) techniques should only be used 
[within the framework] of a comprehensive local and/or 
national crime prevention policy […] and they should 
be] monitored by trained personnel […]. The public 
should be aware of their use. Privacy should be safe-
guarded.” 1
 
These were the early days of CCTV. Three years ear-
lier, in 1994, the British Home Office had kicked off a 
“surveillance camera revolution” by funding a series 
of City Challenge Competitions with a first tranche of 
£2 million.2 In France, the parliament had passed in 
1995 the so-called  Pasqua law which explicitly au-
thorised the deployment of CCTV in a series of “hot” 
areas of France’s main cities. This move had followed 
the controversial installation, two years earlier, of 96 
surveillance cameras in the Parisian suburb of Leval-
lois-Perret.3 In the Czech Republic, the government 
started in 1996 to finance local crime prevention ini-
tiatives, which included, among others, the installa-
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tion of CCTV systems. The same year, following the 
Czech example, the local police department of 
Leipzig installed one camera in the centre of the city, 
the first one ever installed in Germany.4 In the Neth-
erlands the first system was launched in 1998, a year 
only after the Noordwijk crime prevention confer-
ence, when the city council of Ede decided to install 
12 cameras to monitor, at night-time, an area situ-
ated near the central railway station.5
Referring to the Noordwijk conference, the French 
delegation initiated at the end of 1998 a debate 
about video surveillance in the “Police Cooperation 
Working Party” (PCWP) working group of the 
Council of the European Union. The PCWP report 
concluded that “local authorities make little use of 
video systems, except in the United Kingdom and 
Finland” and stated that the PCWP itself “could pro-
mote the development of such systems”.6
Towards ubiquity?
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1 Recommendations of the EU conference ‘Crime prevention: 
towards a European level’, Noordwijk, 11–14 May 1997. In: 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 5, No. 3 
(September 1997), pp. 65-70 (66).
2 Norris, C. et al. (2004): The growth of CCTV. A global perspective 
on the international diffusion of video surveillance in publicly 
accessible space. In: Surveillance & Society, Vol. 2, No. 2/3, pp. 
110-135 (111).
3 Töpfer, E. & Helten, F. (2005): Marianne und ihre Großen Brüder. 
Videoüberwachung à la Française. In: Bürgerrechte & Polizei/CILIP, 
No. 81, pp. 48-55.
4 Müller, R. (1997): Pilotprojekt zur Videoüberwachung von 
Kriminalitätsschwerpunkten in der Leipziger Innenstadt. In: Die 
Polizei, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 77-82.
5  Gemeente Ede (2000): Ogen in de nacht. Eindevaluatie cameratoez-
icht Ede. August 2000. Online: http://www.hetccv.nl/binaries/
content/assets/ccv/dossiers/bestuurlijk-handhaven/
cameratoezicht/1_ede_effectevaluatiex2000.pdf.
6 Council of the European Union: Doc. 5045/99, 12 January 1999.
CCTV surveillance or “industrial television”, as it 
was called at first, is as old as broadcast television. 
But during several decades, the use of surveillance 
cameras in policing was limited to either the moni-
toring and managing of traffic flows or, occasionally, 
the surveillance of crowds at major events as well as 
criminal investigation. Permanent CCTV surveil-
lance of public urban areas was the exception. In the 
UK for instance, CCTV systems had only been in-
stalled in a few areas of national interest such as 
Westminster and Whitehall, where a camera net-
work had been set up by the London Metropolitan 
Police in the wake of the political unrest of the late 
1960s.7 
Today, 13 years after the Dutch crime prevention 
conference, which obviously initiated a process of 
international policy transfer, there are CCTV systems 
in thousands of cities and towns across Europe. As 
Steve Graham, Professor of Human Geography at the 
University of Durham (UK) and one of the world’s 
leading scholars specialised in the cybercities phe-
nomenon, predicted back in 1999, it seems that 
CCTV has become the “fifth utility” of modern urban 
life, after water, gas, electricity and telecommuni-
cations.8
The rise of open street CCTV, understood here as the 
24/7 surveillance of urban public areas for declared 
purposes of crime control and public order manage-
ment, started in the 1980s. Three main factors ex-
plain the “boom” of CCTV throughout European 
cities: 
➤  the emergence of a new paradigm underlying our 
criminal justice policies, whereby the traditional ap-
proach that considered crime as an essentially indi-
vidual deviance has been replaced by the idea that its 
roots lie rather in specific groups and places consid-
ered to be “criminogenic”. And hence, that the risk 
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can be assessed, prevented and managed thanks to 
actuarial methods.  
➤  the decline of industry as the basis of urban econ-
omies and the rise of consumerism and services, to-
gether with the emergence of “place marketing”, or 
“city branding”. Nowadays, safety and security are 
considered to be key elements of a city’s attractive-
ness, in the global competition for investment and 
economic activity. 
➤  the trend towards decentralisation that saw local 
municipalities taking charge of local crime control 
and urban order. Many countries have given munici-
palities an explicit legal mandate to install cameras 
on their territory in order to fight crime.9
The diversity of public area CCTV in Europe
Apart from the global factors that we have just men-
tioned, it is also important to take into account the 
specificities of each European country, their distinct 
7 Williams, C. (2003): Police surveillance and the emergence of 
CCTV in the 1960s. In: CCTV, ed. by M. Gill, Leicester: Perpetuity 
Press, pp. 9-22..
8 Graham, S. (1999): Towards the fifth utility? On the extension and 
normalisation of CCTV. In: Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and 
Social Control, ed. by C. Norris et al. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.89-112.
9  For a detailed theoretical discussion see McCahill, M. (1998): 
Beyond Foucault. Towards a contemporary theory of surveillance. In: 
Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and social control, ed. by C. Norris 
et al., Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 41-65.
10 Lyon, D. (2004): Globalizing surveillance. Comparative and 
sociological perspectives. In: International Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
pp. 135-149 (141-142).
11 Tageblatt. Zeitung für Luxemburg, 12 December 2007.
12 Winge, S. & Knutsson, J. (2003): An evaluation of the CCTV 
scheme at Oslo Central Railway Station. In: CCTV, ed. by M. Gill, 
Leicester: Perpetuity Press, pp. 127-140.
socio-economic context, institutional systems and 
experiences of crime. As the Canadian sociologist 
David Lyon points out:
“It is true that some structural similarities and the 
common problems facing (late) modern states may pro-
duce similar techniques in different places. [...] It is also 
true that local and regional social, political and cultural 
contexts will experience surveillance in different ways. 
[...] The mere existence of new technologies is far from 
being a sufficient reason for them to be used.”10
In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the first open 
street CCTV system was installed in 2007, 13 years 
after Britain had launched its first City Challenge 
Competition.11  In Norway, there is only one system 
-six cameras operated by the local police of Oslo, the 
capital-, which was installed in 1999.12 
By contrast, there are in the UK an estimated 40,000 
to 50,000 cameras installed in public areas in more 
than 500 cities.13 In France, some 500 municipali-
ties -most of which large agglomerations- are re-
ported to operate around 20,000 cameras. Further-
more, the French Interior Ministry announced in 
2009 that the number of cameras in use throughout 
the country would be multiplied by three.14 In the 
Netherlands, a fifth of the 443 local governing bodies 
use video surveillance in public areas, with a total of 
some 4,000 cameras.15
In Eastern Europe, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Baltic countries are known to operate 
hundreds of cameras in their major cities. 
Southern European countries have varying positions 
towards CCTV. Portugal and Spain have been reluc-
tant to use it. Greece installed some 1,200 cameras 
for the Olympic Games of 2004, a move that gener-
ated protests among the population. Some 200 cam-
eras were nevertheless kept after the games.16 By 
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contrast, hundreds of Italian towns (communi) are 
using CCTV systems. 
In Germany, where the Conference of Interior Minis-
ters endorsed CCTV as an “appropriate tool to sup-
port police work”, in 2000, there are today less than 
200 cameras in operation in around 30 to 40 cities.17 
In Austria, where a first system was launched in 
1994 around the railway station of Villach, a federal 
level initiative accelerated the growth of CCTV after 
2005. After an amendment of the Security Police 
Act, the Interior Ministry announced the expansion 
of public area surveillance. 
In 2006, five Austrian cities had installed CCTV sys-
13 Williams, K. S. & Johnstone, C. (2000): The politics of the selective 
gaze. Closed Circuit Television and the policing of public space. In: 
Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 183-210.
14 France Soir, 16 February 2009.
15 Dekkers, S. et al. (2007): Evaluatie Cameratoezicht op Openbare 
Plaatsen. Éénmeting. Eindrapport. Regioplan publicatienr. 1515. 
Amsterdam, Mai 2007, p.IV.
16 Samatas, M. (2007): Security and surveillance in the Athens 2004 
Olympics. Some lessons from a troubled story. In: International 
Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 220-238.
17 Figures updated from Töpfer, E. (2005): Polizeiliche Videoüberwa-
chung des öffentlichen Raums. Entwicklung und Perspektiven. In: 
Datenschutz Nachrichten, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 5-9
18 Salzburger Nachrichten, 4 February 2006.
19 heise online, 4 novembre 2005
20 Hempel, L. & Töpfer, E. (2004): CCTV in Europe. Final report of the 
Urbaneye Project. Zentrum Technik und Gesellschaft, TU Berlin. 
(Urbaneye Working Paper No. 15), p. 44. En ligne : http://www.
urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf.
21 McGrath, J. (2004): Loving Big Brother. Surveillance culture and 
performance space, London: Routledge.
tems in 11 public areas, and applications had been 
registered for the installation of CCTV in 17 new 
locations.18
In Denmark, the government presented a new set of 
measures aimed at reinforcing security, which in-
cluded the official authorisation of CCTV in public 
areas, for the first time ever.19
This brief overview shows that the use of CCTV in 
Europe varies according to each country. It also 
varies in the cities themselves, where some areas are 
covered by a dense network of hundreds of cameras, 
whereas other urban zones are only covered by small 
systems of less than a dozen cameras.
 
Support and regulation
CCTV is broadly supported by major political parties 
as well as by the general public, as opinion polls reg-
ularly show. However, support varies depending on 
the location and extent of surveillance. According to 
a survey conducted in 2003 in five European capi-
tals, 90% of the people interviewed in London were 
in favour of open street CCTV, whereas in Vienna, 
only 25% shared this view.20 In Britain, following the 
Bulger case in 1993, there was a large consensus 
around the idea that CCTV could be the magic “silver 
bullet” against the evils of crime. Indeed, the images 
showing two 10-year old boys abducting in a shop-
ping center a two-year old toddler, James Bulger, 
whose mutilated body was found two days later on a 
nearby railway line, were broadcasted during several 
weeks on all major TV channels. The case prompted 
a national trauma, while offering a promising “tech-
no-fix” to prevent such horrible events in the 
future.21 
However, British-style CCTV is seen in some conti-
nental European countries as a kind of “Big Brother” 
surveillance. In Germany for example, the former 
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Federal Interior Minister, Otto Schily, supported 
open street CCTV when it became a political issue in 
the late 1990s, but he also warned against “blanket 
surveillance”, arguing that it constitutes a dispropor-
tionate violation of fundamental rights.22
To some degree, such attitudes are mirrored by the 
legal regulation of open street CCTV. In Britain, the 
early expansion took place within a regulatory 
vacuum: The UK Data Protection Act of 1984 only 
applies to digital data processing, thus leaving out 
the analogue systems put in place in the early days of 
CCTV. Moreover, the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act of 1994 explicitly authorised local authori-
ties to provide “apparatus for recording visual im-
ages of events occurring on any land in their area”, 
and released them from the duty to pay expensive li-
censing fees for system’s cabling, contemplated 
under the Telecom Act. The regulatory framework 
only changed with the implementation of the EU 
Data Protection Directive through the modernisation 
of the Data Protection Act in 1998, and the incorpo-
ration, in 2000, of the European Convention of 
Human Rights into the national Human Rights Act. 
Contrarily to Britain, most European countries have 
considered since the beginning that open street 
CCTV constitues an infringement of fundamental 
rights. In France, an administrative court in Mar-
seilles ruled in 1990 against plans of the local 
council of Avignon to launch a 93-camera-network, 
considering that the optional recording represented 
22 Speech in Federal Parliament, 9 November 2000. Plenarprotokoll 
14/130.
23 Section 10 of LOI no 95-73 du 21 janvier 1995 d’orientation et 
de programmation relative à la sécurité.
24 A revised version can be found at: http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/
documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/
ico_cctvfinal_2301.pdf.
a disproportionate violation of privacy. Open street 
CCTV and footage-recording was only authorised in 
1995, by the Pasqua Law, which prescribed its usage 
in areas where there exists “a high risk of being as-
saulted or stolen”.23 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 1983 Census 
Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court devel-
oped the concept of a “right to informational self-
determination”, declaring illegal any collection of 
personal data without informed consent, except 
when undertaken in the “prevailing general interest”, 
in line with the principle of proportionality and with 
a clear legal basis. In effect, open street CCTV in Ger-
many is usually regulated by the regional police, and 
limited to so-called “crime hot spots”. Similar legal 
approaches that limit the use of open street CCTV 
cameras to more or less clearly defined areas can be 
also found in several other countries. However, in 
countries such as Hungary and Norway, data protec-
tion legislation is the legal point of reference. This is 
also the case today in the UK. Some of these data 
protection acts address explicitly CCTV, while others 
only mention video surveillance in general terms. In 
Britain, for instance, the first “CCTV Code of Prac-
tice” was issued in 2000 by the Information 
Commissioner.24
Organisation and supervision
The organisation of open street CCTV in European 
countries varies according to their legal framework. 
In some countries, the surveillance of public streets 
is the exclusive domain of the police, who owns, 
maintains and operates CCTV systems. This is the 
case in Germany, where the regional police forces of 
the Länder are in charge, although they sometimes 
share information with the Federal Police and local 
public order departments. In Austria, it is the Federal 
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Police who is in charge. In Norway, the Oslo CCTV 
system is run by the national police. In other coun-
tries, CCTV is mainly a local authority affair. In 
Britain for instance, some 80% of the open street 
CCTV systems are estimated to be owned and oper-
ated by local councils.25 
CCTV systems are usually run by local or municipal 
police forces, in countries that have a local police. 
Most of the time, the actual management of CCTV is 
done by civil staff, in collaboration with the munic-
ipal, regional and/or national police forces. 
There are also examples of public-private partner-
ships. For instance, in Vilnius, the capital of Lithu-
ania, control room operations are contracted to a 
private security company.26 In the UK, the first wave 
of CCTV systems was often co-funded by local busi-
ness communities, and in several cases, a close net-
work was established between the public CCTV con-
trol room and private “ShopWatch” schemes.27 Also 
in the UK, there have been initiatives aimed at en-
rolling the general public, such as the experiment 
conducted a few years ago in the London area of 
Shoreditch, where local residents received CCTV im-
ages on their personal TV.28
Part of this diversity in terms of organisation has to 
25  CCTV Image, No. 25 (février 2008), pp. 5-6.
26 Töpfer, E. (2008): Videoüberwachung in Europa. Entwicklung, 
Perspektiven und Probleme. In: Informatik und Gesellschaft. 
Verflechtungen und Perspektiven, ed. by H.-J. Kreowski, Münster: LIT 
Verlag, pp. 61-82 (65-66).
27 Coleman, R. (2004): Reclaiming the streets. Surveillance, social 
control and the city, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
28 Guardian, 11 January 2006.
do with each country’s regime of supervision and  li-
censing. In many countries, open street CCTV falls 
under the supervision of the data protection authori-
ties who are usually authorised to inspect video sur-
veillance systems, denounce bad practices, and rec-
ommend improvements in the management of data. 
However, some countries do not include CCTV 
among the areas covered by their data protection au-
thorities. This is the case of Austria, for instance, 
where it is the Representative for Legal Protection 
(Rechtsschutzbeauftragter) at the Federal Interior 
Ministry who has the authority to check CCTV sys-
tems prior, but his recommendations are not man-
datory. In France, the national data protection au-
thority (the CNIL according to its French acronym) 
was bypassed by the “Loi Pasqua” which created 
new bodies in each territorial district, the “Commis-
sions Départementale de Vidéosurveillance” (CDV). 
Headed by a judge, the Commission revises each 
CCTV project and its members vote in favour or 
against it. The final decision, however, rests in the 
hands of the “Préfet”, who is the representative of 
the central government in the territorial “départe-
ment”. Most of the times, the Préfet follows the 
Commission’s recommendation. 
Global vs local approach
Cost is a key-factor determining the extent of CCTV. 
Unsurprisingly, CCTV’s expansion is more limited in 
countries where only trained police officers are au-
thorised to monitor CCTV images in the control 
room, compared to countries employing lowly paid, 
civil staff. 
In some countries, the central government made sig-
nificant investments in street surveillance. This is 
the case of the UK, where the Home Office funded 
between 1994 and 1998 four rounds of City Chal-
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lenge Competitions for a total of £85 million, or 75% 
of the overall budget for crime prevention. After 
1998, the New Labour followed the same policy and 
invested some £170 million in its CCTV Initiative 
until 2002.29 
Other countries where public investment has been 
significant are the Czech Republic, where the gov-
ernment’s crime prevention budget includes a sig-
nificant allocation to CCTV, as well as Italy and Ger-
many, where regional governments have supported 
video surveillance. 
Europe’s national and/or regional governments have 
promoted the local adoption of CCTV not only by 
setting legal rules and providing financial resources, 
but also by defining how to use it. In several coun-
tries, the central government has issued guidelines 
for local authorities, in order to avoid a permanent 
“reinvention of the wheel” at the local level. The UK 
Home Office’s booklet CCTV: Looking Out For You, 
published in 1994, can be seen as an early example, 
though it mainly served purposes of promotion 
rather than guidance. More advanced was the guide-
book Handreiking Cameratoezicht issued by the 
Dutch government in 2000, and distributed to all the 
municipalities of the country. The booklet presents a 
summary of experiences with public area CCTV in 
the Netherlands and abroad, and gives information 
29 Töpfer, Eric (2007): Entgrenzte Raumkontrolle? Videoüberwac-
hung im Neoliberalismus. Paru dans : Kontrollierte Urbanität. Zur 
Neoliberalisierung städtischer Sicherheitspolitik, ed. by V. Eick et al., 
Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 193-226 (204-206)r 2006.
30 Les directives sont régulièrement mises à jour. La version actuelle 
est disponible sur : http://www.hetccv.nl/binaries/content/assets/
ccv/dossiers/bestuurlijk-handhaven/cameratoezicht/handreiking_
cameratoezicht_mei_2009.pdf.
31 Gerrard, G. et al.. (2007): National CCTV Strategy. Londres : 
Ministère de l‘Intérieur.
about technical aspects of CCTV, together with prac-
tical tools such as a check-list and a CD with addi-
tional information.30 The government of Belgium did 
something similar, providing guidelines, advice and 
promoting the exchange of experiences. 
In the UK, where the expansion of CCTV and its ef-
fectiveness against crime has attracted growing 
critics over the past few years -in particular since the 
publication, in 2005, of a national evaluation- the 
Home Office and the Association of the Chief Police 
Officers issued in 2007 a National CCTV Strategy. 
This document  outlines 44 recommendations for 
“potential improvements”. Among others, it recom-
mends the standardisation of all aspects of CCTV, 
the creation of a network of live and stored CCTV im-
ages, the training of all personnel, and more synergy 
among the different actors involved in CCTV man-
agement. Furthermore, it calls for increasing the 
power of the Information Commissioner in order to 
ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act. The 
strategy is backed up by the establishment of a na-
tional CCTV strategy programme board which will 
advise on taking forward the recommendations in 
the report and coordinate future activity.31 
France is heading in the same direction, as its gov-
ernment is currently working on a national CCTV 
strategy. 
Most other European countries are far away from de-
vising such strategic approaches, leaving the devel-
opment of CCTV mainly to local initiative.
Political choice or technological momentum?
As we have seen, the European landscape of urban 
CCTV surveillance is characterised by a huge diver-
sity in terms of political support, legal regulation, 
organisation, data protection regimes and national 
strategies. The evolution of video surveillance in 
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public spaces varies according to each country’s in-
stitutional framework, the financial resources avail-
able and, last but not least, the prevailing consensus 
among the public. 
Throughout Europe, however, the real engine for de-
velopment is found at the local level. Public officers, 
local politicians and the police either support or pre-
vent the development of CCTV according to their 
views, their interests and their intentions.
But to what extent do politics, rather than tech-
nology, influence the evolution of CCTV? Surveil-
lance cameras have been used for policing in public 
spaces for more than 50 years. Since the 1990s, 
there has been a massive expansion of CCTV, which 
is promoted as an efficient tool to combat crime. At 
the same time, evaluation studies question its effec-
tiveness as a “silver bullet” against crime. Today, the 
emphasis when justifying video surveillance in 
public debates has shifted from crime prevention to 
criminal investigation, with CCTV being presented 
as a useful tool to find evidence after a crime is 
committed. 
Nowadays, CCTV surveillance is not limited to crime 
prevention. Once installed, a CCTV system can be 
used to control misdemeanours such as littering and 
unauthorised parking, or to watch municipal staff 
working in the streets. It can also be used to manage 
major public events, or any major emergency. 
A new trend is emerging with the networking of for-
merly “discreet” systems. The police and other law 
enforcement agencies demand real-time access to 
CCTV images of a city’s transport system, for in-
stance, or other large public and private organisa-
tions. Today, public spaces are covered by intricate 
32 The term is borrowed from McCahill, M. (2002): The surveillance 
web. The rise of visual surveillance in an English city, Cullompton, 
Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.
networks of video surveillance systems.32 
In an effort to digest the increasing number of im-
ages, algorithmic surveillance is now taking over tra-
ditional methods, which means that crucial deci-
sions are delegated to black-boxed technology of 
biometrics, automated pattern recognition, and GIS-
based decision support systems. As it becomes more 
and more difficult for common citizens and decision-
makers to understand the actual form and function 
of networked and semi-automated CCTV systems, 
the current trends raise serious questions regarding 
the transparency and democratic accountability of 
contemporary urban surveillance. 
The growth and evolution of CCTV in Europe has 
reached a point where it is now urgent that we dis-
cuss, develop and implement common principles for 
its use. 
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    Today, surveillance cameras are used, more or less massively, to monitor public and private areas throughout the world. 
Accompanying the general technological trend 
making the capturing of images increasingly easy, 
video surveillance systems are being perfected and 
evolving rapidly.
Thus, the tools of video surveillance now propose, in 
particular, the transmission of images by Internet 
(video IP), management interfaces integrating into 
the office environment, and ever-improved quality of 
image and storage capacities. Alert rise software, on 
the basis of an ‘intelligent’ reading of images, are 
available and should progress towards even more 
sophisticated analysis possibilities and, in particular, 
through the use of video images combined with other 
technologies (sound recognition, facial recognition).
These future evolutions, the diversification of uses, 
as well as the maturity of the video surveillance 
market, challenge European and national legal 
norms, which specifically restrict the use of video 
surveillance or treat personal data protection on a 
general basis.
Although European institutions restricted the gath-
ering and use of personal data fairly early on, the first 
instruments specifically dealing with the question of 
monitoring have only appeared recently.
At the national level, the legislations of member 
states of the European Union, even though setting 
The legislative framework of 
video surveillance in Europe
Laurent Lim, Legal Adviser, French National 
Commission on Information and Liberties  (CNIL) 
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different rules and conditions, allow for resorting to 
video surveillance.
In Europe, the question of conformity in the use of 
video surveillance systems with the directive on data 
protection arises, and we shall see that there are varied 
legislative responses in the way of legally restricting 
these systems. It is advisable to stress that the law is 
not necessarily the only legal instrument for moni-
toring video surveillance: jurisprudence, the resolu-
tions, opinions and recommendations of European or 
national institutions, as well as data protection au-
thorities, must be taken into account. Finally, codes of 
good practices or charters of ethics constitute tools 
that are particularly useful for self-regulation.
 
I . T H E  E U R O P E A N  L E G I S L A T I V E 
FRAMEWORK
Certain fundamental principles have been adopted at 
the European level regarding the protection of funda-
mental rights and freedoms, as well as regarding per-
sonal data protection. These texts also concern data 
processing carried out in the framework of video sur-
veillance operations.
A. The fundamental guarantees of the texts of the 
Council of Europe
The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in Rome 
on 4 November 1950 by the Council of Europe, sets 
down in its Article 8 the right to the respect of private 
and family life, the home and communications.
This Convention was supplemented by an additional 
protocol, no.4 of 16 September 1963, guaranteeing in 
its Article 2 freedom of movement for whomever is regu-
larly on a state’s territory.
Moreover, the Convention No. 108/1981 for the protec-
tion of individuals as regards automatic processing of 
personal data, adopted by the Council of Europe on 28 
January 1981 and ratified by 40 European states, is the 
first restrictive international instrument whose objective 
is to set  minimal norms to protect individuals against 
abuses likely to occur during the gathering and pro-
cessing of personal data concerning them. 
It applies to the public and private sectors and lays down 
a certain number of general principles concerning the 
gathering, processing and communication of personal 
data via new information technologies.
Video surveillance activities enter into its field of appli-
cation, insofar as they involve personal data processing 
in the sense of Convention no. 108 and where the advi-
sory committee set up by this Convention reckoned that 
voices and images must be considered personal data 
when they provide information about a person by 
making that person identifiable, even indirectly.
These principles focus in particular on the lawful and 
loyal nature of the gathering and automatic processing 
of personal data, the principle of their recording for spe-
cific and legitimate purposes, the non-use of data for 
ends incompatible with these purposes, the limitation of 
the storing duration to the strict minimum, the appro-
priate, non-excessive character in relation to the pur-
poses pursued as well as the pertinence of the data and 
the obligation of updating. The Convention proscribes 
the treatment of ‘sensitive’ data (relative to racial origin, 
political opinions, health, religion, sex life), and also 
guarantees the right of the persons concerned to know 
the information stored concerning them and, if need be, 
to demand rectification.
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The European Court of Human Rights had the opportu-
nity to specify the outlines of these guarantees as regards 
video surveillance. Thereby, the revelation and publica-
tion in the media, in the framework of crime-fighting 
campaigns, of images stemming from video surveillance 
systems of the public highway, unbeknownst to the 
person filmed, constitutes a violation of Article 81.
In order to respond to the need for proposing a more 
specific legal framework for video surveillance opera-
tions, and being ‘concerned’ after finding that ‘national 
laws are far from being homogeneous in this area’, the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a 
Resolution no.1604 on 25 January 2008, by which it 
formally called the member states of the Council of 
Europe to ‘apply the guiding principles for the protection 
of individuals with regard to the collection and processing 
of data by means of video surveillance’.
These principles, numbering twelve, take up and apply 
the principles set by the Council of Europe’s instruments 
concerning video surveillance, stressing in particular the 
necessity of a pertinent, appropriate and non-excessive 
use in relation to the purposes; avoiding that the data 
collected be indexed, compared or saved without neces-
sity; not indulging in video surveillance activities if the 
processing of personal data risks resulting in discrimina-
tion against certain individuals or groups of individuals 
owing solely to their political opinions, religious convic-
tions, health or sex life, or their racial or ethnic origin; 
clearly informing individuals, in an appropriate way, by 
indicating the purpose as well as the identity of those 
responsible; guaranteeing the exercise of the right of ac-
cess to images and recordings; as well as guaranteeing 
the security and integrity of the images by every technical 
and organisational measure necessary.
The Council of Europe thereby encourages its members 
to make sure to lay down by law technical restrictions for 
installation limits of the equipment with reference to 
each place under surveillance; define privacy zones to be 
excluded from video surveillance by law, imposing the 
use of specialised software; provide for the practice of 
encoding video data, as well as provide access to a legal 
remedy in case of alleged abuse related to video 
surveillance.
In particular, it is necessary to note that the Parliamen-
tary Assembly deems it necessary that a unified sign 
with an accompanying unified written notice be adopted 
as soon as possible and used by the member states. In 
view of the constant technical progress in the field of 
video surveillance, it stresses the need to continue the 
work on the issue of video surveillance in the future.
B. Other European texts
Like other European texts that can apply to video 
surveillance activities, it is necessary to mention in 
particular the European Union’s Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. This solemn proclamation, adopted 7 
December 2000 by the European Union, is hence-
forth mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 De-
cember 2007, which went into force on 1 December 
2009, in the article on fundamental rights. This aims 
at giving the Charter a legally restricting value (under 
strong restrictions for certain countries: Poland, the 
United Kingdom and the Czech Republic).
Article 7 of the Charter thus provides that ‘Everyone 
has the right to respect for his or her private and family 
life, his home and communications’.1 Chamber ruling 28/01/2003 Peck v. United Kingdom App. 
44647/98
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In addition, Article 8 guarantees that ‘Everyone has 
the right to protection of personal data concerning him 
or her’. It further specifies that ‘such data must be pro-
cessed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legiti-
mate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of 
access to data  which has been collected concerning him 
or her, and the right to have it rectified. Compliance 
with these rules shall be subject to control by an inde-
pendent authority’.
We must also point out that the European Data Pro-
tection Supervisor (EDPS)2, who has competence for 
monitoring the processing of personal data imple-
mented by European institutions, published a set of 
video surveillance guidelines, intended for European 
institutions and organisations (17 March 2010).
 
These detailed guidelines, elaborated following a 
consultation process, include a number of practical 
recommendations. In particular, they put forward 
the concept of ‘privacy by design’, according to which 
technical safeguards allowing for better protection of 
personal data and the private life of filmed individ-
uals must be incorporated, beginning with the de-
sign, into the technological specifications.
C. Directive 95/46/CE of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
relative to the processing of personal data and 
the free circulation of this data 
This Directive constitutes the legal instrument ad-
opted by the European Union for setting the princi-
ples for the protection of personal data of European 
citizens. It is on the basis of this text that the member 
states adopted national legislations on data 
protection.
In principle, the Directive is applicable to video sur-
veillance systems as soon as it applies to all informa-
tion, including in the form of sound and images, 
concerning a person identified or identifiable, taking 
into account all the means that may reasonably be 
used by the person responsible for processing or by 
other persons in order to identify said person. 
In fact, the images and sounds relating to natural 
persons identified or identifiable are considered  per-
sonal data even if the images are used in the frame-
work of video surveillance; even if they are not asso-
ciated with data of the person’s identity; even if they 
do not concern individuals whose face was filmed, 
even though they contain other information (for ex-
ample, the number of his or her vehicle’s registration 
plate).
However, video surveillance in public places is only 
partially the concern of Directive 95/46, insofar as it 
is not applicable to the processing of data in the form 
of sound and images carried out for purposes of 
public security, defence, national security, for the ex-
ercise of state activities in the domain of criminal 
law, or for other activities that do not fall within the 
field of application of community law.
Moreover, the Directive is not applicable to pro-
cessing carried out by a natural person in the exer-
cise of exclusively personal or domestic activities.
On the European level, the group of national data 
protection authorities (called ‘group of Article 29’ or 
‘G29’) thus specified, in a 2004 opinion3, the inter-
pretation of measures of Directive no. 95/46.
2 See the website  www.edps.europa.eu 
3 Opinion of the G29 no. WP 89 of 11 February 2004
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This opinion stresses, in particular, the necessity 
that the institutions concerned of the member states 
carry out, on the one hand, a general evaluation of 
video surveillance so that ‘an over-proliferation of 
image-acquisition systems in public and private 
areas should not result in placing unjustified restric-
tions on citizens’ rights and fundamental freedoms’, 
which would make them ‘massively identifiable in a 
number of public and private places’. It also calls for 
an assessment of the evolution of video surveillance 
techniques, ‘in order to prevent the development of 
software applications based both on facial recogni-
tion and forecasting of the imaged human behaviour 
from leading inconsiderately to dynamic-preventive 
surveillance’.
These two messages remain topical since the defini-
tion of the most reliable tools and methods possible 
for evaluating the effectiveness of video surveillance 
remains crucial and indispensable.
II. NATIONAL LEGISLATION
A. A wide array of regulatory systems
In different member states, there are already cases of 
studies regarding video surveillance, which rely on 
constitutional norms or on specific legislative ar-
rangements, prescriptions or other decisions issuing 
from competent national authorities.
In certain countries, there are also specific measures 
that apply independently of the fact that video sur-
veillance does or does not include the processing of 
personal data. These arrangements also provide that 
the installation and implementation of a video sur-
veillance system be submitted to prior authorisation 
on the part of an administrative authority, which can 
be represented, in full or in part, by the national per-
sonal data protection authority. Rules may vary ac-
cording to the public or private nature of the person 
responsible for the functioning of the installation.
In other countries, video surveillance is not the ob-
ject of specific legal measures. However, in certain 
cases, the personal data protection authorities have 
been able to play their role by means of opinions, 
guidelines or codes of conduct (United Kingdom, 
Italy), in order to guarantee appropriate application 
of the general measures for data protection.
The aforementioned G29 opinion of 11 February 
2004 includes a summary chart of the principal 
known national legal sources regarding video sur-
veillance within the member states on the day of its 
adoption.
NOTE: The list below is purely informative, and does 
not include any text that may have been issued after 
February, 11, 2004.
Belgium
Opinion of the Data Protection Authority, especially 
initiative opinion 34/99 of 13 December 1999, rela-
tive to the processing of images made in particular 
by video surveillance systems;
Initiative opinion 3/2000 of 10 January 2000 rela-
tive to the use of video surveillance systems in the 
entrance halls of residential blocks
Law of 21 March 2007 regulating the installation 
and use of surveillance cameras
Denmark
Synthesis law no. 76 of 1 February 2002 relative to 
the banning of video surveillance. This law forbids, in 
a general way, private entities from carrying out video 
surveillance on the public highway and in squares or 
any equivalent area of free circulation, whilst however 
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allowing for certain derogations to this ban.
Decision of the Data Protection Authority of 3 June 
2002 concerning video surveillance by a large super-
market chain and direct transmission over Internet 
from a café.
Decision of the Data Protection Authority of 1 July 
2003 by which video surveillance exercised by a pri-
vate company of public transportation must be 
adapted and in conformity with the measures of the 
law on data protection.
Decision of the Data Protection Authority of 13 No-
vember 2003 imposing certain restrictions on video 
surveillance carried out by the authorities.
Two laws were adopted regarding video surveillance 
in June 2007: the first gives private enterprises the 
power to operate a surveillance of areas of which 
they are the owners, without obligation of prior dec-
laration to the data protection authority; the second 
gives the police services heightened powers for im-
posing the installation and implementation of video 
surveillance systems on administrations or on pri-
vate organisations.
Finland
In Finland, there is no special legislation concerning 
video surveillance but measures of a large number of 
different legislative texts apply to video surveillance 
as well as to other surveillance, observation and 
technical monitoring systems.
The mediator for data protection handed down an 
opinion on the recording of telephone conversations 
by customer services and in the workplace (file num-
bers 1061/45/2000 and 525/45/2000).
France
Law no. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 relative to data 
processing, dossiers and freedoms (CNIL)
Law no. 95-73 of 21 January 1995 relative to secu-
rity (modified), decree no. 96-926 of 17 October 
1996 (modified) and circular of 22 October 1996 
(modified) on the implementation of law no. 95-73 
oversees by specific regime prefectorial authorisa-
tion the implementation of video surveillance sys-
tems for security in public places.
The National Commission on Data Processing and 
Freedoms (CNIL), the data protection authority, pub-
lished a Guide with recommendations concerning 
video surveillance in the workplace.
Germany
Article 6, point b of the federal law 2000
Article 25 of the law on the protection of borders.
Other regulations concerning video surveillance ex-
ercised by the police in Länder legislations on the 
police. 
Greece
Letter no.390 of 28 January 2000 concerning the in-
stallation of a closed-circuit television system in the 
Athens Underground.
Directive no.1122 of 26 September 2000 concerning 
closed-circuit television.
Decision no.84/2002 relative to closed-circuit tele-
vision systems in hotels.
Ireland
Law on data protection of 1998 and 2003
Study of case no. 14/1996 (use of CCTV)
Italy
Article 34 of the code for protection of personal data 
(D.lg. no.196 of 30 June 2003 bearing adoption of 
the code of conduct)
Decisions of the control authority (Garante) no. 2 of 
10 April 2002 (promotion of the code of conduct); 28 
September 2001 (biometric techniques and facial 
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recognition near banks) and 29 November 2000 (the 
‘Decalogue’ on video surveillance) d.P.R. 22 June 
1999, no. 250 (vehicular access to historic centres 
and areas of limited traffic)
D.l. 14 November 1992, no. 433 and l. n. 4/1993 
(state museums, libraries and archives)
D.lg. 4 February 2000, no. 45 (ocean liners allotted 
to national voyages)
Article 4 l. 20 May 1970, no. 300 (workers’ status)
Luxembourg
Articles 10 and 11 of the law of 02.08.2002 relative 
to the protection of individuals as regards the pro-
cessing of personal data
Netherlands
The report of the data protection authority, published 
in 1997, contains guidelines concerning video sur-
veillance, in particular with regard to the protection 
of individuals and property in public places.
Enquiry on video surveillance in all Dutch munici-
palities in 2003.
Modification of the legal code going into effect on 1 
January 2004 and extending the field of application 
of infraction consisting of photographing places ac-
cessible to the public without informing people.
Portugal
Government decree 231/98 of 22 July 1998 
(private security activities and self-protection 
systems)
Law 38/98 of 4 August 1998 (measures to adopt in 
case of violence associated with sports events).
Government decree 263/01 of 28 September 2001 
(discothèques)
Government decree 94/2002 of 12 April 2002 
(sports events)
Spain
Law no. 4/1997 (video surveillance by security forces 
in public places)
Royal Decree no. 596/1999 of application of the law 
no. 4/1997
Sweden
Video surveillance is specifically regulated by the law 
(1998:150) relative to general video surveillance and 
the law (1995:1506) on secret video surveillance (in 
criminal investigations).
In principle, general video surveillance requires the 
authorisation of a regional administration even 
though there are a certain number of exceptions, for 
example, as concerns the surveillance of post offices, 
banks and shops. Secret video surveillance must be 
authorised by a court. The Chancellor of Justice can 
appeal a decision of the regional administrative 
commission.
Video recording by digital cameras is considered 
processing of personal data and is therefore placed 
under the supervision of the data protection au-
thority insofar as it is not specifically regulated by 
the law relative to general video surveillance.
An enquiry commission published a report on video 
surveillance (SOU 2002:110) in 2002.
United Kingdom
CCTV Code of practice (Information commissioner) 
revised in 2008
B. Towards specific European legislation?
This diversity of legislations, combined with the 
rapid technological advances of systems backs up 
the pertinence of a more harmonised legal approach. 
Several recent studies on the European level in fact 
lie within this perspective and recommend the rein-
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forcement of European and national legislations.
In its report of 7 May 2010 on the role of data protec-
tion authorities in Europe4, the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights retains the develop-
ment of video surveillance systems as a point of con-
cern necessitating urgent action: ‘Video surveillance 
in public spaces [...] is widespread, but the legislative 
framework is lagging behind. As an example, the report 
reveals that in practice, CCTV cameras are often not 
registered and/or monitored in some Member States.’
The report thus specifies that in Austria, the vast 
majority of cameras are not registered (and thereby 
elude the control of the data protection authority); 
that in Germany, certain cases of video surveillance 
in the workplace, unbeknownst to the employees, 
have been reported. It recalls that in Greece, the data 
protection authority was refused access to police 
premises where data processing was being carried 
out; and in the United Kingdom, there are few re-
strictions on the use of cameras in the  public land, 
and there are more cameras in this member state 
than anywhere else in the world.
The Agency for Fundamental Rights thus deems 
that, whilst keeping in mind the intrinsic technical 
particularities of sound and visual data, as well as 
the potentially important impact on individuals’ 
rights, a specific European legislative instrument 
should be envisaged in the future.
Finally, the Council of Europe, in its draft recommen-
dation on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the automatic processing of personal data in the 
context of profiling, adopted 15 June 20102, ob-
serves that the gathering and processing of data for 
the purpose of profiling can use different types of 
data, such as coming from video surveillance 
systems.
In the absence of a European legislative initiative 
aimed at monitoring video surveillance operations in 
a specific manner, the players can rely on the opin-
ions or sectorial recommendations of the national 
data protection authorities.
Some, out of a concern for ensuring the best legal su-
pervision and the most coherent use possible of their 
video surveillance system, choose to provide them-
selves with a charter of ethics setting rules of good 
conduct and good management. It is in this perspec-
tive that the European Forum for Urban Security pro-
posed its charter in the framework of the ‘Citizens, 
Cities and Video Surveillance’ project.
4 Available for consultation on the website of the Council of Europe: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/DataProtection/
default_en.asp
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Part II
Towards a Charter 
for the democratic use 
of CCTV in European 
cities
➤
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    With the Mayor of Rotterdam, you are one of the first two signatories of the Charter for a democratic use of 
videosurveillance. Why have a Charter?
Charles Gautier: This Charter is the result of a Eu-
ropean project for which several cities and actors in-
volved in videosurveillance worked together. 
For the past fifteen years, urban videosurveillance 
has developed rapidly in Europe, even though there 
are many significant differences from one country to 
another in terms of network density but also in terms 
of regulation and supervision. Nowadays, we are at 
the point where it has become necessary to reflect 
together upon this technology. Videosurveillance is 
not trivial. Because of its very nature, it invades the 
privacy of citizens whose images are collected from 
the streets in our cities without them knowing. 
The EFUS has therefore launched a European project 
on videosurveillance, for which the French forum 
took on the role of expert. The aim was to organise 
debates on the political and social implications of 
urban videosurveillance.  How should this tech-
nology be used? What are the legal and political 
frameworks? How is privacy guaranteed? Who is su-
pervising? Who is watching? Who are we watching? 
What experiments conducted in such or such town 
or country can be used elsewhere? What lessons can 
be learnt from the “bad” experiences?
The Charter for a democratic use of videosurveillance 
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“I call upon all elected 
representatives to examine and 
sign the Charter for a democratic 
use of video surveillance»
An interview with Charles Gautier, Senator and 
Mayor of Saint-Herblain and Chairman of the 
French Forum for Urban Security
➤
99
reviews the key topics the team worked on. It mainly 
presents a number of founding principles to pro-
mote, as its title states, a democratic use of videosur-
veillance in compliance with citizens’ fundamental 
liberties. 
Who is the Charter aimed at and what is it 
used for?
I must first clarify that this Charter is, by no means, a 
statutory document requesting European cities to 
comply with a set of directives. It has been designed 
and prepared by these same cities to clarify a number 
of common ideas. It should therefore be considered 
as a tool that cities may use when defining the role of 
video surveillance in their urban safety policy as well 
as the practical details of its use. If you want, it’s a 
sort of guide. It is also a declaration of principles. 
In what capacity did you take part in this 
project? 
Firstly, as the Senator and Mayor of Saint-Herblain, 
one of the ten partner cities in this project. Saint-
Herblain is a city of 45,000 people, part of the Nantes 
population centre, in the department of Loire-Atlan-
tique in the North West of France. The Nantes area 
comprises half a million people. 
Saint-Herblain installed its first CCTV cameras in 
1999. It now counts 18 cameras. As the mayor of 
this town, I have a clear political line: balance the 
need for public safety with the protection of indi-
vidual liberties. The development of our CCTV 
system is based on this strategic choice. 
I have also taken part in this project as a senator, as I 
was one of two rapporteurs, together with Senator 
Jean-Patrick Courtois, on a background report on 
videosurveillance for the Senate. Our recommenda-
tions followed the same line as the principles defined 
in the European project “Citizens, Cities and Video-
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surveillance”. 
Finally, I was involved in the project as the President 
of the French Forum, where discussions around this 
i s s u e  w e r e  a l s o  o r g a n i s e d  w i t h  e l e c t e d 
representatives. 
Is video surveillance a major topic for French 
elected representatives? 
Undoubtedly. Not only because CCTV is an impor-
tant component of urban safety policies but also be-
cause of the national political will. The government 
announced that, as part of the fight against ter-
rorism, its objective was to multiply the number of 
CCTV cameras installed in France by three by 2011 
in order to reach a grand total of 60,000 cameras. 
Large funds have been allocated to CCTV. Thus, part 
of the interministerial fund for crime prevention is 
dedicated to funding CCTV. It has also been funded 
by the departments, which spend a significant part of 
their allowance: at least 30 million Euros from a total 
of 49 million Euros in 2010. 
What is the position of the Forum and of the 
French elected representatives on this issue? 
We do not take a dogmatic position within our net-
work. What’s certain though, is that many commu-
nities are now trying to assess the efficiency of video-
surveillance. They are also mainly trying to reconcile 
this technology with fundamental freedom. 
There are many debates on these topics. As a sum-
mary, let’s say there is a general consensus around 
four key principles:
Firstly, video surveillance is a tool which must be 
used as part of a comprehensive crime prevention 
policy. Not only technical aspects must be taken into 
account, but planning, human resources, financial 
cost and ethical dimension must also be considered. 
Secondly, it seems fundamental that local communi-
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ties invest in training their operators. The goals of 
local councils must be explained in addition to any 
training on the technical operation of the systems. 
Operators must be acquainted with the local safety 
and crime prevention policy as well as be informed of 
the objectives of their local council. They must also 
understand the current legislation, especially re-
garding the protection of privacy and individual 
liberties. 
Third principle: the emphasis on establishing an as-
sessment method for local video surveillance sys-
tems according to the objectives. These systems are 
costly for local communities. It seems therefore vital 
that the latter are provided with assessment tools, 
particularly to ensure the video surveillance system 
and other local safety operations are consistent with 
one another and, if required, to make the necessary 
improvements. 
Finally, the fourth driving principle is that all video 
surveillance systems must be used in compliance 
with ethical principles. Two concepts seem particu-
larly important: the transparent use of these systems 
and the traceability of the information gathered. 
What does this Charter bring that didn’t exist 
before?
As yet, there is no European text on videosurveil-
lance. This Charter is therefore a first. It arises from 
the will of a number of European cities to create a 
frame of reference. This was needed by mayors as 
they are in tune with the safety expectations of their 
citizens, but are also aware of their fears regarding 
the protection of privacy. So this approach is any-
thing but bureaucratic, trickling from the top 
down. 
This Charter provides us, local elected representa-
tives, with assessment criteria and practical recom-
mendations in the current European and national 
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regulatory framework. This is not a declaration in 
favour or against videosurveillance. 
You have called upon your colleagues, mayors 
and European elected representatives, to sign 
this Charter. In practice, what does signing this 
charter change? 
I am asking elected representatives not only to sign 
but also to examine this Charter for a democratic use 
of video surveillance as I believe it addresses an es-
sential and urgent topic. 
Nowadays, considering the expansion of video sur-
veillance systems and their technological evolution, 
any mayor or local council representative (even for 
small councils) has to manage such systems and 
therefore take a stand. 
This Charter allows elected representatives who wish 
to do so, the ability to use a number of principles 
which guarantee a democratic use of videosurveil-
lance. Signing the Charter means we are publicly 
committed to ensuring the fundamental liberties of 
our city or local council citizens are protected. 
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THE FRENCH ARE LARGELY  
FAVOURABLE TO CCTV
According to a survey carried out in 2008, 
71% of the French population is in favour of 
using videosurveillance in public spaces, and 
only 28% against it. 
To the question “As a general rule, are you very 
favourable, rather favourable, not very 
favourable, not favourable at all to the use of 
CCTV in public spaces?”, 
➤ 21% declared they were very favourable
➤ 50% were rather in favour of CCTV
➤ 15% were not very favourable
➤ 13% were not favourable at all
➤ and 1% had no opinion.
This survey was carried out between the 
March 14 and 17, 2008, by Ipsos, for the 
CNIL (National data protection authority), 
by interviews with a selected group of 972 
people representative of the French 
population aged 18 and above.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN FRANCE: 
KEY FIGURES
➤ 396,000 cameras are authorised in 
France - of which 20,000 in the public 
space (2007 figure)
➤ 9,772 permits have been issued in 2007 
to public and private operators (an increase 
of 5 % compared to 2006) – of which 86% 
are for systems installed in public places or 
buildings open to the public and 14% used 
for monitoring public streets.  Note: This 
data should however be used carefully. Some 
systems have probably been installed without 
authorisation and have complied with regu-
lations subsequently.  Conversely, some au-
thorisations have been granted but the cam-
eras may not have been installed.
➤ 1,522 French local communities (out 
of a total of 36,682 on the 1st January 2009, 
according to the National Institute for sta-
tistics and economic studies) use at least 
one CCTV system. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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Why (recommendations in the 
form of) a charter?
 
 I. Why is a charter necessary?
    Through its project “Citizens, Cities and Video Surveillance”, the European Forum for Urban Security sought to create an ex-
change of points of view and experiences about the 
use of video surveillance and its effect on the respect 
of individual rights and freedom. This project en-
tailed, among others, a series of working visists in 
Genoa (Italy), London and Brighton (United 
Kingdom), as well as Lyon (France). Also, the part-
ners of the project exchanged their experiences and 
analysed them. This work has enabled them to get 
an overview of video surveillance practices and of the 
methods put in place to ensure that the rights of citi-
zens are respected. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this project? 
What lessons can be learned from the experiences 
and know-how acquired by the cities involved? What 
advice can be given to the Efus partner cities and be-
yond that, to all actors involved in video surveillance? 
Are there codes of practice we can recommend? 
 
Key principles for reconciling video 
surveillance and the protection of fundamental 
rights
Clearly, the project has identified practices which the 
partners have qualified as “good” when they are ap-
plied to a given problem, in a specific context. At the 
beginning of the project, the partners worked to-
gether to develop an interpretative framework for 
evaluating the different practices using the same cri-
teria and addressing the same issues in each case: 
data protection, safeguarding the respect of privacy, 
citizen involvement at all stages of a video surveil-
➤
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lance project - design, implementation, use, evalua-
tion and system development. However, the partners 
thought that it would be hard to recommend to all 
cities to implement certain practices that had been 
designed and implemented by one city in particular, 
in response to a specific context.  In fact, the project 
has shown that there is no such thing as a European 
code of practice, but rather, that it is interesting to 
exchange various ideas and practices so that each 
city may choose its own route to achieving the 
common goal: the protection of individual rights. 
First of all, it was necessary to identify the general 
principles upon which the codes of practice were 
based. Secondly, the various challenges of video sur-
veillance were examined. Finally, ideas for practices 
were drawn up in order to implement these princi-
ples, taking into account the challenges previously 
identified. 
The idea of a charter for the democratic use of video 
surveillance that aims to be universally applicable 
and formulates the basic principles that should 
govern video surveillance is based on three 
considerations: 
1) Principles that can be applied to video 
surveillance throughout Europe
When considering the use of video surveillance with 
regard to the respect of fundamental rights at Euro-
pean level, it is necessary to find a common denomi-
nator that can guide users outside of the various in-
stitutional, legal and cultural contexts. It is not a 
question of finding the lowest common denomi-
nator, but rather it is about finding the essential 
points on which everyone agrees, in the knowledge 
that each city or country is free to choose from a large 
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range of options, and to adopt the solution(s) that 
best suit the country or region, depending on indi-
vidual circumstances.  
2) Principles that can be applied to all areas of 
video surveillance
The charter aims to draw up a set of norms which 
respond to all of the challenges of video surveillance. 
Partners have therefore tried to identify the basic 
principles that are the foundations of the right to re-
spect of privacy in all aspects of the use of video sur-
veillance. These principles are independent from one 
another, while also complementary. They can be ap-
plied to all cases in which video surveillance is used, 
whether in the project planning, system implemen-
tation, methods of use, data protection, or even eval-
uation of the system and possible modifications.  It 
is only through application of these principles that 
the recommendations regarding the kind of actions 
to take become apparent. Then, the concrete exam-
ples of practices and techniques can inspire the im-
plementation of actions. 
3) Sustainable practices in a context of rapid 
technological development
Advances in technology and the constantly in-
creasing capacity of video surveillance systems have 
been a key theme in debates regarding the protection 
of privacy. Systems are increasingly powerful and in-
telligent (automatic recognition of vehicles, people, 
behaviours, etc.) and increasingly often they are con-
nected to other information systems. Video surveil-
lance is just one aspect among many that make up 
the technological network that governs our cities, 
and which is irreversibly advancing, and at an expo-
nential rate. This is why any recommendation on the 
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correct use of video surveillance can quickly be over-
taken by the technological reality. 
On the other hand, technological advances offer new 
solutions to certain moral dilemmas. For example, 
systems exist today that can prevent cameras from 
filming the interior of private spaces (see Jeroen van 
den Hoven’s article). For this reason, the recommen-
dations drawn up in this Charter do not deal with 
practical methods for using this or that technique, 
but rather with the application of basic principles. 
Nevertheless, one of the aims of this project was also 
to provide cities with concrete means of action. This 
is why the Charter offers, as a rough guide, a certain 
number of recommendations and practical methods. 
It is also important to point out that the Charter for the 
democratic use of video surveillance does not attempt 
to summarise all of the debates that have taken place 
within the framework of the project. However, the 
Charter cannot and does not claim to be a substitute for 
the exchange of concrete practices that has taken place 
as part of the project, of which this publication is a re-
port. The publication is in addition to the charter and is 
the first step towards a practical guide.
A European charter for cities and regions
The charter has not been drawn up based solely on 
the practices collected from cities. The debates are 
also clearly based on the national legislations in 
force, European texts and the first initiatives of local 
charters dealing with ensuring the respect of indi-
vidual rights.
The Efus initiative is not the only one of its kind. It is 
more of a complementary project, which bridges the 
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gap both at local and European level. Video surveil-
lance is a European phenomenon that affects all citi-
zens living, working and travelling in Europe. At the 
same time, video surveillance of public spaces is the 
responsibility of local authorities. The charter is 
original in the fact that it establishes a link between 
local and European dimensions. 
The European texts regarding video surveillance can 
only provide the opinions and recommendations of 
experts. A charter for local and European collectivi-
ties reflects the commitment of all cities and regions 
throughout Europe to respect, locally, the principles 
guaranteeing the democratic use of  video 
surveillance. 
European institutions play an important role in the 
protection of fundamental rights and the protection 
of privacy: the Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights (1950), article 8, Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(2001/2009) articles 7 and 8, and the Council of Eu-
rope Convention (108) for the Protection of Individ-
uals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, 1981, and Directive 95/46/CE of the Euro-
pean Union. They have also taken a position on the 
issue of video surveillance and have drawn up very 
similar recommendations to ours as contained in the 
charter, in the report of the European Committee on 
Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) (2003), Judgement 
4/2004 (Article 29) of the Venice Commission 
Working Group (2007), in resolution 1604 (2008) of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope, and the guidelines on video surveillance of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
(2010). 
Although these very comprehensive texts have 
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greatly inspired the project, they have not however 
clarified the principles on which the various recom-
mendations are based. Although several countries 
have used the opportunity of the transposition of di-
rective 95/46/CE into national law to also legislate 
on video surveillance, and although the conventions 
for safeguarding fundamental rights and protection 
of privacy result from European and international 
law, the European institutions do not currently have 
the power to legislate on video surveillance. They 
must make do with the opinions and recommenda-
tions and count on the fact that their message has 
been received, as well as on the good will of the par-
ties involved.  It is precisely in the absence of Euro-
pean regulation on the matter that the Forum’s 
charter makes sense. 
As regards national regulations, which dictate the 
restrictive framework for the use of video surveil-
lance, they vary greatly from country to country (see 
Laurent Lim’s article in this volume).  While some 
countries have very precise legislations and regula-
tions regarding video surveillance, others have kept a 
general legislation of protection of privacy and per-
sonal data. In some countries, a charter on video 
surveillance would be something of an innovation. 
In many others, the principles of the charter would 
complete the legislation in force and would above all 
highlight a political will and concern regarding the 
responsible use of this technology on the part of local 
authorities and representatives.  
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City involvement in the charter – a significant 
counterpart to the regulations in force.1
Charters and Codes of Practice are frequently 
referred to as forms of “soft law”, as they do not typi-
cally give rise to substantive legal rights or interests. 
It would be wrong, however, to assume that Charters 
and Codes are not important forms of internal regu-
lation. By providing a clear set of values and gov-
erning principles, they can play a pivotal role in 
shaping the organisational culture of CCTV schemes, 
and provide camera operators and scheme managers 
with goals that can be used to guide everyday deci-
sion-making. In addition, they can also serve as a 
benchmark against which the performance of a 
scheme can be measured, and provide the basis for 
the development of detailed procedures regarding 
the operation and management of a video surveil-
lance centre. 
Charters can also play an important role in public 
communication. By providing an explicit statement 
of the purpose and limitations of a given CCTV 
scheme, a Charter can help to provide the public with 
a set of criteria against which they can judge the con-
tinuing operation and success of the system. In this 
sense, it can provide citizens with a clear framework 
in which they can express their concerns or fears. 
Such a framework can consequently help to ensure 
that those responsible for the systems are both ac-
countable and prevented from exceeding their demo-
cratic “surveillance” mandate. 
As regards the relation between Charters, Codes of 
Practice, and official discretion, it is clear that to a 
large extent the importance of “soft law” will depend 
on local needs and conditions. In many towns and 
cities there is a strong assumption that CCTV 
schemes should be under the direct control of elected 
1 This part is by Benjamin Goold, University of British Columbia/
Oxford University.
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public officials, and that their operation should be 
subject to the exercise of official discretion. Clearly, 
because Charters do not have legal status and are not 
legally enforceable, they cannot displace the operation 
of executive discretion, or be used to interpret or 
modify existing law. One of the advantages of adopting 
a Charter, however, is that it can provide a structure 
for the use of executive discretion, promote transpar-
ency in the use of CCTV, and help to ensure that the 
aims and objectives of surveillance are well-known 
and understood by the public. Finally, Charters can 
help new officials to understand the workings of 
CCTV, and ensure a certain degree of operational and 
managerial continuity after local elections and during 
other periods of political change.
In summary, the primary advantages of Charters and 
Codes of Practice lie in their ability to help shape or-
ganisational and managerial practices, promote ac-
countability and transparency, and foster public un-
derstanding of CCTV. It is for these reasons that they 
can provide an extremely useful addition to existing 
legal rules and regulatory structures, and comple-
ment the exercise of official and executive discretion 
regarding the operation of CCTV. 
This is why several members of the Efus such as 
Lyon and Le Havre have already created their own 
charter. This is also the reason why the Commission 
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) 
[French National Commission for Information Tech-
nology and Civil Liberties] has supported this initia-
tive and contributed to a similar initiative by the Ar-
ticle 29 working group, an initiative assessed by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 
Therefore, the project partners believe that any ini-
tiative for the creation of a charter might be of in-
terest not only to European cities and regions but 
also to any actors with similar objectives. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER
 
 1. The principle of legality
 1.1 – Why?
The Forum is built around the belief that “cities help 
cities”, which is the inspiration behind all of the Eu-
ropean projects that they develop. Reflecting on the 
central theme of the video surveillance project, each 
partner city has expressed the desire to learn from 
the experiences and contexts of other cities involved 
in the project.  
These are, above all, defined by the legislation in 
force. Referring to a principle of legality is has not 
been the obvious thing to do. In fact, should we talk 
about legality or legitimacy? 
Legitimacy means having the right to carry out an ac-
tion or occupy a position. For example, local repre-
sentatives draw their legitimacy from elections, or 
policemen draw theirs from a status awarded to 
them. The only legitimacy that applies in all cases is 
that of the law. To declare legitimacy with regard to 
video surveillance is to declare that the first legiti-
macy of a CCTV system must be based on the legis-
lations in force.  
These legislations reflect a frame of mind and the 
choices of society.  They are also telling of a culture, a 
history and relationships of power, balance or com-
promise between authorities/citizens, cities/State 
or even different regional levels. 
They reveal relationships of trust or mistrust and are, 
essentially, a tool for legitimising a practice.
Legislation is therefore an essential basis for any 
project. 
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The first level of interest to partners is the commu-
nity level. These legislations define the rules that are 
to be put into practice in all EU countries. 
  The charter therefore reminds  
us that:
The design and development of video surveil-
lance systems can only be undertaken in compli-
ance with existing laws and regulations. 
Respect of and compliance with European, na-
tional, regional and local laws. A video surveil-
lance system should also only be developed in 
compliance with norms regarding data-protec-
tion, the monitoring of communication and con-
versations, illicit interference with privacy, pro-
tection of dignity, image, home and other places. 
Norms concerning protection of workers should 
also be taken into account. 
 
This being so, how can this principle of legality 
be put into practice? 
This happens through knowledge of the legislative 
texts in force. The challenge for partners was to high-
light those texts which do not specifically deal with 
video surveillance, but which should be taken into 
account by cities when installing their CCTV system, 
as well as their own legislation, if it exists. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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 1.2 – How?
  ➤ Video surveillance systems should be 
developed in line with: 
  1) Major European and  
international texts:    
  ➤ The Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CEDH) of 
the Council of Europe – 1950 ;
  ➤ The Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
- 1981 ;
  ➤ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union ;
  ➤ - Directive 95/46/CE of the European   
Parliament and of the Council of 24th October  
1995 relative to the protection of persons in  
regard to the handling of personal data and the  
free circulation of these data;  
  2) National and local rulings  
governing video surveillance systems 
and protection of personal data 
  ➤ Assess whether the installation of a CCTV 
system is suitable or appropriate to achieve the 
objectives for which the Constitution allows a 
limitation of fundamental rights.
  3) Jurisprudence: consultation of 
previous rulings
  ➤ With regard to technological development 
and in the case of a lack of legal judgement on a 
specific question, the putting into operation of 
a video surveillance system must be sure to 
obey the principles defined by the present 
charter. 
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By following this principle of legality, one thing be-
comes clear: respecting the regulations in force is 
the first act of democracy. These legislations, how-
ever different they may be, provide a framework for 
the development of video surveillance systems. 
Taking into account the legislation in force guar-
antees sustainability. 
This principle of legality provides a framework for 
the legitimisation and objectification of video 
surveillance, but like any framework, it must be 
clarified. 
Putting the principle of legality into practice
This principle of legality exists in different forms 
throughout Europe. While in certain countries the 
operation of video surveillance is governed by a gen-
eral law regarding data protection, in others, such as 
Belgium, Italy and Spain, the use of this technology 
is strictly defined. For example, in these countries 
the law imposes a technical setup of the system 
which enables images of private zones to be blocked 
(window and doors for example). The law also stipu-
lates the duration for which personal data may be 
kept and makes it compulsory for the public to be in-
formed of the identity of the authority responsible 
for the installation and management of the system. 
Regarding this last point, both Italy and Belgium im-
pose a framework that must be respected regarding 
communication to citizens, requiring all cities to use 
the same descriptive signs and to make a certain 
amount of information clear, as specified by the law. 
Another important aspect of the principle of legality 
relates to training of video operators. It is essential 
that these staff know the legislation regarding data 
protection. This is mandatory in some countries, 
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such as the United Kingdom for example. In others, 
such as France, this training regularly features in 
ethical guidelines given to operators by local authori-
ties. Finally, in other countries, this training is the 
responsibility of local authorities.
A third fundamental aspect of the principle of legality 
deals with the independent control procedures of the 
authorities. Many countries have therefore set up in-
dependent bodies to ensure that authorities using 
video surveillance systems are complying with the 
law. These include, for example, ethics committees 
in France, the “Garante de la Privacy” in Italy, or the 
Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD), which have, 
for example, the right to propose sanctions if the 
legal provisions are not respected. 
The increasingly widespread use of video surveillance 
means that the law must be adapted so as to manage 
and restrict intrusions of privacy. Therefore, in the 
United Kingdom, a strategic national framework was 
defined in 2008 and the government elected in 2010 
had included the issue of the protection of privacy 
with regard to video surveillance in its action plan. 
Knowing and respecting the law is clearly an obliga-
tion sine qua non, but there is no reason why cities 
cannot take further measures beyond the law in 
order to guarantee the respect of privacy and funda-
mental liberties. Collecting experiences and drawing 
up recommendations on this matter was just one of 
the aims of the project which led to the creation of 
this Charter.
The law is not prescriptive: it provides a framework 
which enables systems to be implemented. This 
being so, which elements of a video surveillance 
system can be considered to be prescriptive? In other 
words, how can the principles of the charter be ap-
plied when it comes to installing and/or managing a 
video surveillance system? 
Part II– Towards a Charter for the democratic use of 
CCTV in European cities
The principles of the Charter
122
 2. The principle of necessity
All of the partners have observed that video surveillance 
is not a solution in itself but rather it is one of many tools 
that form part of a global security strategy. Faced with 
technological advances in video surveillance systems 
and the growing number of cities using them, it is im-
portant to remember that the installation of a system 
does not constitute an end in itself. It must be 
necessary. 
But how can such a necessity be defined without lapsing 
into justifications of video surveillance?
How can a principle of necessity be defined, however, 
without prejudice to the freedom of each city to define its 
own strategic choices concerning security matters, with 
or without video surveillance? And furthermore, can it 
be said that necessity is, in itself, a fundamental 
principle? 
It is never easy to define the choice of installing a video 
surveillance system as a necessity. This is because an-
swering the question of whether or not it is a necessity, 
requires knowledge of the effectiveness of video surveil-
lance. What part does video surveillance play in solving 
a specific problem? Does video surveillance seem to be 
the most appropriate response to a certain context? 
There is no simple answer to these questions, which the 
partners of this project have discussed at great length. 
Scientific assessments offer mixed results, as show for 
example by studies carried out by the British Home Of-
fice (Welsh and Farrington 2002, Gill and Sprigg 2005, 
Gill et al 2005). First of all, it is advisable to work out the 
aim of the system: is it for preventing crime or for facili-
tating investigation a posteriori? As regards the expected 
effects, these can vary considerably over time and they 
are not the same for all types of crime. The role of preven-
tion means that the potential criminal reasons and acts 
in a rational way. But as we well know, numerous crimes 
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are committed with emotions “running high”. The effec-
tiveness of video surveillance for investigational pur-
poses is not guaranteed either, nor is its role in reducing 
feelings of insecurity. 
There are so many considerations to take into account 
when talking about necessity. It is not a matter of neces-
sity in itself, but rather a necessity that should be formu-
lated in terms of a diagnostic process. It is reasoning 
which leads to the decision to install a video surveillance 
system, which reveals the necessity. 
  THE CHARTER DEFINES THE 
PRINCIPLE AS FOLLOWS :
  The installation of a video 
surveillance system must be justified.
The decision to install a system should be based 
upon necessity. Necessity can be termed as the 
adequate balancing of circumstances and needs 
on one hand and, on the other, the appropriate 
response, in this case the use of video surveil-
lance. It is based on this need and these circum-
stances that the decision can be considered cor-
rect and the action necessary. The principle of 
necessity requires a clear demonstration of the 
reasoning behind an action, thereby justifying it. 
The decision whether to install a video surveil-
lance system or not depends on this principle of 
necessity. Necessity can be considered prescrip-
tive, as it renders actions imperative, in the sense 
that there is no other measure that can attain the 
same goal as effectively. 
This being so, how can this principle of necessity 
be implemented. Using this principle, it is by fo-
cussing on reasoning that the installation of a 
video surveillance system is justified. This rea-
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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soning is structured around identifying the cir-
cumstances, defining the needs and the necessity 
of video surveillance as a response. 
  This principle of necessity is made up 
of three elements: :
  The conjunction between the circumstances 
and the need creates the response.
Here, the charter uses a problem-solving method 
similar to that which is used by the British police 
force in its neighbourhood policing scheme. The 
“SARA” method is followed, which stands for scan-
ning (reviewing a problem, a situation, circum-
stances), analysis (analysing needs), response (de-
fining a response), and assessment (evaluating the 
response to the problem). 
The approach is very interesting because it distin-
guishes between the problem to be dealt with and 
the symptoms observed. If the two first stages, 
“scanning” and “analysis”, are not carried out thor-
oughly enough, there is a risk of achieving a response 
that only deals with the symptoms and not the real 
underlying problem. 
In the case of video surveillance, the danger is that it 
is very tempting to think that it is the solution to ev-
erything, and that from then on, it is not necessary to 
follow through with the rest of the process. The key 
question is no longer “what is the most appropriate 
response to this problem?” but, “we want to install a 
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video surveillance system, how can we justify it?”.
The charter’s principle of necessity takes a different 
approach, placing the problem before the solution, 
while considering that, depending on the case, CCTV 
may or may not be effective. This approach views 
video surveillance as one response of many, and it 
enables its effectiveness to be put into perspective 
compared to other urban security tools. 
 
It is also very important to evaluate the system (the 
fourth stage of the SARA process). The principle of 
necessity does not just relate to the decision re-
garding installation of the system, but also to each 
development throughout its “life time”. The issue of 
necessity is therefore a permanent one. 
It arises, for example, when an expansion is planned. 
Is it a necessary investment for security2? It also 
arises if the initial situation changes. For example, 
what should be done when a significant improve-
ment in security is observed? Is video surveillance 
still necessary? Although it would be irresponsible 
not to take into account the investments made, and 
although there is the question of what the conse-
quences would be of removing the video surveil-
lance, nevertheless, there is always the option of re-
moving the cameras. 
In this way, the city of Rotterdam at one time ap-
proved a project to remove some of its cameras, after 
carrying out an assessment. The residents of the 
neighbourhood concerned opposed the idea because 
they felt reassured by the presence of the cameras. 
Other European cities had the same experience, 
which reveals that the principle of citizen involve-
ment may be more complex than you would think. In 
2 Obviously, the cost of enlarging a system is normally a lot less, 
because the expansion is able to take advantage of investments 
already made and no longer generates the same fixed costs. 
The circumstances
The response
The need
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the case of Rotterdam, the decision was taken in fine 
to reduce the number of cameras, offering an adapted 
response to a new necessity. 
Another interesting example is the law in the German 
state of Baden-Württemberg. It stipulates that a 
video surveillance system can only be considered 
necessary if it is statistically demonstrated that an 
area is particularly prone to crime. In Mannheim, the 
local authorities and the police had to dismantle a 
system of six cameras installed in the city centre, ap-
proximately five years after it was installed, because 
the crime rate had significantly dropped. After the 
cameras were removed, the situation remained 
stable, which may also be linked to the measures 
taken by the local authorities, such as for example, 
development of public spaces and lighting. 
 RECOMMENDATIONS /  
 FORMS OF ACTION
  In this context, we can recommend that 
the principle of necessity should be 
applied
 CIRCUMSTANCES
  ➤ Precisely identify the security and crime 
prevention problems present in a defined area 
through an audit of the issues to be addressed; 
  ➤ Establish the range of local resources 
available and existing systems capable of 
responding to the problems identified through 
the audit;  
 
 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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 NEEDS
  ➤ Draw out the needs exposed by the audit 
and the analysis of local conditions. The needs 
should be as precise as possible as they will 
form the basis of the objectives for the project;  
  ➤ Consider if there are less intrusive 
possibilities for responding to the problems  
to be addressed;   
 RESPONSE
  ➤ The system’s objectives must be defined, 
including an identification of its expected 
benefits and intended outcomes. These 
objectives must be translated into operating 
methods. For example, it is necessary to outline 
the functional implications of a video 
surveillance system whose objective is crime 
prevention.  
  ➤ Establish what sort of system could 
realistically allow a city to achieve its objectives. 
This system should be set up in an appropriate 
manner to efficiently meet the identified needs;
  ➤ Video surveillance should only be employed 
when other, less invasive, available measures 
are shown to be insufficient or inapplicable 
(following a considered evaluation) or where the 
problem to be solved is beyond the means of 
existing measures. In any event, video 
surveillance must form part of a coordinated 
response to an identified problem.    
  ➤ Allow the possibility of withdrawal. Cities 
should be able to decide, on the basis of 
evaluation, that video surveillance is no longer 
necessary or that cameras could, on the basis 
of analysis, be relocated;  
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 Once the necessity of the system has been estab-
lished, the size and scale still need to be established, 
in relation to reasoning put into practice within the 
framework of the principle of necessity. 
The scaling of video surveillance schemes should be 
done to the correct proportions. 
3. The principle of proportionality
Proportionality is a principle that has always been 
hard to define. It can be defined as respecting a 
sound measure. But how can it be evaluated, when, 
and in relation to what? Furthermore, how can pro-
portionality be defined outside of a specific context? 
How can something be stipulated in a European 
charter which is appropriate in a certain context, 
specific to a given city or region?
The main concern of the partners, when they debated 
this principle, was not to define a general norm, but 
rather to emphasise the need to scale the video sur-
veillance system in relation to each particular con-
text and to specific circumstances. 
Comparisons are often made between video surveil-
lance systems, based on the number of cameras. But 
this is not necessarily the best criteria because the 
number of cameras should be consistent with the 
needs identified in the city. 
This principle of proportionality is based on re-
specting a sound measure. The deployment of a 
video surveillance system must be coherent with the 
reasoning recommended by the principle of neces-
sity. This principle of proportionality is also linked to 
the principle of accountability. In fact, defining a 
system that respects a sound measure is an act of re-
sponsibility on the part of the authorities. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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 Therefore: 
The design, installation, operation and sub-
sequent development of video surveillance 
systems must respect a sound and suitable 
measure
The deployment of a video surveillance system 
must be appropriate and proportionate to the 
problem it is intended to address. The search 
for proportionality is above all the search for the 
adequacy between the objectives to be reached 
and the means to achieve them. The principle of 
proportionality is thus clearly a question of bal-
ance. This balance requires that video surveil-
lance be not the only security and crime-pre-
vention response developed in a location. 
How should this principle of proportionality be 
implemented? The principle is applied to dif-
ferent levels of the definition and deployment of 
the system. 
  RECOMMENDATIONS /  
FORMS OF ACTION
Proportionality should be evaluated at each phase 
and with regard to each method of data-handling, 
particularly when it is necessary to define:   
	 	•	the	number	and	scope	of	vision	of	cameras	
as well as their  technical capabilities  
  ➤ The technical and human aspects of installa-
tion must be adapted strictly to needs. It is 
therefore necessary to use a technology that re-
sponds to the established objectives, without 
going further. The use of the video surveillance 
system should therefore be confined both in 
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terms of time and space: on a given territory at a 
given moment to respond to a clearly identified 
need. Assigning any new function constitutes a 
new circumstance for the project, therefore re-
quiring a repeat of the analysis carried out at the 
beginning of the project; 
  ➤ Technical installation should include a 
system of concealment of private areas, through 
dynamic masking technology, since a public-
space surveillance system cannot have as a 
“side effect” the surveillance of private spaces. 
The positioning and angling of the cameras, as 
well as their type (fixed or mobile) should also 
be adapted to requirements;  
	 •	Data	protection	
Images recorded through video surveillance con-
stitute personal data and as such should come 
under the same level of protection as is applied to 
all other forms of personal data. This means that 
strict rules should be adhered to, covering the re-
cording, retention, disclosure and ultimate dis-
posal of such images. It is important to ensure that 
the objectives are appropriate to:  
 
  ➤ The decision to store or not to store images, 
thus to create or not to create personal data; 
  ➤ The period for which data should be saved, 
which should always be temporary. The period 
of data conservation should be limited to that 
which is strictly necessary, outlined and defined 
in the system’s setup; 
  ➤ The physical and technical protection of 
data;
It is therefore necessary to define the protocols 
governing access and transmission of images. It 
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is important to include in these protocols 
the “Privacy by design” method, which encour-
ages personal data protection to be considered at 
the early stages of the system design.  
	 	•	Video	surveillance	should	strike	a	balance	and	
take its place within an integrated public secu-
rity and crime-prevention strategy. Video sur-
veillance is only one tool within a broad, global 
security policy and its use should be in collabo-
ration with other responses. In this way it will be 
applied most efficiently. 
Proportionality put into practice…. 
The city of Saint-Herblain began, in 1997, a safety 
audit before implementing a CCTV system. This was 
carried out by an external agency. In parallel, the Se-
curity Committee of the “Conseil communal de 
prévention de la délinquance” (CCPD) was made re-
sponsible for holding a discussion regarding security 
in the city of Saint-Herblain. In 1998 it presented its 
report to the senator-mayor, who decided to create 
several working groups on themes involving security 
issues. In 1999, the group report of these working 
groups was presented to the City Council. Further-
more, an opinion survey on security, carried out 
using a representative panel, revealed that this issue 
was the main concern of the inhabitants of Saint-
Herblain.
Building on all of these diagnostic elements, the 
mayor initiated a debate within the City Council re-
garding the application of the CCPD’s propositions, 
which included video surveillance. In June 1999, the 
City Council voted for the installation of a system in 
the community and the creation of an Ethic Com-
mittee to accompany the implementation of this 
project. 
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In the case of Saint-Herblain, we can also see that 
the debate over video surveillance is part of a wider 
global consideration of security issues. The initial 
audit has enabled needs to be identified and to pro-
vide the elements for scaling the scheme. 
Proportionality is applicable both when defining the 
scale of the video surveillance system and when inte-
grating it into a local security and crime prevention 
policy. Video surveillance is integrated into a global 
policy and is proportionally coherent with other ele-
ments of the scheme. 
This is because the installation of a system responds 
to a necessity and its deployment is carried out in re-
spect of a sound measure that will be transparent.
4. The principle of transparency
Throughout the project, one of the essential issues 
for the project partners was to make video surveil-
lance systems understandable to citizens and to 
guarantee the respect of individual privacy and fun-
damental rights.
Transparency is linked to the information that is 
given to citizens: which information is relevant? How 
much information should be given to citizens? Do 
citizens want to be informed? If yes, then informed 
of what? 
The challenge of this principle is not so much af-
firming the need to inform citizens, but more de-
fining the kind of information to be provided and the 
conditions of this information. 
Every authority employing a video surveillance 
system must have a clear and coherent policy re-
garding the operation of their system
The notion of transparency is closely linked to com-
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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munication. Transparency can be defined as visibility 
from the exterior. This principle is thus significantly 
based on the information made available. This prin-
ciple is essential because if video surveillance can be 
considered a technology that restricts liberties it 
should be accompanied by thorough public informa-
tion. All information displayed around the system, 
respecting legislation in vigour, would be in line with 
this principle of transparency. 
 RECOMMENDATIONS/ 
 FORMS OF ACTION
	 	•	The authority installing video surveillance 
cameras should give citizens clear information 
on: 
  ➤ the project to install a video surveillance 
system;
 ➤ the systems’ objectives; 
  ➤ the costs of the system;
  ➤ the zones being surveyed. In order to achieve 
this, it is necessary to use visible and recognis-
able signage, with symbols; 
  ➤ the identity, function and contact details of 
those that can be contacted for more informa-
tion. This information should feature on the 
sign displayed in surveyed zones; 
  ➤ the specific measures in place to protect im-
ages recorded. Access to data created by a 
video surveillance system should be restricted 
through password-protection. This data should 
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only be used for the ends set out, by authorised 
persons and saved only for the necessary time. 
All use of these images should be recorded in a 
register to be kept up to date; 
  ➤ the authorities that can make use of the im-
ages recorded;
  ➤ their rights concerning images of their own 
person, specifically:
The right to access one’s own image, without 
prejudicing the rights of another. This right can 
be refused in the case of judicial process or 
when linked to risks to national security or 
defence;
The right to confirm the deletion of one’s own 
personal images once the deadline for deletion 
has been reached; 
The information mentioned above must be pro-
vided in an intelligible way, using clear and 
easily comprehensible language.
	 	•	The	authority	 responsible	 for	 the	system	
should regularly inform citizens of results and 
the achieving of objectives, through the normal 
means by which such an Authority reports on 
its public security and crime strategy. This ap-
proach encourages the clear definition of objec-
tives, and ongoing evaluation of performance 
against previously defined indicators; 
	 	•	The	use	of	false	cameras	is	discouraged.	This	
misinformation is liable to discredit the system 
and bring its managers into question; 
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Transparency put into practice
All of the partner cities in the project have imple-
mented a system for informing citizens about their 
video surveillance system. 
In Rotterdam, for example, each time that a camera 
is installed, all of the actors involved are invited to 
see the control centre, including citizens. The expe-
rience has shown that transparency is highly appre-
ciated and that it gives good results: 80% of the 
population asked in a survey aiming to evaluate the 
different security schemes said that they were in fa-
vour of the use of cameras, and only 1.2% were 
against, with the rest having no opinion. The problem 
arises when an incident occurs and there is no im-
agery recorded: then, the expectations of the inhabit-
ants are more important. 
The city of Lyon has also begun working strongly in 
favour of transparency through its ethics committee 
and descriptive signage. The committee has good 
visibility, as 30-40% of the population know about 
it. There is also descriptive signage which respects 
the regulatory framework and helps citizens to be 
better informed. At each site where CCTV is present, 
the signage is very clear and visible. The public is 
therefore informed that it may address any claims to 
the ethics committee. Furthermore, the ethics charter 
drawn up by the city of Lyon, which outlines the 
city’s commitments in favour of protecting the rights 
of its citizens, is available at the city’s website, at the 
municipal building of the arrondissement, the cen-
tral town hall and in all the member associations of 
the ethics committee. 
5. The principle of accountability
The principle of accountability must ensure that the 
responsibility for the system is assigned to a specific 
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authority. It implies that these responsibilities are 
clear and understood and that this authority as-
sumes all responsibility for the system. 
The right to surveillance of public areas is reserved 
to carefully limited authorities. These authorities are 
responsible for the systems installed in their name. 
The authorities in charge of video surveillance sys-
tems are the guarantors of a use that is legal and re-
spects privacy and fundamental liberties. They would 
therefore be responsible for any breaches or viola-
tions reported. The administrative authorities with 
the competence to deal with these problems should 
be clearly identified. Video surveillance systems 
owned and operated by private companies which 
cover public areas must operate to the same stan-
dard as systems operated by public authorities. 
One might ask what accountability without sanc-
tions would involve. The aim of the charter is not to 
define this, but to provide the responsible authori-
ties with the marketing tools and to promote the 
practices of cities which oblige the operators to take 
responsibility. 
The election of local representatives by universal 
suffrage is the ultimate measure of legitimacy and 
accountability. Elected representatives must 
shoulder their responsibilities under the scrutiny of 
the voters and risk not being re-elected if they are not 
seen to be doing this properly. It should be noted, 
however, that in the majority of cases, elected repre-
sentatives are not usually directly responsible for a 
video surveillance system, particularly when they are 
not an exclusively municipal representative. In this 
case, identifying responsibilities is more compli-
cated. This is why the principle of accountability re-
137
lies on the principle of transparency. 
The accountability principle does not just apply to 
the decision to install a video surveillance system, 
the correct operation of the system and the respect of 
the other principles. It also applies to the various dif-
ferent uses of the system, which should be in accor-
dance with the objectives assigned to them. One of 
the risks is the phenomenon of “function creep”, in 
other words, the “sliding” towards new functions 
that were not planned for in the beginning and for 
which new justifications are found, or which are 
made possible thanks to technological advances. 
Logic should not be reversed and result in a system 
being used for something just because it can be, not 
because it is necessary (principle 1). If new functions 
are attributed to a system, the operator must be ex-
plicitly accountable for their application. 
 
This is why the charter suggests the fol-
lowing recommendations and means 
of action:
•	Communicate	the	contact	details	of	those	re-
sponsible for the system. Each sign indicating a 
surveyed zone could also display this information;
 	•	Affirm	the	system	managers’	obligation	to	en-
sure confidentiality. This obligation could be en-
shrined in an internal code or in a code addressed 
to the system managers. Their responsibility could 
be challenged in the event of breaches of this 
obligation;
	 	•	Employment	of	suitable	security	measures	to	
protect access to the system’s control room and 
stored images. Technical measures to control 
access should be put in place;   
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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	 	•	Make	known	the	means	for	judicial	pursuit	of	
suspected abuses;
	 	•	Establish	an	appropriate	mechanism	for	pub-
lishing information required by citizens so that 
they may properly understand the use of video 
surveillance.  
	 	•Establish	an	appropriate	mechanism	for	pub-
lishing information required by citizens so that 
they may properly understand the use of video 
surveillance.  
6. Principle of independent oversight
One of the key ideas for a democratic use of video sur-
veillance is to set up an independent control system 
for managers of video surveillance. As summarised by 
Richard de Mulder, of the University of Rotterdam, in 
the title of his speech at the project’s final conference, 
“Citizen surveillance: no problem. But who oversees 
those in charge of the surveillance?”. Citizens need to 
be reassured that the managers of video surveillance 
are respecting their rights. There is therefore a need 
for monitoring to ensure that system operators re-
spect the rules and the other principles of the charter. 
Independent oversight should not necessarily be car-
ried out by a supervisory authority with powers to 
impose sanctions, the same as the public authority 
that regulated the video surveillance. The concept of 
independent oversight is both more flexible than the 
authority of the State, and more restrictive. It 
reflects the idea of “check and balance” as the 
federalists called this principle, which was al-
ready the basis of the notion of the separation 
of powers as defined by Montesquieu (Trias 
Politica). 
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A hierarchy is not needed, but instead it is based on 
the idea that the responsibility does not lie with one 
actor alone. The video surveillance user’s actions are 
observed (principle of transparency) and they must 
be accountable for their actions (principle of ac-
countability). This monitoring must be carried out by 
a supervisory agent that is independent of the au-
thorities that manage the video surveillance system. 
Professor Richard de Mulder clearly explains how 
new technologies and video technology itself offer 
new powers to those who use them, which presents 
a new risk of an imbalance of powers and the system 
of check and balance that is the basis of democracy. 
The solution, in his opinion, is to install a fourth 
power (excluding executive, legislative and judicial 
powers), which would be responsible for monitoring/
surveillance/supervision, i.e. implementing the Trias 
Politica.
There are already certain institutions exercising this 
“fourth power”, such as for example the figure of the 
Ombudsman (mediator), which can supervise the 
correct operation and, yet more importantly, inter-
vene when a system is not working as it should.3 De 
Mulder also emphasises the fact that it is more im-
portant to ensure that an independent monitoring 
body like this exists, rather than trying to prevent 
any malfunctioning. The supervisor can, if needs be, 
intervene and rectify a malfunctioning.  It is in this 
way that the oversight is independent. 
The idea of oversight goes beyond the idea of autho-
risation. The process of independent oversight 
3 The media are also sometimes considered to be the fourth power. 
However, for De Mulder, the media can only partially fulfill this role, 
as they do not have their own agenda and their own interests, as well 
as the fact that they do not actually deal with the issues that are really 
the most important for society. 
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should be guaranteed for the duration of the scheme 
and should be applied to all of the challenges of video 
surveillance and all stages of a CCTV project. 
This is why independent oversight is defined as: 
“Checks and measures put in place to 
maintain the correct functioning of the 
video surveillance systems through a pro-
cess of independent oversight” 
Any control process entails the definition of 
norms. Independent supervision allows, thanks 
to these norms, to bring harmony to the various 
ways of implementing video surveillance fol-
lowing the guidelines of the Charter. Indepen-
dent control can be carried out in various forms 
and at various stages of the development of a 
CCTV system. There can be an independent 
control during the conception itself of the 
system, so as to ensure that the response it will 
give does correspond to the problem that needs 
to be tackled. Also, the power to give the go-
ahead to the installation of video surveillance 
can be given to an independent body. 
Furthermore, independent control can be 
planned at further stages of implementation, 
such as the installation, the daily operations, 
the usage being made of the system, data pro-
tection, operators’ training. Lastly, it can also 
intervene in the evaluation of the system and 
any decision to extend it or not. 
The independent scrutiny might be carried out 
by a qualified individual or a specific body, in-
cluding citizen participation. 
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There are many organisational methods for this in-
dependent oversight. Furthermore, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, it also exists to varying degrees. There 
are some authorities that give authorisation for in-
stalling a video surveillance system such as, in 
France, a departmental commission which is depen-
dent on central government. In Italy, the data protec-
tion authority, the “Garante Privacy” plays a signifi-
cant role in video surveillance, relying on detailed 
legislation, as in Spain, France and Belgium. 
In cities, it is the city council that, traditionally, fulfils 
the role of supervisor and involved to a lesser or 
higher degree in managing video surveillance. The 
example of the city council also demonstrates the 
limits, because it is often the same majorities that de-
cide and supervise the video surveillance. If the mayor 
is not elected by universal suffrage and is therefore 
independent from the majority in the city council, or 
if the opposition does not have a supervisory role, 
this can no longer be considered to be independent. 
In addition, the supervisor must be able to defend 
himself or be defended by an external party. 
With the many checks and measures in place, the 
project partners identified two practices of particular 
interest, which both ensure supervision in very dif-
ferent ways. On one hand, an ethics committee (like 
the ones set up in Lyon or Le Havre in France); on the 
other hand, the figure of the “independent custody 
visitor” , as implemented in the county of Sussex in 
the United Kingdom. 
Ethics committee (France)
The ethics committee is an institution specifically 
set up to monitor video surveillance, in the French 
cities of Lyon and Le Havre, with the specific aim of 
ensuring the respect of liberties. “Its formation re-
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sponds to the objectives of balance, independence 
and plurality. It is made up of elected representatives 
shared equally between the majority and the opposi-
tion, of qualified individuals representing the legal, 
economic and educational spheres and representa-
tives of human rights associations. It is responsible 
for ensuring, beyond the respect of legislative and 
regulatory obligations, that the video surveillance 
system set up by the city does not infringe funda-
mental public or private liberties. It informs citizens 
about the operating conditions of the video surveil-
lance system and deals with any complaints.” (Art. 
4.1 of the ethics charter for video surveillance in 
public spaces in the city of Lyon). An ethics charter, 
like the one created by the city of Lyon or the one that 
the project proposes, can act as a reference point for 
the committee and regulate its operation. The com-
mittee ensures that the ethics charter is properly ap-
plied. To do this, it draws up a report every year re-
garding operating conditions and the impact of the 
system. Within this framework, it can ask the mayor 
to proceed with studies by independent bodies, as 
the city of Lyon is doing at the time of going to press 
(July 2010), with a global evaluation (technical and 
sociological) of its video surveillance system, carried 
out by the town and country planning faculty of the 
university of Lyon (professor Jacques Comby). Then, 
the ethics committee formulates recommendations 
for the mayor. In practice, the ethics committees of 
Lyon and Le Havre are very rarely approached by citi-
zens, which might also be interpreted as evidence 
that they work well. Citizens know that an indepen-
dent supervisor ensures the respect of privacy and 
monitors the correct operation of the system. Fur-
thermore, it may deal with any issue that falls within 
its field of competence. 
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Independent custody visitors (United Kingdom)
The “CCTV” partnership that exists in the county of 
Sussex, involving the police and local authorities, 
has opted for another kind of supervision. The citi-
zens themselves are invited to check the correct op-
eration of the system and to check conformity with 
the Code of use. To this end, a group of a dozen citi-
zens has been recruited following a call for candi-
dates, in order to carry out “spot checks” of police 
surveillance areas and to ensure conformity with the 
Code of use. Furthermore, the independent custody 
visitors may go to review meetings of the police au-
thorities and annual reports. 
Checks can be carried out at any time, day or night, 
without previous warning. Mostly, the visits are car-
ried out by two people. At the start of their assign-
ment, these citizens are given training regarding the 
system and the Code of use, so that they know what 
they should be checking for. If they detect a problem 
or if they have concerns about something, they make 
this known to the police authority and video surveil-
lance management. 
Unlike the ethics committee system, this scheme 
mainly applies to the operation of video surveillance. 
That is why it is complemented by the work of the 
police authority involving local elected representa-
tives. They work with the police on all of their activi-
ties, but also on planning, management, assessment 
and development of video surveillance systems. This 
scheme is particularly interesting for its simplicity, 
the involvement of citizens (principle 7) and its great 
transparency (principle 4). 
  Therefore, in order to apply the 
principle of independent oversight, 
we can recommend that: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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  ➤ the independent authority is responsible, 
after studying the files, for providing the 
authorisations for the installation of video 
surveillance systems;
 ➤ the authority is responsible for ensuring that 
the implementation and use of the system re-
spect the various regulations and norms. 
7.  Principle of citizens’ involvement
This is undoubtedly the principle that is most directly 
linked to the theme of the European project “Citizens, 
cities and video surveillance”: how can the rights and 
liberties of individuals be taken into account and 
how can citizens be involved in drawing up and 
considering the implementation of a local video 
surveillance system?
Involving citizens is not an easy task. How far should 
we intrude into the privacy of citizens in order to guar-
antee their security? How can citizens be involved in a 
system which is devoted to guaranteeing the confi-
dentiality of the information which it creates?
Everything possible must be done to encourage cit-
izen involvement at every stage in the video surveil-
lance system’s life
                   
The principle of citizen participation consists of 
giving citizens a voice, through various forms of con-
sultation, involvement, deliberation and joint deci-
sion-making. Every new installation or extension of 
existing systems should envisage the active partici-
pation of the area’s inhabitants. Wherever possible, 
discussion groups or other forms of citizen partici-
pation should be organised. Citizen participation im-
proves the chances of success.
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 RECOMMENDATIONS /  
 FORMS OF ACTION
	 	•	Support	citizen	participation	in	the	identifica-
tion of needs in the context of the prior auditing, 
for example through victimisation studies; 
	 	•	Encourage	initial	citizen	involvement	in	the	
installation of cameras when responding to a 
specific need. This might take the form of envi-
ronmental visual audits;
	 	•	Seek	citizen	acceptance	of	global	security	
projects. It is recommended to organise public 
information meetings to encourage citizen sup-
port for the local authority’s holistic public se-
curity and crime strategy; 
	 	•	Encourage	citizen	involvement	in	the	control	
and evaluation of the system through satisfac-
tion questionnaires;  
	 	•	A	managed	and	formal	system	to	give	citizens	
the opportunity to visit the video surveillance 
system’s control room. These visits should be 
unannounced. Refusal to allow access must be 
properly documented and explained (i.e. confi-
dential security operation underway) The rights 
of third parties should not be compromised by 
this opportunity.; 
	 	•	Reinforce	the	local	authorities’	engagement	to	
set up a system allowing regular citizen involve-
ment. The creation of a local control and over-
sight structure should include active citizen 
part ic ipat ion in the system’s l i fe  and 
development. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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The principle of citizens’ involvement in 
practice
For the cities involved in this project, this principle 
was already a reality, because the project for in-
stalling a video surveillance system came about in 
response to an increased demand for security on the 
part of the citizens. This is the case in the munici-
pality of Ibiza (Spain), for example, which after 
having analysed the demands of the residents, the 
schemes already in place and their results, decided 
to install five cameras in areas where no other 
methods had proven to be effective. 
Other municipalities, such as Genoa, Le Havre or 
Saint-Herblain, have organised public debates with 
the residents or meetings with neighbourhood asso-
ciations in order to work out their needs and the best 
ways of responding to them.
In Rotterdam, this principle is integrated into all of 
the city’s policies, including security policies. To en-
sure that the policies defined by the municipality ad-
equately meet the citizens’ demands, the municipality 
annually assesses the security schemes, which in-
clude the CCTV system. The mayor reserves the right 
to be able to install and remove cameras depending 
on the reaction of the public and the results obtained. 
This principle does not only apply in the event that it 
has been decided to install cameras, or when as-
sessing whether or not the response provided by the 
authorities has met the demands of the residents. It 
can be integrated into all stages of the implementa-
tion of an instrument of an integrated security policy, 
even in the operation of the video surveillance system 
itself. It is through consultation with residents that 
the authorities can choose the exact location for 
placing a camera, in order to make a space that 
is perceived as potentially dangerous more secure. 
This permanent dialogue strengthens the feeling of 
participation of individuals in political decisions. 
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The city of Liège organises “open days”, when resi-
dents can go on guided visits of the control rooms. 
In Sussex, the population have voted overwhelm-
ingly in favour of the “external visitors” scheme.
These are just a few examples of the initiatives taken 
by responsible authorities to involve citizens in secu-
rity policies. 
III. TOWARDS A COMMON LANGUAGE  
FOR VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN EUROPE: 
PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON SIGNAGE 
How can we move forward together in the sense of 
creating a common language in Europe in terms of 
security and video surveillance? This was also one of 
the main threads of this project, focussing on the im-
portance of communication that is transparent vis-
à-vis the citizens. Faced with the increased mobility 
of people in and around Europe, it has become clear 
that there is a need to create common points of refer-
ence and to translate public policies into a language 
that is easy for everyone to understand. Hence the 
idea of proposing a common signage for cities using 
CCTV cameras. This proposal also responds directly 
to a demand formulated by the European courts: the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
called for the creation of European signage in its res-
olution 1604 of 2008, as did the Article 29 working 
group for data protection in 2004 with its Recom-
mendation 4/2004 regarding video surveillance. 
A primary study on existing signage has highlighted 
that there are some very good instruments for com-
munication but that some shortcomings also exist. 
Some countries, such as Belgium or Italy, have a very 
precise legislative framework regarding signage, pro-
viding a fixed structure for all the details that need to 
be mentioned, including a standardised pictogram. 
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In others, the law states that citizens must be in-
formed of the fact that they are in an area of CCTV 
surveillance, without giving precise details, and it is 
up to each authority to decide the way in which this 
communication shall be organised. It is in this sce-
nario that one will find, for example, signs showing 
no pictogram, written in the language of the country 
only, therefore impossible for a tourist to decipher, 
without any information regarding the identity of the 
responsible authority.
In view of the results of this research, it was decided 
that the partners of this project would reflect on the 
creation of a common signage and the requirements :
 ➤ Signage should contain both text and images, so 
as to be understandable by anyone who does not 
speak the local language.
➤ The pictogram should reflect the current techno-
logical advances. Increasingly, “dome” type cameras 
are used in cities, and as they are new, they are not 
spotted or identified by citizens. By proposing a pic-
togram that resembles a dome, the project aims not 
only to inform citizens of the increasingly frequent 
use of this type of camera, but also to inform them of 
the existence of this kind of technology. Signage also 
plays an educational role.
 
➤ As regards the text, all of the partners agree that 
the word “video” should feature, because it is 
common to all European languages. 
➤ It is also important for the term “public space” to 
appear, because it is necessary to signal that the public 
security policy concerns public and not private space. 
➤ It was also deemed important to clarify the aim of 
the video surveillance system, so that inhabitants 
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clearly understand the link between this instrument 
and the local security policy.
➤ The rules governing the transparency of public 
policies require the authority in charge of the instal-
lation and operation of cameras to be clearly indi-
cated, and for at least one method of direct commu-
nication to be provided (telephone, website).
 ➤ Finally, the principle of legality - meaning that the 
installation and management of a video surveillance 
system can only be carried out in strict compliance 
with the law - should also be included in the signage 
and must mention the precise legal framework gov-
erning the system, along with the measures re-
garding data protection. 
How would this signage be used? 
Insofar as the majority of cities have already imple-
mented signage, the project partners obviously asked 
themselves what the added value of European sig-
nage like this would be. 
Firstly, the Charter’s recommendations for signage 
that provides maximum information might en-
courage cities to change and complete their own 
signage. 
For cities that do not yet have their own signage, the 
recommendations can provide a guide that is easy to 
adapt, depending on the local context.
For other authorities in charge of financing video 
surveillance, such as regions or ministries, the 
above-mentioned elements can act as recommenda-
tions for the communication section.
Last but not least, the use of a common signage 
throughout the whole of Europe would contribute to 
a much greater transparency of public policies, thus 
benefiting citizens of all the member states. 
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Part III
Zoom on the cities: 
How they use CCTV 
and how they protect 
fundamental rights 
and liberties
➤
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 Video surveillance system:  
‘Integrated network system for protection and 
security’. The City of Bologna & The Emilia-
Romagna Region
    The city of Bologna’s video surveillance project was born of the desire to find solu-tions to pressing problems such as the 
feeling of insecurity, which is linked to the presence 
of groups of drugs-dealers and the degradation of 
certain public spaces in the city’s historic centre.  
During April 2000, the municipal service respon-
sible for security in Bologna conducted a survey of 
753 of the city’s inhabitants in order to improve un-
derstanding of their perception of insecurity. The re-
sults demonstrated that the problem of crime is 
BOLOGNa
number of inhabitants :
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responsible authority : 
City of Bologna
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rooted in a feeling of insecurity, especially in the his-
toric centre of Bologna. In reaction to these findings, 
the city administration decided to install a video sur-
veillance system in the north-east zone of the city’s 
historic quarter.  
In June 2000, this initial video surveillance project 
was presented by the city of Bologna to the Emilia-
Romagna Region. The regional authority regularly 
funds improvements in urban security and public 
spaces, particularly urban renewal, street lighting 
and surveillance based on new technologies. 
The project was 50 % financed by the Emilia-Ro-
magna Region as part of a programme agreement 
signed in 2002 with the city of Bologna. 
The total cost of the video surveillance system’s in-
stallation was 1,829,164.80 euros. The cost of the 
network of fibre-optics transmitting the images is 
approximately 100,000 euros per year. There is also 
an annual maintenance cost of 50,000euros. Addi-
tionally, around 200,000.00 euros were provided in 
2009 (66% financed by the Emilia-Romagna Re-
gion, the rest by the city of Bologna) to replace the 
oldest cameras (installed in 2000) and generally to 
improve the technological aspects of the system as a 
whole. The installation costs were equally divided 
between the city and the Region, while the operation 
and maintenance costs are met entirely by the city.  
In total 291 cameras have been installed in the city. 
New funding by the Emilia-Romagna Region will 
raise this number to 315 by the end of 2010. The 
cameras are analogue and are equipped with noc-
turnal vision. Eighteen of the cameras are ‘dome 
cameras’ (these can be turned 360° horizontally and 
zoom). The images are transmitted by an analogue 
feeder network. Transfer of images between camera 
and recording system is by coaxial feeder cables, 
157
whereas the police operation centres are linked by 
fibre-optic cables. Future funding by the Emilia-Ro-
magna Region will be used to connect the whole 
system with fibre-optic cables. 
The Project ‘Integrated network system for protec-
tion and security’ is based on the installation of in-
novative technologies to prevent and limit the possi-
bilities for committing a crime.  
Images recorded by cameras on the busiest pedes-
trian routes and at bus stops in the town centre are 
sent simultaneously to the headquarters of both the 
national and municipal police forces. The National 
Police Headquarters can then send the images to the 
judicial authorities as items of evidence. The Local 
and National police can view the encrypted images 
and keeps them for up to 7 days until their 
destruction. 
The operator in the National Police Headquarters of 
the Municipal Police station can:
➤ View the images from all cameras
➤ Control the cameras remotely
The Municipal Police manages the installation with 
the help of technicians from a private company and 
with the advice of the National Police. The National 
Police, the Municipal Police and the Carabinieri con-
trol the cameras.   
In the Municipal Police’s video surveillance central 
operations office, three police officers work relayed 
shifts to ensure 24 hour coverage. 
Meanwhile, in the National Police headquarters, a 
State Police Inspector and two assistants are on hand 
twenty-four hours a day. The inspector and one of 
the two assistants have participated in training or-
ganised by the city of Bologna. 
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The choice of operators is limited by national legisla-
tion which restricts the choice to police officers of the 
judicial police. In total, the images are consulted by a 
dozen operators drawn from the national police, the 
municipal police and the carabinieri. The images 
cannot be shared in real time with other services.  
Only agents of the judicial police can access the 
saved images, with the authorisation of a magistrate. 
To view the images, not only authorisation but also 
physically the key is needed. However, only the 
system manager has permission to consult the re-
cordings and must use a specific access key. 
The state police’s role in real time is essentially re-
pressive (following an alert raised by the cameras’ 
images) but can also include a form of ‘tracking’ of 
suspects using the cameras’ zoom capabilities.  
The preventive function of the cameras is clearly 
linked to the increased risks faced by a criminal when 
committing a theft or other anti-social behaviour. A 
greater surveillance of the territory can give citizens 
a feeling of greater protection, with the possibility of 
a more rapid response from the Police. 
The network has been evaluated before, during and 
after its functioning. Evaluation is carried out 
through crime statistics, reports of petty crime and 
anti-social behaviour, urban degradation and per-
ceptions of insecurity.
However, it is difficult to measure precisely the proj-
ect’s results, as the crime statistics are not suffi-
ciently detailed (notably from a geographic point of 
view) and do not allow a full analysis of the evolution 
of crime rates. The police forces have expressed their 
satisfaction, seeing video surveillance as an effective 
tool for the identification of individuals and for use 
in trials and legal proceedings (thereby a punitive 
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aspect). The preventive aspect is less clear. Citizens’ 
satisfaction is nonetheless high, even if the system 
does not meet all the expectations that were ex-
pressed before it was put in place. The displacement 
effects (relocation of criminal activities) are not quan-
tifiable, due to a lack of reliable statistics. 
Gian Guido Nobili
The City of Bologna &  
The Emilia-Romagna Region (Italy)
Part III: Zoom on the cities: How they use CCTV and how 
they protect fundamental rights and liberties
160 161
    The video surveillance system of the city of Brno (Czech Republic) was put in place by the national police and the municipality, 
within the framework of the Crime Prevention Pro-
grammes covering the period 1996 to 2008. The 
system includes 18 cameras, and its cost was roughly 
627,000 euros (according to the exchange rate as of 
July, 15, 2010). These cameras cover mostly the city 
centre, various areas around the main railway and 
bus stations, and the city’s busiest traffic areas.
Prior to the installation of the video surveillance 
system, local authorities conducted a series of inves-
tigations concerning safety in Brno, which included 
surveys among the population, socio-demographic 
analyses, and police statistics. The preliminary work 
➤
also included interviews with local and national po-
licemen, social workers, members of NGOs and other 
street workers.
The primary objectives assigned to the system were:
➤ to increase the feeling of safety among citizens in 
the areas of the city with the highest delinquency 
rates; 
➤ to prevent crime; 
➤ to facilitate the intervention of security forces 
when a crime is committed in the areas monitored by 
the video surveillance system.
Apart from this system, there are 57 other cameras 
installed in several districts of the city, operated by 
the municipal police and the district authorities. The 
total cost of this additional system is of approxi-
mately 2.3 million euros (according to the exchange 
rate as of July, 15, 2010). These cameras monitor 
areas considered as problematic, among others be-
cause of the presence of groups of people known to 
be prone to delinquency. 
The CCTV system of Brno’s public transport com-
pany is comprised of 24 units. Also, 38 tram cars are 
equipped with cameras. There are another 64 cam-
eras installed by the city’s road maintenance com-
pany. All of the above-mentioned joint stock compa-
nies do not provide in their official documentation 
(such as their annual reports) the amount invested in 
the installation of their CCTV systems, nor their op-
erational costs. 
According to the Czech law, CCTV operators can only 
be either the national or the municipal police. Fi-
nancing is assured through the city budget or 
through subsidies paid by the Crime Prevention Pro-
grammes. The operational costs are paid by the po-
BRNO
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lice administration (both local and national), and by 
the Public Transport Company and Brno’s Road 
Maintenance company. All the CCTV systems in-
stalled in Brno are part of an integrated network. 
According to the regulation of the Office for Personal 
Data Protection -which has the authority to sanc-
tion-, private operators are allowed to monitor cer-
tain types of public areas such as parking lots, super-
markets etc. But their CCTVs cannot include the 
recording of images. Also, their images cannot be 
used in police investigations. 
The video recordings from the CCTV systems of the 
city of Brno and the Czech national police are stored 
for 20 days and then recorded over. They can only be 
accessed by the national police (70 camera surveil-
lance operators and three members of the police de-
partment of analyses). The criminal police and the 
road traffic police can also use recordings in the 
course of an investigation. 
The recordings are kept in a special storage room at 
the national police’s operational centre, to which no 
one has access except duly authorised officers, who 
receive a special training. The system is accessible 
through a code. 
The Czech Republic’s legislation on the protection of 
privacy is included both in the civil code and in the 
law on the protection of personal data. Czech au-
thorities also apply the ISO code of practice for infor-
mation security management (CSN ISO 27 001). 
Furthermore, there is a special police directive con-
cerning the performance of the operational centre. 
The directives concerning the handling of video re-
cordings are given by the national police. In order to 
control their application, a special section has been 
put in place in the national police, called the police 
administrator of personal data protection.
The current technology does not allow 
blacking out of private areas
One shortcoming that needs to be highlighted is the 
lack of information given to the public. People are 
only informed of the installation of new cameras 
through press conferences. On the other hand, in 
some problematic areas, the city has put up signs in 
the streets indicating the presence of video cameras, 
when actually there are no cameras there. This inita-
tive was taken because it does have an effect to pre-
vent delinquency and increase the feeling of safety 
among the public, at a very low cost.  
The city conducts regular surveys among its popula-
tion about their feeling of safety and their apprecia-
tion of the CCTV systems. Surveys indicate that the 
majority of inhabitants have no idea where the cam-
eras are installed although they believe that they are 
safer thanks to the CCTV. In 2005, 4.5% of respon-
dents believed the installation of CCTV restricts per-
sonal freedom. In 2009, this figure had gone down 
to only 1.9% . Given the usual margin of error in 
such surveys, it is fair to state that the amount of 
people who believe CCTV infringes on personal 
freedom is now insignificant. 
In fact, the video surveillance systems in Brno have 
not generated any kind of public debate nor opposi-
tion. There have been no public protests against it, 
nor any initiative in favour or against CCTV surveil-
lance. All of the democratic political parties repre-
sented in the assembly of the city of Brno include in 
their programmes a chapter on safety and crime pre-
vention. And from left to right, all of them are in fa-
vour of prevention. 
Every phase of the installation of the video surveil-
lance has been discussed in the Crime Prevention 
City Council, then recommended by the City Council 
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and approved by the Assembly of the City of Brno. At 
the national level the Crime Prevention Department 
of the Ministry of Interior was consulted and the 
project has been approved by the National Com-
mittee for Crime Prevention. 
The public is not allowed to see the video recordings, 
as stipulated by the legislation. In case of extremely 
serious crimes, the police is allowed to release some 
images to the media. This is done by the information 
department of the police, based in the regional head-
quarters of Southern Moravia. 
The evaluation of the CCTV systems is carried out by 
the Crime Prevention Department of the Ministry of 
Interior, among others thanks to the information pro-
vided by the city and the police, including comparative 
analyses of crime and offence rates in the areas which 
are video-monitored and those which are not. It is 
worth noting that indeed, thanks to the video surveil-
lance, there has been a decrease in crimes against 
property. Also, groups of pickpockets have left the 
areas under video surveillance and gone to other, less 
“attractive” zones. Furthermore, surveys show that 
citizens feel safer in the monitored areas. 
All these elements show that CCTV systems can be 
considered a useful tool in the security policy of the 
city of Brno. It can be recommended in a functional, 
democratic society, provided data and recordings are 
properly secured by legislative and technical means, 
thus guaranteeing fundamental individual rights and 
freedom. The risk, as always when handling sensi-
tive data, is in the human factor. We would certainly 
not recommend the use of CCTV in a non-democratic 
society where corruption, blackmail and extortion 
are commonplace.
Stanislas Jaburek
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 CCTV in Italy led by the city council of 
Genoa  
    Italy witnesses an increase of citizens’ re-quests in terms of security, despite the re-duction, or at least the relative stabilisation, 
of serious crime. The factors contributing to the in-
crease of this demand are essentially: 
a) the media coverage of crime and the search for 
scoops, which can lead to the perception of excep-
tions as the general rule. The influence of a particular 
incident entails the risk of generalisation. 
b) the fear of diversity, a challenge that we constantly 
face, because of the fast rhythm and the continuous 
evolution of social changes and difficulties in terms 
GeNOa
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of social inclusion; 
c) the conviction that we should find a way to control 
all aspects of our environment, in its individual or 
collective components and therefore, we should be 
able to hold someone accountable for any negative 
incident that could happen to us, at least from the 
objective responsibility point of view;
d) the fact that ‘our’ behaviour is an independent vari-
able and that someone else should guarantee our 
security. 
In this framework, the intervention measures most 
called for are more severe sentences, more resources 
and powers for the police, and control technologies. 
Very often, the latter offers responses according to 
the circumstances and only in a limited number of 
cases. 
In Italy, public order and security fall under the juris-
diction of the State. The recent legislation modifica-
tion gives more competences to the mayors in terms 
of urban security, which they exert by means of ordi-
nances and by developing CCTV systems. 
In the city of Genoa, urban security policies started 
to develop in the mid 90s, following the increasing 
citizens’ demand for security, which is addressed 
more and more directly to the elected representatives 
and especially to the mayors, while at the same time 
recognizing the role of the forces of law and order 
and of all the public authorities in charge of security. 
Those security policies focused primarily on action 
in the historical city centre; they are part of the Urban 
II European Programme, which allowed, with the 
Police Headquarters’ agreement, to install cameras, 
under the police responsibility, to watch a number of 
rough areas. Following the Security Pact concluded 
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between the Interior Ministry and ANCI (Italian Na-
tional Cities Association), the “Genoa safe city” Pact 
has been signed in 2007. Within this framework, a 
project to develop a local CCTV system has been 
funded. The main objective of the project is to estab-
lish a tool able to prevent criminal acts to happen, 
and to increase the citizens’ perception of security. 
In order to identity the city rough areas which would 
be appropriate to control with the CCTV installa-
tions, we considered necessary to involve the city 
council, as representatives of the population living in 
the areas concerned. Because we were convinced 
that spaces identification and choosing the technolo-
gies to adopt have to bring a real answer to the secu-
rity need of the area and of the citizens, we initiated a 
location process of rough areas with a geo-classified 
information computer system, which enabled us to 
chose where to install the surveillance cameras. The 
results will be restored to the citizens via various 
forms of appropriate communication. 
At the moment there are three CCTV systems on the 
city of Genoa territory. The first one aims to control 
traffic; it is composed of 38 CCTV devices watching 
the main roads. The National Police, thanks to its 
central control station, manages 97 surveillance 
cameras. Finally, in 2009, the first 60 cameras of the 
local CCTV system have been installed.
 
The main lines to ensure the appropriate develop-
ment of the local CCTV system are announced in the 
personal data protection ordinance promulgated in 
2004, in which are set out four general principles: 
1-Legality
2-Necessity
3-Proportionality
4-Purpose
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In order to ensure that those principles are respected, 
a special technical Commission has been created. It 
is composed of a representative of the local Police, a 
representative of the national Police and a govern-
ment official, expert on CCTV. This Commission is in 
charge of identifying the spaces that should be sub-
jected to CCTV, on the bases of the needs expressed 
by the citizens. 
From a legislative point of view, image processing is 
generally assimilated to personal data processing. 
Given the great difference between the nature of im-
ages and the nature of personal data processed on 
paper or on computers, it was considered necessary to 
bring the images processing methods into line with 
the principles of the norms in force in terms of privacy 
protection, to guarantee the citizens protection and 
rights. 
To that purpose, the city of Genoa elaborated a regula-
tion, currently under inspection, which:
➤ Sets out the general principles that the local admin-
istration must respect in CCTV activities; 
➤ Enumerates the objectives on which the adminis-
tration can process images;
➤ Defines the scope of situations in which it is pos-
sible to apply these CCTV measures;
➤ Identifies the tools that can be used;
➤ Lays down the obligation of traceability of the ac-
cess of recorded data;
➤ Defines the forms of communication to the citizens 
and decides of the period during which images can be 
retained, according to the different aims and objec-
tives pursued;
➤ Recognises the rights of individuals being filmed, as 
well as those of the population in its entirety, and de-
fines how those rights can be exercised.
The right of access to images from the people con-
cerned should be proportional to the objectives of effi-
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ciency, of performance and of cost saving of public ac-
tors’ action, of the protection of third party’s privacy 
and of response to sensible requests, in the respect of 
fairness and efficiency principles of public administra-
tion, as enunciated in our Constitution. 
It is undeniable that the importance of human and 
economic resources to implement CCTV systems re-
quires verifying the efficiency of the choices made. In 
this optic, the city of Genoa equipped itself with a first 
tool, consisting of launching surveys of satisfaction to 
measure the perception of security of the citizens after 
the interventions, and of starting a research project to 
identify the impact of the city’s policies in terms of 
urban security.  
Mariapia Verdona
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    The installation, in July 2009, of a video surveillance system in the city of Ibiza, capital of the Balearic island of the same 
name, was part of a series of measures taken by the 
municipality to rehabilitate the quarters of the his-
toric centre, invaded by marginalisation and crime. 
Since 1987, the municipality has invested some 50 
million euros in the renovation of the three most ‘dif-
ficult’ neighbourhoods of the old town —Sa Penya, 
La Marina and Dalt Villa— turning streets into pe-
destrian zones, creating new cultural areas, and im-
proving infrastructures. 
At the same time, the town council reinforced its 
crime prevention policy by increasing the number of 
community police in these neighbourhoods and, 
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since 2006, by taking steps with the regional gov-
ernment to obtain the authorisation to install video 
cameras. The project presentation dossier included 
statistical data on local crime as well as newspaper 
articles devoted to crime in the old town. On the 
other hand, all the technical characteristics of the 
cameras as well as their planned emplacements were 
indicated in this dossier. 
With a permanent population of some 41,000 in-
habitants, the city of Ibiza (Eivissa in the local Cat-
alan language) welcomes some 400,000 tourists 
every year. Thefts, minor drug-dealing, public drunk-
enness... The tourist success of Ibiza—one of the 
most heavily frequented sites of the Mediterranean 
and a Mecca of the legendary Spanish movida—has 
had a direct impact on crime, in particular that which 
is linked to the drug traffic. This is particularly sub-
stantial in the old town of Eivissa, the nerve centre of 
nightlife. According to information published in June 
2006 by the local newspaper Diario de Ibiza, the re-
ported crime rate in the islands of Ibiza and Formen-
tera was, at the time, more than twice the Spanish 
average (118 offences per inhabitant versus 49.3 on 
average in Spain) *.
The town council requested the authorisation for 
a total of five video cameras, four of which were 
installed in July 2009. The cost of the installation 
was 89,600 euros, with maintenance being financed 
by the municipality. 
Data protection and respect of private life
The town council is responsible for the storing of 
tapes, delegated to the municipal police, as well as 
their use or destruction. A team of eight video opera-
tors operates the  cameras and has direct access to 
the images. Once these are recorded, only three po-
lice officers are authorised to view them. There is no 
other transmission, live or recorded, of the images. 
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though this was not legally mandatory). On the other 
hand, one can note that, aside from the inhabitants 
of the residential blocks where the cameras were in-
stalled, the rest of the population of Eivissa was not 
informed as to the exact location of the cameras. 
The setting-up of the  video surveillance system pro-
voked no contention or controversy. At very most, 
there were a few protests as to the waiting period for 
the installation, which some deemed too long. 
Positive results
At the end of the first year of operation, the munic-
ipal team and local police judge the effects of the 
system to be positive. It has allowed for reducing 
criminal acts and also served in the framework of 
several police operations. Video surveillance there-
fore constitutes a useful complement to the work of 
community policing carried out in the quarters of 
Eivissa’s old town. Generally speaking, this is also 
the opinion of a large part of the local population. 
* ‘Las Pitiüses duplican la tasa media de delincuencia 
por habitante de España’, Diario de Ibiza, 6 June 2006 
Manuel Ayala Garcia
However, the municipal police has, on occasion, 
turned over some tapes to the national police in the 
framework of its investigations. 
The tapes are destroyed after a maximum waiting 
period of a month, unless they are being used in the 
case of an investigation on a serious crime or if legal 
proceedings are in progress. 
When potentially criminal acts are taped, the videos 
are turned over to the legal authorities within a max-
imum of 62 hours after recording. When it concerns 
acts that may constitute an ‘administrative offence’ 
linked to ‘civil security’ (in the terms of Spanish law), 
the tapes are immediately turned over to the compe-
tent authorities in order to initiate criminal proceed-
ings. In the event of the illegal recording of images 
and sounds, the tape must be destroyed immedi-
ately, in accordance with the Fundamental law 
4/1997.
In the case where only partial destruction of the re-
cording is necessary, and if total destruction is im-
possible or inappropriate for technical reasons or 
depending on the  procedure used, the person re-
sponsible for storing the tapes must distort or block 
the sounds and images in question so as to make 
them unusable. This must be done according to the 
technical means available. 
Public Information
The inhabitants of Eivissa were informed of the in-
stallation of the  video surveillance system primarily 
via a campaign in the local press. The population of 
the neighbourhoods concerned was also informed by 
local authorities about all the measures of the law on 
personal data protection and recourse procedures in 
the event of anomaly. Furthermore, the inhabitants 
of the residential blocks where the cameras were in-
stalled were informed personally by those in charge 
of the installation, who requested their consent (even 
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    In Le Havre, we have set up a permanent partnership with State services (the Sub-prefect), the Justice service (District At-
torney), the National Police (the Chief of Public Se-
curity for the Arrondissement of Le Havre), the 
National Education service (Local Education Au-
thority Inspector), who we meet with fortnightly, 
along with the Deputy Mayor, the Deputy Head of 
Security and the Municipal Security Department, 
within the framework of the limited unit of the Local 
Security and Crime Prevention Committee [Comité 
Local de Sécurité et de la Prévention de la Délinquance] 
(C.L.S.P.D].
➤
➤ We have, since the first discussions regarding a 
project for the installation of video surveillance, sub-
mitted this question to our partners to get their opin-
ions, then at each stage of the implementation, reali-
sation, creation of a possible Ethics Committee, its 
composition and will pursue these exchanges when-
ever it seems necessary to extend areas of video 
surveillance.
➤ Sometimes, at the request of the National Police, 
we plan and propose a sustainable expansion of the 
system, depending on the number of actual inci-
dences of crime in an area or neighbourhood. 
➤ It is only after collective consideration, and always 
in due course, that we put extra cameras in place, 
and not by way of reaction to the demand of a fellow 
citizen, who may have been the victim of a crime.
There are so many requests for cameras, coming 
from all areas of the city, and from private individ-
uals, shopkeepers as well as business owners, that 
we simply cannot respond to them all. 
Between 2004 and the end of 2005, the date that the 
first three cameras were installed in a neighbour-
hood shopping centre which was going to close due 
to crime, which we succeeded in stamping out, the 
Deputy Head of Security informed the City Council of 
the project, and received representatives from var-
ious forms of the media: written press, radio, televi-
sion and associations: the Human Rights League, 
neighbourhood associations and all residents of Le 
Havre who requested meetings to find out about the 
scheme. The maximum amount of information was 
communicated before, during and since the installa-
tion. This information was precise, transparent and 
in full. 
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We believe that urban video surveillance is a useful 
tool for security policies and crime prevention within 
the framework of the City of Le Havre’s local security 
contract. It aims to prevent incidents involving 
people and property, to contribute to the feeling of 
security of individuals and to ensure the security of 
communal buildings and exposed public spaces. 
This measure should accommodate the need to re-
spect public and individual liberties, in accordance 
with the ethos of the Law on the Orientation and 
Programming for Internal Security (LOPSI) of 21 
January 1995 and its decrees affecting the applica-
tion thereof. 
Out of a permanent concern to ensure that citizens 
have the maximum level of protection, the City of Le 
Havre created an ethics committee for video surveil-
lance of public spaces. 
This Ethics Committee is composed of three 
colleges: 
➤ three elected representatives, one of whom is 
chosen by the municipal opposition.
 
➤ three qualified individuals:
• the ex-vice chancellor of the university
• a former President of the Bar of lawyers
• a representative of the Chamber of Commerce
➤ three representatives of associations:
•  the chairman of the association Aide aux Victimes 
(Victim Support)
•  the chairman of Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais 
du Havre (Superior Council of the Senegalese 
people of Le Havre)
• the chairman of a social workers association
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The ethics committee for video surveillance of public 
spaces is therefore responsible for:
➤ ensuring that public liberties are respected at all 
times
➤ informing citizens about the operation of the 
system
➤ examining, at the request of the mayor of Le 
Havre, any requests for access to images or other 
citizen complaints
➤ articulating opinions and recommendations to the 
mayor regarding the operation of the system
➤ presenting an annual report to the mayor of Le 
Havre with regard to the operation of video 
surveillance.
All of this information, and the reality of its useful-
ness, mean that there is currently no (or only very 
slight) opposition to operating CCTV protection in 
our city. 
 
Bertrand Binctin
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     Presentation of CCTV use in the city 
of Liège,
    Liège, a thousand year old city, a city known for its century-old university, is a major economic and cultural engine of 
Wallonia. In the heart of a metropolitan area of 
600,000 inhabitants, it is located at the crossroads 
of the fast railway “TGV” and trans-European roads 
networks, 100 km away from Brussels, 25 km away 
from Maastricht, and 40 km away from Aachen. 
This fervent city, day and night, favours friendliness 
and hospitality. It receives many big sporting, festive 
and cultural events. 
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Since 2002, the CCTV renovation project was en-
tered amongst the priority action proposals, subject 
to the citizens’ choice as part of the section “A safe 
city” in the citizen consultation about the City 
Project. The vote turned out overwhelmingly in its 
favour. 
Since then, at the request of the Town Mayor, the 
services of the Liège Local Police Area have been in-
stalling successively a total of 109 surveillance cam-
eras from 2003 to 2008. 
On a technological aspect, the cameras are high 
technology “speed domes”, high-definition, allowing 
360° rotation horizontally and 90° vertically. The 
zoom enables to read clearly a number plate 150 
metres away, day and night. 
All the cameras parameters are defined in a way that 
visualization is not possible in a private house. They 
are not equipped with an intelligence operating 
system, thus the importance of having in front of the 
screens properly trained staff who knows the neigh-
bourhood they are watching and its usual 
population. 
They are all interconnected with a closed circuit of 
optical fibres – thus excluding any hacking risk – and 
visualised in the Events Management Centre as well 
as in two Local Police Stations. The data are not 
shared with any other service or institution. 
Visualisation is carried out exclusively by police offi-
cers – personnel on oath, bound by confidentiality. 
The images are recorded and deleted after seven 
days, whereas the Belgian Law allows keeping im-
ages up to a month. 
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LIÈGe
number of inhabitants :
190,000 
number of cameras :		
109 
responsible authority : 
Police/boroughs
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Individuals can request to visualise images con-
cerning them, through a claim to the system admin-
istrator, who is the Town Mayor. Appeal against the 
system administrator is possible. 
The tribunal prosecutor department and the exam-
ining magistrate can also seek images if they might 
interfere in a penal case. 
The cameras installation location has been chosen 
according to the objectives pursued by this system. 
The aim is to provide a quality solution to the three 
types of issues raised below:
➤ circulation issue, with the viewing of the major 
roads penetrating into the city,
➤ law and order issue, with the viewing of recurrent 
demonstration places,
➤ security and environment issues, with the viewing 
of some sensitive areas such as the main nightlife 
streets. 
Information signs are put on display in the urban 
area, indicating who is the system administrator. 
For each of the four successive stages, the files had to 
be approved by the local Council, where concerns re-
garding respect of individual liberties have been 
publicly discussed. 
The objectives pursued and the specific locations of 
the cameras are regularly promoted through the 
media via communiqués and press conferences. 
Information to the population is also provided 
through contacts with local committees, before the 
installation as well as after, as part of the continuous 
assessment of the system. People attending those 
meetings are therefore openly invited by the Town 
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Mayor to express their wishes concerning the 
cameras. 
In 2007 was established a Local Control Commis-
sion, composed of representatives of each of the four 
democratic political groups represented in the Liège 
Local Council. They meet every two or three month. 
The Local Control Commission objective is to guar-
antee the implementation of the 2007 Belgian Law. 
In particular, it makes sure that:
➤ viewing in the “cameras” centre is carried out ex-
clusively by police staff specifically trained;
➤ the statement to the Privacy Commission has been 
correctly fulfilled;
➤ parameters hide the private buildings particular 
areas;
➤ information signs in accordance with legal decrees 
are installed in the streets concerned;
➤ the images are retained, then destroyed after 7 
days. 
The town councillors are regularly informed of as-
sessment elements: the results of the Local Control 
Commission works, Police special Commission 
meetings, Events Management Centre visits… 
Such visits of the Events Management Centre are 
regularly suggested to the general public, as part of 
the Police “Open day” for example, and are always a 
success. 
In terms of cost, the overall system installation rep-
resents a sum amounting to over 5 millions euros. 
The operating costs are null, since the red rests on 
optical fibre. However, an annual budget of around 
100.000,00 euros for preventive maintenance has to 
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be expected. Moreover, it is possible to adapt the in-
stallation to technological evolution by purchasing 
specific computer software. 
The system impact is considered positive in terms of 
deterrence and security of the population; however 
there is still no extern assessment of the system. 
Over a year period, the cameras enabled to constitute 
54 red-handed criminal acts and brought 58 positive 
results to investigation follow-up requests.
Catherine Schlitz
LONDON
number of inhabitants :
7,684,700 
number of cameras :		
600,000 
responsible authority : 
Police/boroughs
 Description of the project to create a 
CCTV installation
    The London experience, indeed the UK experience, with CCTV does not take the form of a single project. In the first in-
stance, London is divided up into 33 administrative 
areas, each with its own CCTV system.  In addition, 
there are many other schemes to which public au-
thorities have access and there are also many private 
CCTV systems which cover public space (cameras 
owned by business covering access and exit points).
The use of video surveillance has been growing ex-
ponentially over recent decades.  Initially cameras 
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were introduced to control traffic in the 1960s. Later 
systems were introduced into large retail settings 
(1970s and 80s) where there was a certain ambiguity 
about the nature of the space. In other words, in 
large shopping malls the thoroughfare between indi-
vidual retail units feels like public space although it 
is in fact private.  Most of these malls are patrolled by 
private security guards, usually with a protocol with 
local police allowing/encouraging regular patrolling 
by them also.  In addition, CCTV has been used for 
some time to manage large sporting events – notably 
football matches where it has proved a successful 
feature of the strategy to remove violence from the 
stadia and their environs.  All this, coupled with an 
extended period with a real threat of terrorism has 
combined to acclimatise the UK public to the use of 
video surveillance. So complete has this been that 
very often it is communities themselves that demand 
the installation of cameras.  
    
The desire to reduce crime has been a consistent 
factor in the development of schemes with the ob-
vious additional potential objective of preventing 
terrorism as well as providing a valuable detective 
option. The use of CCTV is now so pervasive that 
there is a broad underlying assumption that one is 
being observed by camera even if this is not in fact 
the case. Most if not all of the town centres across 
London are covered extensively by CCTV cameras. It 
is not easy to say with any precision how many cam-
eras there are, however, the Command and Control 
Centre for the Police is capable of accessing over 
60,000 cameras. As a guide, Heathrow Airport alone 
has some 3,000 cameras.
It has been argued, with increasing determination, 
that the use and placement of cameras has been 
somewhat indiscriminate.  It has tended not to take 
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heed of the potential impact on the displacement of 
criminal or anti-social behaviour and, furthermore 
there is little evidence that once an identified problem 
has been reduced that cameras are removed or rede-
ployed. These issues are now being addressed in a 
more structured way through the development of a 
national video surveillance strategy under the guid-
ance of the Home Office. Clearly, this activity comes 
long after the use of such technology is well estab-
lished.  Indeed, we are into a second or even third 
generation of such technology as local authorities 
and their partners upgrade their systems to take ad-
vantage of recent developments in this field. For in-
stance, there is a broad shift from analogue to digital 
technology and an increased use of dome cameras, 
with the particular advantage that those within the 
area being viewed cannot be sure which direction the 
cameras are facing. Of course, it is a common theme 
with popular technology that the desire to obtain the 
latest equipment obscures the rational reflection on 
what level of technological complexity best fits a 
given situation – the easy analogy being the purchase 
of a Ferrari to go to the supermarket shopping!  There 
is now a growing desire to examine the benefits ac-
cruing from such systems, given the considerable 
costs involved. However, it would seem that the re-
moval of systems would be a politically difficult 
decision.
With the emergence of local authority CCTV sys-
tems, from the mid 1980s onwards, there was a pre-
sumption that these systems should be under the 
control of these local authorities rather than the po-
lice. However, it has been a consistent feature of the 
approach that the police have had ready access to the 
cameras, either through officers in the control rooms 
or by having live images relayed to police control 
rooms and even with staff there being able to take 
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control of the cameras to monitor specific incidents. 
The rapid development of partnership working be-
tween the police and local authorities has seen the 
further blurring of distinction between police and 
local authority in terms of controlling CCTV.  A 
number of CCTV control rooms are now co-located 
with police control rooms and although the CCTV 
operators are local authority staff, there is constant 
police access to the live images.
A number of local authority control rooms have the 
facility to run sensitive operations from rooms within 
the complex which allow the monitoring of cameras 
in isolation from the main bank of monitors and 
without the direct knowledge or involvement of the 
operators. The obvious application for such a facility 
would be a live anti-terrorist or other major crime 
operation. This might be a good point at which to ad-
dress some of the human rights and privacy issues!
The legislation affecting this area includes the 
Human Rights Act and also Data Protection Act.  It 
should be noted that there is no specific statutory 
provision for video surveillance in the UK. However, 
the legislation, including the Data Protection Act ap-
plies to anyone and is not limited to public bodies. 
Alongside this, as noted above, the national CCTV 
strategy envisages the development of a code of con-
duct covering all aspects of video surveillance and, in 
common with other states, the UK uses various tech-
nologies to protect private space from intrusive sur-
veillance.  For instance, the practice of greying out or 
obscuring those parts of the camera image that in-
volves private space is common to the Local Au-
thority owned systems. An example would be where 
there is residential property above retail or commer-
cial property on a High Street.  As a camera moves 
across its range of observation, as it takes in the pri-
vate areas, these are automatically obscured.  How-
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ever, there is scope to override this technology (with 
appropriate authority) for situations that demand it. 
Such situations would be restricted to serious crime 
including terrorism and require very high level 
authorisation. 
   
All premises covered by CCTV must carry signs that 
indicate the presence of CCTV and how to contact 
operators if desired. However, it would seem that 
cameras are now so ubiquitous that such signage is 
largely ignored. As noted already, work is ongoing 
with regard to a national strategy for CCTV usage. 
The relevant documents can be found on the UK 
Home Office website. At the time of writing, the 
newly elected coalition government has indicated its 
intention to increase the regulation of CCTV. This 
will affect the implementation of the National 
Strategy but, as yet, details of the enhanced regula-
tory framework are not known. 
There are already codes of conduct which apply to 
the operators monitoring the systems and these form 
the basis of the training they receive.  For the most 
part CCTV control rooms are themselves subject to 
video surveillance around the clock – an example of 
‘watching the watchers’! Furthermore, there is the 
practice of ‘lay visitors’ calling in to CCTV control 
rooms.  The scheme comes from that which operates 
in respect of the access to detained persons in police 
stations. Volunteers from the community are per-
mitted immediate access to the custody area and the 
opportunity to speak to prisoners to ascertain the 
conditions of their detention.  In a similar manner, 
volunteers can attend the CCTV control room, unan-
nounced, to speak to operators and to satisfy them-
selves that proper procedures are being followed.
There is, in all areas of public service provision, a 
drive to get citizens more actively engaged in the de-
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cision making process.  In the context of policing, 
this can be observed in a number of ways including, 
by way of example, the neighbourhood panels. This 
initiative which is part of the national Neighbour-
hood Policing approach, brings together individuals 
from across a local community to set priorities for 
policing and to hold the local police and partners to 
account for their performance against these priori-
ties. Such bodies can be the catalyst for the installa-
tion of CCTV systems.  
The public perception being largely positive regarding 
the potential benefits of video surveillance, such 
groups become campaigners for local schemes. It can 
even generate the possibly counter intuitive image of 
the police seeking to dampen the enthusiasm for 
CCTV, pointing out that its place is always within a 
broad package of measures to address an identified 
problem that has been properly researched. 
There is, over more recent years, an emerging 
groundswell of opinion in favour of caution though 
not outright opposition in respect of CCTV. This cau-
tion seems to be as much about cost versus the per-
ceived benefit as about the invasion of privacy. It 
should be seen to derive from the experience in situ-
ations where cameras were deployed without proper 
thought or without the resources to respond effec-
tively to what was observed; nothing more quickly 
diminishes the value of CCTV than the widespread 
perception that no one comes even if there is a crime 
taking place under the gaze of a camera.
As with any community safety or policing activity the 
task of evaluating the effectiveness of CCTV is a 
complex one. The assessment of performance 
against objectives is difficult if the objectives them-
selves are confused.  For instance, does ‘effective-
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ness’ mean prevention or detection?  Is there an in-
trinsic and measurable value in the perception of 
safety apparently engendered by CCTV? How are the 
effects of CCTV to be separated from any other inter-
vention that may have been put in place to counter 
an identified problem?  
There appears to be some evidence that CCTV can 
reduce crime and anti-social behaviour, although it 
is less certain that this effect is necessarily long term. 
There is some evidence that CCTV is of value in rela-
tion to major crime such as terrorism – even suicide 
bombings – perhaps more in relation to the curtail-
ment of the necessary reconnaissance planning 
phase that precedes an attack. 
There is perhaps somewhat more evidence that 
CCTV can provide valuable support for investigators. 
At its simplest, it provides often irrefutable evidence 
of conduct as well as identification evidence - it 
should be noted that research suggests that the exis-
tence of CCTV evidence leads to a high percentage of 
guilty pleas, obviating the need for a trial and re-
sulting a cost saving. Furthermore evidence suggests 
that where CCTV footage is shown, a more severe 
sentence is imposed. 
With regard to reassurance, again the picture is con-
fused.  The use of CCTV is so pervasive that in many 
situations it is ignored.  At the same time, there 
might be a question about its tendency to increase 
fear in those areas not covered. The human need for 
security is its own driver for demanding more and 
more reassurance be that a police officer on every 
corner or a camera on every lamppost!   
     
In conclusion, CCTV is a valuable tool in the com-
munity safety toolkit but it is not a self-contained 
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answer; it must be part of a planned, well-researched 
and coherent strategic response. Its effectiveness 
needs to be established according to the objectives 
behinds its implementation on a case by case basis. 
The objectives will vary across the spectrum of crime 
types and physical locations and therefore the evi-
dence of success will vary accordingly. 
Andrew Bayes
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LYON
number of inhabitants :
472,000 
number of cameras :		
219 
responsible authority : 
City of Lyon
 Video surveillance ethics committee, 
Lyon
    Ever since the city of Lyon decided to im-plement a CCTV system, it was also de-cided to set up an extra-municipal com-
mittee, named the collège d’éthique, or ethics 
committee. As the natural chairman of this com-
mittee, the mayor of Lyon delegated this mission to 
an independent agent, Jean-Pierre Hoss, member of 
the Council of State, who also filled the committee’s 
first term of office. For the second term of office he 
was replaced by Daniel Chabanol, honorary member 
of the Council of State, and former chairman of the 
administrative court of appeal of Lyon.
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The committee was formed with diversity in mind: 
besides the elected representatives of all political 
tendencies (including the opposition), other mem-
bers of “civil” society form part of the committee, 
including representative of associations, such as the 
Human Rights League, or qualified individuals in-
cluding an honorary President of the Bar of lawyers, 
and an honorary chief education officer of the 
Academy of Lyon. 
The official mission of the committee is based on 
three main themes:
➤ Drawing up and continuously updating a set of 
recommendations for video surveillance: work 
which was accomplished under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Hoss, but which must be resumed in order to 
take into account legislative developments with re-
gard to the issue. The aim of these recommenda-
tions, proposed by the elected representatives, is, 
while respecting legislative decrees, to define the 
complementary methods for capturing and using 
images for the purpose of increasing the guarantees 
for users of public space. Current discussions un-
derway (besides the insertion of new legislative 
norms) are focussed on the right of access to images 
and their potential use: can people who have been 
filmed obtain the right to access the images that 
concern them; by what means / which authorities 
can see the screens in “real time” and for what pur-
poses / who can access the recordings, and under 
what conditions? 
➤ Receiving complaints put forward by people who 
have been filmed, providing advice about keeping 
images and making any proposals to this end. It 
should be noted, of course, that this activity is mar-
ginal, as serious complaints of this sort are ex-
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tremely rare: by definition, people who might be 
filmed under questionable circumstances (for ex-
ample in a private space, in the event of a malfunc-
tioning of mechanisms that they disagree with), or 
whose images might be kept beyond the legal time 
limit, or might be seen by unauthorised persons, 
would not know that a breach or violation had been 
committed, and would therefore not have the chance 
to make a complaint...
➤ Creating a database of practices related to video 
surveillance, that are observed both in France and in 
other European countries. This objective is twofold: 
on one hand, this data must enable the issue of the 
usefulness of video surveillance to be dealt with in 
the most scientific way possible. We should point 
out that the city of Lyon - overseen by the ethics 
committee - has launched a university study dedi-
cated to this issue: a PhD student is carrying out re-
search within a strict university framework (Lyon-II 
and Geneva Universities), backed by financial sup-
port from the city, with full guarantees that the work 
will be carried as a completely independent univer-
sity study.
On the other hand, contacts linked with this data 
collection should eventually lead to the implemen-
tation of a network of municipalities, the idea being 
to create a sort of spin-off of the Lyon institution.
Beyond exercising these powers, it is essential to 
point out that the existence of the ethics committee 
and the exchanges that are fostered through its 
meetings, by diffusing an often heated debate, lead 
to a calm and peaceful discussion of a delicate sub-
ject. Obviously this is not to say that a “loose con-
sensus” takes the place of a necessary debate on an 
issue that is fundamental to society. This would not 
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 CCTV in Rotterdam: retaining an 
effective system, while managing expectations
    Rotterdam’s participation in the Efus project on camera surveillance fits in with our aim to improve our CCTV system. 
What options do we not yet use? What is the balance 
between technology and the ability of individuals to 
respond to all these incidents? How do you interpret 
the concept of privacy in public spaces?
This article discusses our experiences with camera 
surveillance in Rotterdam, the rules under which our 
camera surveillance operates and what particular is-
sues Rotterdam is still working on.
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be desirable, and it is not the case. The opposing 
parties are present and vigilant and there are con-
stant arguments between the enthusiasm of one 
side, and the restrictions of the other. But this en-
riches the discussion, much more than having static 
presentations from two fixed positions.  And that is 
the essential contribution that our ethics committee 
makes.
 
Manuel Magne
ROTTeRDaM
number of inhabitants :
589,615 
number of cameras :		
289 
responsible authority : 
The police
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Experiences
Every city is trying to get a grip on crime and public 
nuisance. Every city is seeking smart and efficient 
methods to increase safety. Every city can make use 
of technological innovations. Rotterdam is no excep-
tion. Camera surveillance aims to reduce public nui-
sance and crime and increase the sense of safety and 
security among its population. 
The very first cameras were installed in Rotterdam 
ten years ago. The immediate reason was the Euro 
2000 football tournament that year. It was important 
for the tournament to run smoothly, and this meant 
being able to obtain a clear picture of the atmosphere 
and incidents as they arose. Cameras were installed 
in the city centre to monitor the mass influx of 
supporters
The same year cameras were installed in Saftlevenk-
wartier, an area close to the central station. In this 
project the goal was to reduce and prevent violence 
and harassment problems on the street.
Since 2000 the number of cameras in public spaces 
has increased steadily to 300. In addition there are 
1600 camera’s to be found on public transport such 
as metros, trams and buses as well as stations. These 
cameras are owned, controlled and monitored by pri-
vate transport companies. When incidents occur, they 
can transmit images real time to the CCTV room.
Every application for camera surveillance is always 
accompanied by a detailed report, describing the 
number and type of incidents in the area and the cur-
rent safety situation. Each decision to install cam-
eras is considered very carefully. There is no point 
installing cameras willy-nilly. We must be genuinely 
convinced that it is a necessary tool to increase 
safety. 
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Camera surveillance is not a panacea for everything. 
In Rotterdam, however, it has developed to become 
the basic tool to ensure safety, such as in property 
and violent offences.
Violent offences, for example, are often committed 
on impulse, and often also under the influence of 
drugs and alcohol. The presence of cameras will 
probably not deter these offenders. However, camera 
surveillance does have its uses here. Police and the 
responsible bodies follows up all incidents and 
works on being on the spot as quickly as possible. 
Moreover, the images can be used effectively to pro-
vide evidence in court proceedings. 
Property offences are usually committed less impul-
sively. These include pick-pocketing or car bur-
glaries. If cameras have been installed and the police 
act quickly after a break-in or burglary, the offenders 
will tend not to target that area again. This can re-
duce the number of incidents.
Conditions
Ever since camera surveillance was introduced, the 
same question has been asked, which is also the 
theme of this European project: how can camera sur-
veillance be used in an ethical and democratic way? 
The more cameras there are, the more necessary it 
becomes to manage these aspects properly. 
Dutch law allows municipal councils to permit camera 
surveillance. If the council is in favour of camera sur-
veillance, it can give the mayor the authority to desig-
nate areas. The mayor’s decisions are made public 
and are then open to objection by local residents. Once 
the cameras begin recording images - and this is al-
ways the case in Rotterdam - the images are subject to 
the Police Data Act, which places stringent require-
ments on the use and exchange of these images.
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 From the very start, camera surveillance in Rot-
terdam has been based on a number of principles: 
All cameras are monitored live 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week. Images are always recorded. Local residents 
can expect that any incidents which occur will be 
noticed. 
Incidents observed must be followed up. Camera 
surveillance therefore means a considerable intensi-
fication of surveillance in a neighbourhood. Not only 
are there extra eyes permanently watching the area, 
but each incident requires a response by the police or 
other monitoring bodies. 
Points of attention
Many parties have been working hard in Rotterdam 
to make the city safer. Our people expect the local 
government to ensure a clean, decent and safe city. 
They see the problems in their street, outside their 
own homes. It is vital for the local council to live up 
to these expectations, and camera surveillance forms 
an indispensable tool in this task. 
This method in Rotterdam is expensive. It involves 
the costs of technology and maintenance, as well as 
the costs of extra personnel to monitor the images 
and take follow-up action. Rotterdam has studied 
what the limit is in the number of images that an in-
dividual can monitor simultaneously. This limit 
means that each area where a new camera is installed 
will also lead to recruitment of extra personnel. This 
remains a dilemma with each camera surveillance 
application.
The value of surveillance, however, is also signifi-
cant. Incidents which would otherwise not have been 
noticed, or where the burden of proof is complex, are 
now investigated. In 2009 the camera surveillance 
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department recorded 23,700 incidents. This is 65 
per day. We have to continue to weigh up these ben-
efits against the costs. 
The attitude of local people to camera surveillance 
has changed over the past ten years. Ten years ago 
the first cameras were accepted with a certain degree 
of mistrust. People were sceptical about the need for 
them. There was little confidence in the profession-
alism of the users, and concern about the breach of 
privacy. Now, ten years later, the attitude has changed 
dramatically. In fact, local people have become at-
tached to ‘their’ cameras. People increasingly say 
they want cameras in their neighbourhoods. An an-
nual surveys study has also shown in Rotterdam that 
there is a high level of confidence in camera surveil-
lance and that local people regard it as an effective 
tool.
Finally
Cameras have become a familiar feature of public 
spaces. In Rotterdam they have proven their worth at 
major events. We started using CCTV because of the 
EURO 2000 football tournament. It also proved its 
worth as we saw recently when there were some se-
rious disturbances at a large event. Thanks to camera 
images we were able to apprehend a large number of 
the rioters. 
Our experiences using CCTV have been positive in 
the last decade. The legal framework has developed 
to balance issues on civil rights and safety demands. 
We have built a strong organisation and manage-
ment structure. Operational processes are clear. We 
need to maintain our efforts in guarding this system 
in the upcoming years, but our mission will shift as 
new questions are rising. Those questions will be 
based on the increase in citizens support. We will 
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have to manage those high expectations. Also, we 
expect huge budget cuts caused by the economic 
crisis. Controlling the costs of CCTV, and main-
taining our current budget will be a challenging task 
and needs to be thought about very carefully.
Afke Besselink, Niels Wittersholt
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    Saint-Herblain is a French city of 45,000 inhabitants located in the inner suburbs of Nantes’ urban area (500,000 inhabitants). 
It is the second largest city of Nantes’ urban agglom-
eration and the third city in the Loire-Atlantique 
department. 
The CCTV system installation has been introduced 
by the mayor and senator, as well as elected repre-
sentatives at the beginning of the 1996-2002 term 
of office. The first cameras have been installed in 
1999. The city now has a system of 18 cameras. The 
city established its Urban Supervisory Control Centre 
(CSU according to its French acronym) in 2000, 
➤
SaINT-HeRBLaIN
number of inhabitants :
43,510 
number of cameras :		
18 
responsible authority : 
Saint-Herblain
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mandated by a decree issued by the prefect. This 
centre was initially supposed to be the CCTV man-
agement centre. Now it is used to manage simulta-
neously urban CCTV and the telesurveillance system 
and tends to become more and more a global urban 
management tool. 
In 1997, a security audit has been carried out by an 
outside agency. At the same time, the city Council 
Security Commission for Crime Prevention (CCPD 
according to the French acronym) was in charge of 
leading a discussion about security issues in the city 
of Saint-Herblain. This Commission handed its re-
port in to the mayor who decided to create several 
work groups about themes including those security 
issues. In 1999, the work groups’ reports were pre-
sented to the city Council. At the same time of this 
work within the CCPD, a questionnaire about secu-
rity was carried out with a sample group of Saint-
Herblain inhabitants, which revealed that security 
was their first concern. 
Thanks to all those diagnosis elements, the mayor 
introduced a debate within the city Council about the 
implementation of the CCPD suggestions, among 
them was CCTV. In June 1999, the city Council voted 
the CCTV system installation in Saint-Herblain and 
the creation of an ethic committee to accompany the 
project implementation. 
The city of Saint-Herblain set three main objectives 
for its CCTV system:
➤ Secure the places where the flows of goods and 
persons are most important, in order to reduce public 
highway offences; 
➤ Complement with technological means the crime 
prevention system existing (local police, prevention 
actions in schools); 
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➤ Reassure the inhabitants and enable the State po-
lice services to have at their disposal elements to 
clarify criminal acts. It was a double objective: in one 
hand assist the national police in the increase of 
clarified cases which was then very low, and on the 
other hand secure trading, industrial or large gath-
ering public spaces.
The CCTV system was introduced to increase secu-
rity for all the Saint-Herblain inhabitants. CCTV is 
understood as an additional tool integrated to the 
security and crime prevention local police. In this 
sense, the city’s Urban Supervisory Control Centre 
manages the CCTV and telesurveillance system, 
which ensures a greater reactivity of the local depart-
ments (local police, technical department etc…) and 
the national police and the gendarmerie. In this sense 
the Urban Supervisory Control Centre is truly an 
urban management tool. 
In terms of prevention and security, the local police 
has over twenty years of experience in Saint-Her-
blain. It always had the constant concern of pre-
venting first-crime or high-risk behaviours, consid-
ering that this is a fundamental step before any 
repressive posture. The will for prevention can be 
found through various tools such as: prevention ac-
tions in schools, situational prevention, local police 
interventions, and local regulation deeds concerning 
public space management. 
All the prevention actions are politically organised by 
the deputy mayor in charge of prevention and public 
and administrative security, within the Prevention 
and Public peace management, composed of 40 
agents. 
In this context, urban CCTV is one of the elements in 
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the global prevention and security policy. CCTV has 
been created in the strict respect of the regulation 
texts which govern individual liberties, especially re-
lated to the use and storage of images. The city’s will 
was to do it in all transparency towards the popula-
tion. For this purpose, several presentations and 
visits have been organized to allow the citizens to 
appreciate the guarantees offered regarding privacy. 
The system established is composed of 18 cameras. 
The CSU is composed of 14 agents and one person in 
charge of the CCTV system operation. Digital param-
eters enable to respect the prohibition of visualising 
private areas or making out an individual’s face fea-
tures. According to current regulation, sign posts are 
located in the city’s various access roads to inform 
citizens of the presence of cameras. 
The city’s CCTV images are transferred in real time 
to the National Police Information and Command 
Centre. 
The images can be consulted only when requested 
by the national police, in the case of a citizen’s com-
plain, or specific requests by state security. 
CCTV system has had a positive impact on security 
and on crime reduction in the watched spaces. How-
ever, no displacement of crime has been observed.  
An annual report is established on CSU activities 
(CCTV and telesurveillance). The operators have 
been trained by an external body on ethical aspects, 
on the environment, on the partnership and on re-
sponsibilities in terms of security. 
Dominique Talledec
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 The birth of CCTV in Sussex
    The use of public space CCTV in the County of Sussex dates back to 1993 when the first batch of 15 cameras were installed 
on the streets of Brighton, following a decision by 
Sussex Police and local authority partners to employ 
cameras for crime prevention, reduction and detec-
tion purposes. This initial installation was followed 
by further schemes in Brighton and other cities, 
towns and villages – financed by a combination of 
local authority funding and central government 
grants. From the outset, CCTV in Sussex developed 
➤
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through a close working relationship between police 
and local authorities, with monitoring rooms being 
established in police stations at Brighton, Haywards 
Heath, Bognor and Eastbourne, as well as five local 
authority monitoring facilities. At the same time, the 
principle of shared costs was adopted.
Central government initiatives to support CCTV 
growth continued in the shape of the 1994 CCTV 
Challenge competition, and the Crime Reduction 
Programme of 1999 to 2003. This process was given 
further –legislative - impetus through the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, which obliged public authorities 
to work together to tackle issues of criminality and 
anti social behaviour. As a result, by 2006, approxi-
mately 30 cities towns and villages across the County 
of Sussex had CCTV cameras, with 17 local authori-
ties and 1 housing association involved.
Thus, the Sussex CCTV Partnership was created. 
This relationship is now defined by separate legal 
contracts between Sussex Police and each local au-
thority, setting out operating protocols, roles and re-
sponsibilities, and financial arrangements. 
CCTV in Sussex today
Currently there are some 400 cameras across the 
county. These are a mixture of analogue pan-tilt-
zoom and dome cameras, linked to the various mon-
itoring rooms through a network of fibre transmis-
sion lines. The control, monitoring and recording 
platform is a newly installed digital system called “i-
Witness” – designed by Teleste, and installed by BT 
Redcare. This platform gives standard 2 frame-per-
second “background” recordings, as well as 25 
frame-per-second “real time” recording on selected 
pieces of footage. 
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In addition, “client” terminals have been placed in 
all major police stations and custody facilities, en-
abling local officers to have instant access to video 
footage for investigative purposes. 
This fully networked system allows control of all 
“live” camera images from any one of the monitoring 
rooms across the county, as well as immediate ac-
cess to historical footage at any one of the local 
“clients”. 
Benefits
Having a fully networked system gives us a number 
of business benefits.
1.Business continuity – the system is inherently re-
silient. Cameras can be operated from any one of the 
many “entry points” on the system, thus ensuring a 
continuity of service to the public.
2.Officer time savings – investigating officers at local 
stations have quick and easy access to the video 
footage they need for their investigations. This has 
eliminated time consuming journeys across the 
county to retrieve – by appointment – the necessary 
images. The net result is that officers are spending 
more time in their neighbourhoods, policing their 
communities. 
3.Environmental benefits – reduction in the number 
of car journeys required, thereby reducing carbon 
emissions, and saving in fuel costs.
4.Quicker justice – arrested suspects are now being 
confronted with video evidence at an early stage in 
the investigation, leading to fewer police bails, ear-
lier guilty pleas, and ultimately a better service to 
victims of crime. 
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5.Security of images – password protected access 
and fully audited through a system activity log en-
sures better control of sensitive data.     
Individual rights, privacy and the use of CCTV 
in Sussex 
The proper use of CCTV in the UK is governed by 3 
principle pieces of legislation, plus guidelines issued 
by the Information Commissioners Office. The Data 
Protection Act 1998, lays down 8 data protection 
principles, covering the fair processing of data, 
proper control of such data, the accuracy of all data 
retained, and proportionality in retention times of 
such data. The Human Rights Act 1998 adopts into 
UK law, the fundamental principles laid out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights – the right 
to privacy in article 8 being particularly relevant in 
regard to CCTV. The Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 sets out rules for the covert use of 
cameras, with stringent authority levels laid down.
In Sussex, all operators are trained to Security In-
dustry Authority standard. This training covers the 
relevant law, and operator responsibilities when 
using the cameras, as well as respect for equality and 
diversity.  In addition, a CCTV Code of Practice laying 
out best practice in terms of both operational and 
ethical use of CCTV, has been adopted. This Code of 
Practice has been shared between partners, and in 
conjunction with protocols between the police and 
local authorities, consistency and compatibility is 
ensured.
At the same time, all use of locally placed “client” ter-
minals is quality-assured through a programme of 
training to ensure proper use and handling of sensi-
tive video footage. Individual password with appro-
priate system access further guarantees proper usage. 
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Public confidence and accountability of police 
use of CCTV in Sussex
Accountability to the residents of Sussex is achieved 
through the twin processes of properly audited man-
agement meetings with all CCTV partners, and a 
ground breaking process  of  independent 
monitoring.
Partnership Management 
The Sussex CCTV Partnership involves a shared ap-
proach to the management and operation of public 
space cameras. Local authority owned cameras are 
operated by a combination of police staff at police 
stations and local authority staff at local authority 
monitoring rooms, and the costs for maintaining the 
system are shared. 
Regular quarterly meetings between Sussex Police 
CCTV management and local authority partners ad-
dress such issues as performance of the system, 
technical developments, financial matters and any 
perceived challenges that lay ahead. Through this 
means, police use of council owned cameras is held 
to account.
We are currently developing an agreed process to 
initiate new camera installations, to ensure consis-
tency of approach across the County of Sussex.  
Independent Monitoring  
In Sussex it has been recognised that it is essential to 
retain public confidence in the use of CCTV. An inde-
pendent process of monitoring and verifying police 
use of the cameras has now been adopted. Sussex 
Police Authority has recruited 12 members of the 
public to carry out “spot checks” on police moni-
toring facilities to ensure compliance with legislation 
and the Codes of Practice. These checks can take 
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place at any time of the day or night, without prior 
warning. Any issues raised, or concerns highlighted, 
are forwarded to the Police Authority and the CCTV 
Management. Publicly accessible police authority 
scrutiny meetings and annual reports ensure 
transparency.  
It is now proposed to extend this scheme to our local 
authority partner rooms    
  
Interestingly, the work with European partners 
through the Efus project has confirmed the validity 
and appropriateness of this scheme, and we in 
Sussex consider any such process to be an essential 
element in any future Charter of CCTV usage. 
The National CCTV Strategy and Sussex
The National CCTV Strategy was first published in 
October 2007 and presents the results of a wide 
ranging review of CCTV in England and Wales. Ini-
tially undertaken by a joint ACPO / Home Office 
project team, the Strategy is now supported by a 
multi agency programme board with representation 
from a number of stakeholders.
The Strategy supports and develops recommenda-
tions that will deliver:
1. effective, well managed CCTV, taking into account 
the role of the CCTV industry and the views of the 
public
2. best practice for partnerships between local au-
thorities, CCTV operators, police officers and the 
emergency services - offering better protection to the 
public both as a deterrent and in the investigation of 
crime
3. better standards in CCTV operation and in the 
presentation of imagery
Through the above outlined features the Sussex 
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CCTV Partnership seeks to adopt and implement 
each of these key elements, to ensure compatibility 
with nationally adopted best practice.
Christopher Ambler, Roger Fox
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 Video surveillance in the Veneto 
Region
    The region of Veneto in north-east Italy has an area of 18,400 km² and a popula-tion of almost five million, of which 7 % 
are of immigrant origin. The region is one of the 
country’s principal economic and industrial areas 
and is in the top 30 of European regions economi-
cally. It is also the Italian region that welcomes the 
greatest number of tourists, attracting more than 60 
million visitors a year. The region is divided in seven 
provinces and 581 communes; four fifths of these 
communes have a population smaller than 5,000 
inhabitants.
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According to general regional crime data, the past 
few years have seen a reduction in crime which is, 
however, accompanied by a growing feeling of inse-
curity, which has encouraged many local authorities 
to pursue the development of urban security policies. 
In 2002, the regional administration adopted a legal 
code (Law 9/2002) which supports and promotes an 
action plan for urban security. The Region wishes to 
create a ‘system’ intended to manage the complex 
problems that appear at a regional level in a coordi-
nated manner, within a collaboration between the 
different levels of government (State, Region, Prov-
ince, Commune) and the police forces (both national 
and local). 
The communes and provinces have thus been invited 
to develop integrated urban-security projects, which 
habe subsequently been examined and financed by 
the Region. During the last five years (2005-2009), 
278 projects have been approved, financed and put 
into action: many of them are video surveillance in-
stallation, either alone or alongside other initiatives. 
According to offcial data, 131 of these projects in-
volved the installation of video surveillance systems 
(almost one in two projects). 
In 2007, the Regional Security Monitoring Centre 
(the creation of which was intiated by the Regional 
Law No. 9, 2002, cited above) carried out its first en-
quiry into the number of CCTV systems in place and 
their effectiveness. Amongst the total of 581 com-
munes, 215 have responded to the enquiry and re-
sults have shown that funding by the Region was one 
of the main reasons encouraging the installation of 
these systems; the demand for video surveillance 
was seen to increase.  
In terms of the equipment chosen, more than 70% 
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of cases were digital video surveillance systems con-
sisting of more than three cameras. The places most 
frequently chosen for installation of cameras were 
primarily public car parks, crossroads, public parks 
and schools. In approximately 60% of cases these 
systems have contributed to a reduction in petty 
crime and public disorder, according to the local po-
lice commanders who responded to the question-
naire. However, it should be noted that in 21% of 
cases it has been observed that these illicit activities 
have been moved to other areas that are not covered 
by video surveillance.  
Another, specific project concerned the installation 
of cameras in the public transport of the Veneto Re-
gion’s principal towns and cities. Public transport 
systems appear to be exposed to several risk factors, 
such as vandalism, violence and petty crime while 
also being potential targets for terrorist attacks (as 
demonstrated by the tragic events in London and 
Madrid). It is for this reason that video surveillance 
systems were installed in urban transport networks 
and bus-stops throughout the Veneto region, in-
cluding obviously the city of Venice with its of va-
poretti (the “boat-buses”). 
The Region has thus played an important role in the 
motivation and coordination of video surveillance 
installations by the various local authorities and 
provinces. This has contributed significantly to 
growth in the use and diffusion of video surveillance 
in areas of high, urban concentration. Overall, the 
results appear to be positive, as shown by the expo-
nential increase in the putting in place of these 
technologies. 
Following the activities and experiences provided by 
the Efus project, it is now important to consider the 
role of regional authorities in the management of 
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urban security policies, particularly regarding video 
surveillance.
The role performed by the Veneto Region, as de-
scribed above, seems to be the most natural and 
widespread, as other regions have followed the same 
pattern, at least in the first phase. This involves 
granting subsidies in order to encourage investment 
by local authorities and the suggestion of analytical 
tools to identify, within a local project, the most ap-
propriate methods to put in place to tackle issues of 
urban security, given that the problems can be 
treated and resolved more easily if they are examined 
at the administrative level that is closest to the 
population. 
However, it is also possible to envisage a second 
phase, which must still be developed, in the course 
of which it can be anticipated that the Region would 
have a role of closer coordination of communes, in 
order to ensure a greater uniformity and better tech-
nical integration as otherwise these installations risk 
isolation, each one operating in its own limited terri-
tory. Equally, supplementary instruments can also 
be encouraged, aimed at facilitating participation 
and control, which have not yet received great in-
terest from local authorities, as they tend for the time 
being to focus on the strict, bureaucratic application 
of the standards set out by the organisation charged 
with the protection of privacy.  
In other terms, the coordination of the technologies 
employed by the local authorities should be ensured 
to allow greater efficiency and to guarantee imme-
diate and preventive action (through the use of other 
available databases and a better organisation of the 
service). In the mean time, these systems are often 
simply technical aids to police enquiries. 
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However, these technological tools must be sup-
ported by effective organisation of police services. To 
this end, the Veneto Region is currently reorganising 
the territorial partition of the local police forces (dis-
trettualizzazione), pooling together several com-
munes into units of at least 20,000 inhabitants, cor-
responding as far as possible to the organisational 
structure of the national police. This new division of 
territory allows the smallest communes to benefit 
from a full police service, in coordination with the 
national police and in turn guarantees faster inter-
ventions and actions of a preventive nature. It is only 
through prevention that the impact of video surveil-
lance can be optimised. 
At the same time, it is necessary to increase citizen 
involvement in communities and citizen awareness 
of the utility of video surveillance cameras (which, 
though somewhat invasive, are in general well ac-
cepted in the Region) and the benefits of civic sur-
veillance. The importance of cooperation should also 
be highlighted as part of the fight against the phe-
nomena of degradation and urban disorder by con-
tributing to the maintenance and reinforcement of 
the social networks, which represent the structure of 
all life in civilised society and are therefore also an 
indispensable reference for the police. 
The role that the Region can play in this domain can 
include the formulation of legal guidance (declara-
tion of laws and appropriate regulations) as well as a 
financial role (directing the flow of funding towards a 
better technological integration according to shared 
standards). The Region is also committed to sup-
porting local administrations, by providing direction 
and directives, helping them to establish urban se-
curity systems, including the installation of CCTV 
systems, within a coordinated approach that involves 
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citizens. In this sense, the Region’s activities could 
aid the evolution of the concept of security, in which 
video-protection constitutes but one part of the mea-
sures taken.
Giorgio Vigo
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➤Conclusion
 Towards a use of video surveillance 
respectful of individual freedoms
    In 2008, more than 50% of the world population was living in cities, and the trend is towards greater mobility between 
urban areas. Consequently, there is an intensifica-
tion of urban phenomena, and that is also mani-
fested in terms of security. In this context, video sur-
veillance is certainly a technological instrument but 
it also illustrates a form of social collaboration 
between the different institutions and administra-
tions. 
It poses several challenges that this project wished 
to examine in greater depth:
1.The relations between video surveillance, a tech-
nological tool, and the human factor controlling it. It 
is not the technology in itself that presents risks, but 
the use made of it; the risk that its potentialities be 
diverted must be monitored, beginning with the in-
stallation of the systems, both by technical measures 
and by a political engagement.  
2.A video surveillance system can also be thought of 
as an intelligent terminal, not only for the retrieval of 
images, but also in terms of reorganisation of the 
city’s different resources. It can facilitate the work of 
city agents, but that calls for responses that are less 
generic and better adapted to needs. So the question 
of security can benefit from greater visibility based 
on better information for citizens. 
3.The small number of studies carried out to the 
present day with regard to the effectiveness of video 
surveillance has shown that the results obtained by 
this technology must be put in correlation with the 
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particular context in which the cameras are sup-
posed to intervene. That means taking into account 
the nature and size of the territory, the population as 
well as the need that must be identified through se-
curity audits. Experts and professionals have unani-
mously recognised that video surveillance is not the 
panacea that might solve all of a city’s security issues 
but must be considered an instrument amongst 
others in the framework of an overall security policy. 
A balance must therefore be struck between the use 
of tools other than those the decision-makers have 
put at their disposal. It is also important not to limit 
oneself to the use of a single instrument, for the real 
effectiveness of a security policy depends on the 
complementarity of the tools implemented and the 
capacity to contribute coordinated responses adapted 
to every situation.
4.The quest for effectiveness is also translated by the 
possibility of integrating different video surveillance 
systems on public land. In certain cities, there are in 
fact several systems that are operated by different 
players. This possibility of integrating systems, 
which presupposes better sharing of information, 
does not apply only at the local level but also the re-
gional and metropolitan levels. It could take the form 
of ‘transversal’ pacts between governments, regions 
and municipalities or, when legislation permits, 
public-private partnerships, in particular when it 
comes to the surveillance of semi-public spaces. 
Even then, it is necessary to define strict, precise 
protocols for sharing information in view of respect 
for the protection of personal data and private life. At 
the same time, crossing video surveillance with other 
information systems and databases, which is in the 
process of becoming technically possible, is double-
edged. Even though this increases the systems’ sur-
veillance capability, the principle of necessity im-
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poses a rigorous justification for the need to 
accumulate and connect so much information on 
individuals. 
Finally,  the transversal question examined through 
all these subjects has been to see how far one can go 
to ensure citizens’ security without, for all that, in-
terfering with their private life. Does the right to inti-
macy on public land exist? Up to what point? To 
what degree can the right to security affect other fun-
damental rights such as the freedoms of speech, as-
sociation and demonstration? 
These issues have been addressed through the prism 
of the inhabitants of the cities, during these 18 
months of European cooperation. The partners 
placed the citizen at the centre of their concerns. The 
citizens indeed need to feel safe at home but this 
does not mean that they want to renounce to their 
right to the protection of their image. As guarantors 
of citizens’ well-being, the political deciders must 
therefore consider this question a constant concern 
and weigh these different aspects. The balance in the 
way in which the demands for security and for the 
right to anonymity varies from one country to an-
other, from one city to the next. In examining public 
policies as regards public perceptions, this project 
set itself the goal of reinforcing the citizens’ place 
and information within the framework of the use of 
video surveillance systems, with a concern for trans-
parency that is indispensable to a democratic set-
ting-up of public policies.
Does the urban population seek video surveillance or 
not? Is this the response adapted to the fears ex-
pressed? Does it correspond to the budget available? 
What training and what means of control and re-
course are conceivable?
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How do citizens voice their request for or refusal of 
video surveillance? In what way are they informed 
and associated in the various steps of implementing 
a video surveillance policy? How do these measures 
influence the perceptions of citizens and the behav-
iour of victims and potential perpetrators? 
These are all questions that the project partners 
asked themselves and to which they tried to provide 
responses, as much in the form of illustration of their 
practices as in the form of recommendations. The re-
sult of these interrogations and of this search for so-
lutions is translated by the Charter for the Democratic 
Use of Video Surveillance, a document that attests to 
the cities’ political will. These cities pledge to make 
use of video surveillance in respect of the funda-
mental rights of citizens and in full transparency vis-
à-vis the decision-making process. 
It is to go in this direction that the first signatories of 
the Charter, the Mayor of Rotterdam (Netherlands), 
the president of the European Forum and Mayor of 
Matosinhos (Portugal) as well as the president of the 
French Forum and mayor of Saint-Herblain (France) 
invite Mayors from other cities to join them and take 
part in this initiative.
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